concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to affirm the damages award entered by the trial court. Although Columbus undeniably committed bad acts during the bidding process, I believe that the trial court's damages award to Liberty was simply too speculative. I agree with the trial court's conclusion that "[it a impossible to know what the precise contractual arrangement would have been between Liberty and the State had Columbus not acted as it did." Appellant's App. p. 70.
Although I appreciate the trial court's attempt to serve equity and right the wrongs committed by Columbus, there is simply no way of knowing what would have happened if Columbus had behaved properly, been eliminated sooner, or not been *100involved at all. No representative of the IDOA testified that if Columbus had been eliminated sooner, the contract would have been awarded to Liberty at its First BAFO price with the negotiated omission of the employment clauses. The only evidence supporting the damages award was McParland's testimony. McParland, however, merely made a series of calculations based on different sets of assumptions. The trial court selected the calculation based upon Liberty's First BAFO, but I believe that decision requires speculation to an untenable degree. Thus, in my opinion, the decision to award Liberty damages based on its First BAFO is simply not supported by sufficient evidence in the ree-ord.
I also believe that the result reached by the majority leads to bad public policy. No one held a gun to Liberty's proverbial head and forced it to lower its bid. Liberty chose to do so. Admittedly, its decision was based on faulty, likely fraudulent, information, but it was a choice, nonetheless. Liberty is essentially arguing that but for Columbus's misrepresentations, the taxpayers of Indiana would have had to pay significantly more money for Liberty's services than they did following the Second BAFO. As a matter of public policy, I do not believe we should award damages to a company that decided it was able and willing to lower its bid on a project-even if that decision was based on a competitor's fraud.
As an aside, I note that at oral argument, Columbus admitted that Liberty sustained some damages as a result of Columbus's misrepresentations. Specifically, Columbus conceded that Liberty was damaged to the extent of the cost of preparing and submitting the Second BAFO. I agree that Liberty sustained those damages because of Columbus's fraudulent statements. Unfortunately, Liberty presented no evidence of those damages at trial. Therefore, there is no way to calculate Liberty's costs in this regard.
I concur with the majority's conclusion that the Crime Victims Relief Act applies herein. Therefore, I would reverse the damages award, order nominal damages of $1 to Liberty, treble those damages pursuant to the Crime Victims Relief Act for a total award of $3, and affirm the trial court's award of $473,468.04 for Liberty's attorney fees and litigation expenses.