concurring. Agreeing with the result that they have reached, I have difficulty with the majority’s interpretation of the facts. It is uncontroverted that by the terms of his employment, defendant’s agent Wiberg was to make collections, render services and solicit new business *249in an assigned and specifically delineated debit area, six or seven miles from his home. Further, Wiberg was to perform these duties in accordance with a work schedule arranged and altered by him at will.
It seems to me, therefore, that the curtailment of his duties, apparently shortly after noon, in fayor of paying a visit at the funeral parlor- and having lunch at home, constituted termination of a work period rather than a deviation from the scope of his employment. So considered, Wiberg’s status at the time of the accident was no different than it would have been had the accident occurred when he was en route to the debit area in the morning.
The question to be resolved then, it seems to me, is: Would the jury have been warranted in finding that Wiberg entered the scope of his employment on leaving home for either the office in Johnston or the debit area in which he worked? On the facts of this case, I think not.
■ They conclusively establish that in acting on behalf of defendant, Wiberg was limited to an assigned debit area, but as to how he would reach it, defendant assumed no responsibility. In such case, Wiberg’s travel to and from his debit area was no more within the scope of his employment than is the daily travel between home and work common to most employees.