Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Boberts:We have before us a case in which the Commonwealth’s evidence is far from overwhelming. No one saw the defendant actually strike the decedent, nor is it inconceivable that her death was not caused by criminal conduct at all. Thus, although I agree with the majority that there is enough circumstantial evidence to sustain a verdict of guilty, I nevertheless believe that this is precisely the case where the trial judge’s instructions to the jury must be most carefully prepared and the language most carefully chosen. Unfortunately, I believe that some of the language used *234in this charge was quite poorly chosen, and only reluctantly must I concur in the majority’s ultimate conclusion that the charge as a whole was not reversible error under our Act of May 23, 1887, P. L. 158, §10, 19' P.S. §631 or under Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S. Ct. 1229 (1965).
It is to me extremely unfortunate that the court below, rather than relying on the myriad of well established and long accepted charges on the defendant’s right to remain silent,* instead decided to strike out on its own and instruct the jury that the defendant may- choose not to testify “for any undisclosed reason.” And even more distressing is the fact that the majority of this Court has seen fit to endorse such language as both fair and proper. Indeed, there are times in the law when trial courts should at least be cautioned if not actually reversed; This, I believe, is one of those times.
, Of course, I certainly do not wish to stultify judicial initiative or creativity in seeking to clarify instructions to make them more understandable and more helpful to the jury. What gives me concern is the unnecessary and suggestive use of “for any undisclosed reason” which adds nothing to. the clarity, impartiality or fairness of the charge, but instead introduces the risk of setting the jury to speculating as to why the defendant did not take the stand. When it is considered just how influential a.trial judge’s remarks to a jury can be, and when it is further considered how fine is the line between an instruction on a man’s right not to testify and a judicial “hint” that this failure to speak may indicate guilt, I can never encourage a jury charge such as the une here given. To recall the old *235adage, these instructions are like “milking the cow and then kicking oyer the bucket.”
Mr. Justice Jones and Mr. Justice Eagen join in this concurring opinion.See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kloider, 378 Pa. 412, 106 A. 2d 820, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 875, 75 S. Ct. 112 (1954); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 275 Pa. 137, 118 Atl. 667 (1922).