(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. We previously held that when a warrant is executed in violation of Minn.Stat. § 626.14 (2006), the evidence obtained as a result of the search will not be suppressed when the violation is technical in nature. State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833, 839-11 (Minn.1978). Because *181I conclude that the facts in this case are similar to those in Lien, I would affirm the court of appeals and deny suppression of the evidence.
I.
The State does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that the nighttime search warrant was defective. The State argues, rather, that the evidence obtained should not be suppressed despite the defect. The majority holds that the evidence must be suppressed not only because of the statutory violation, but also because the search violated Jackson’s constitutional rights. In so holding, the majority attempts to distinguish, but does not overrule, our holding in Lien. I disagree with the majority’s analysis of that case as it pertains to the facts now before us.
In Lien, the police obtained a search warrant authorizing a nighttime search despite failing to make a particularized showing that a nighttime search was necessary either to preserve evidence or to protect the safety of the officers executing the warrant. 265 N.W.2d at 836. Upon observing several people enter and leave the defendant’s home and observing the defendant enter the home, the officers executed the warrant shortly after 9 p.m. Id. Despite being unable to see inside the home because the curtains were drawn, the officers entered the slightly open door and conducted a search, finding and seizing illegal drugs and other evidence. Id. Although we concluded that a nighttime search should not have been authorized, we held that the evidence obtained in the search was admissible. Id. at 840-41.
Our decision not to suppress the evidence was based on our conclusion that the error was not of a constitutional nature. Id. at 841. In support of this conclusion, we noted that “the intrusion was not the kind of nighttime intrusion — with people being roused out of bed and forced to stand by in their night clothes while the police conduct the search — that our statutory rule against nighttime execution of search warrants is primarily designed to prevent.” Id. We further stated, “[I]t is significant that, although the warrant was executed in the nighttime, it was executed at a reasonable hour when most people are still awake.” Id. We therefore concluded that “while there was a technical violation of our statute, the violation was not of a constitutional nature,” and the exclusionary rule should not be applied. Id. at 840-41.
Similar to Lien, in this case the police approached Jackson’s home with a defective nighttime search clause in a search warrant. Also similar to Lien, the police did not rouse Jackson or her children out of bed; they were awake, fully clothed, and seated at the kitchen table. Furthermore, 9:25 p.m. is “a reasonable hour when most people are still awake.” Id. at 841; cf. Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(a)(2)(B) (defining “[djaytime” hours, for purposes of executing search warrants, as 6 a.m. to 10 p-m.).1 Because MinmStat. § 626.14 only allows searches until 8 p.m. absent a particularized showing, there is no question that the officers violated the statute. But, as in Lien, the less than an hour-and-a-half technical violation does not warrant suppression.
The majority distinguishes Lien based on the fact that “the police had no basis to believe that Jackson had not yet entered [a] period of nighttime repose,” an interest that the majority determines section *182626.14 is designed to protect. While I agree that the police had more information regarding the state of the home’s occupants in Lien before executing the warrant than was available here, I do not agree that such a distinction is relevant, much less dispositive, in this case.
The majority cites no rule or case law that precludes the State from introducing evidence regarding the state of the home’s occupants at the time of execution of a warrant. In Lien> we made an objective inquiry, considering all of the relevant facts and circumstances concerning the effect of the unlawful nighttime search on the occupant. 265 N.W.2d at 841. In that case, it just so happened that most of those facts and circumstances came to light before the police entered the home. Nevertheless, our inquiry concerns the effect of the unlawful nighttime search on the occupants of the home, regardless of police knowledge. Here, it is the facts that came to light at the time of execution of the warrant that justify not suppressing the evidence, and in the absence of some clear prohibition on consideration of such evidence, the evidence should be considered. For purposes of suppression under section 626.14, the question of when the police learned that Jackson and her children were not roused from sleep is not as relevant as the fact that Jackson and her children were not roused from sleep.
We also emphasized in Lien that the error committed was attributable to the magistrate, not to the police, and that the police acted in “good faith.” 265 N.W.2d at 840. Indeed, as is recognized by the majority, section 626.14 is directed at police conduct. The majority’s desire to avoid “encourag[ing] the police to play the odds by ignoring the statutory timeframe” is commendable and a worthwhile goal, but it is irrelevant to this case because the police actually obtained a warrant authorizing a nighttime search. As we noted in Lien, “[ljittle more can be expected of a police officer who gathers evidence, presents it to a magistrate, and receives a warrant.” Id. at 840 n. 1 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496, 96 S.Ct. 3087, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring)).
If different facts are posited, e.g., the occupants of the home are asleep at the time the warrant is executed, the warrant does not authorize a nighttime search, or there is evidence of what the majority fears might happen — that the police are “play[ing] the odds” in ignoring the statutory requirements — there is little doubt the analysis would change as well. But those are not our facts; here, as in Lien, the facts support a conclusion that, at most, we have a technical violation of section 626.14, and I would therefore affirm the court of appeals.
II.
I would dismiss Jackson’s constitutional argument on the basis of Lien, where we stated that the error of conducting an unauthorized nighttime search under section 626.14 in that case was not of a “constitutional nature.” 265 N.W.2d at 841. We concluded that execution of the warrant did not violate the defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because the warrant was executed at a reasonable hour and the search did not entail the type of police conduct that section 626.14 was designed to prevent: rousing people out of bed and making them stand by in their night clothes while the search is conducted. Id. For the same reasons, I would hold that the police conduct in this case was not of a constitutional nature and suppression is consequently not warranted under the Fourth Amendment.
*183But even if I disagreed with our constitutional analysis in Lien, I would reject the majority’s constitutional analysis here. First, it is unclear to me why the majority addresses the constitutional issue at all once it concludes that the statutory violation warrants suppression. We avoid constitutional rulings if an issue can be decided on other grounds. See State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 926 (Minn.2006); In re Senty-Haugen, 583 N.W.2d 266, 269 n. 3 (Minn.1998) (“It is well-settled law that courts should not reach constitutional issues if matters can be resolved otherwise”). The majority notes “the likely recurrence of this issue,” which further justifies exercising judicial restraint. I would wait until the constitutional question is squarely presented before discussing or deciding it.2
Regarding the substance of the constitutional analysis, the majority correctly notes that “the Supreme Court has never held that a nighttime search implicates the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” See United States v. Rizzi, 434 F.3d 669, 675 (4th Cir.2006). The cases relied on by the majority in which federal circuit courts have held that a nighttime search violates the Fourth Amendment involved searches pursuant to a warrant that either prohibited a nighttime search or did not explicitly authorize such a search. See O’Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 F.2d 1465 (10th Cir.1989) (where the warrant did not authorize a nighttime search); United States ex ret. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 896 (3d Cir.1968) (where the warrant only authorized a daytime search); United States v. Merritt, 293 F.2d 742 (3d Cir.1961) (where the warrant only authorized a daytime search). In its reliance on these authorities, the majority overlooks the point I emphasized above: the police in this case acted pursuant to a warrant authorizing a nighttime search.
III.
Even if I agreed that the nighttime search violation in this case implicates the Fourth Amendment, the question before us today is whether the evidence obtained must be suppressed.3 Not every Fourth Amendment violation requires application of the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that the exclusionary rule applies “only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its ‘substantial social costs.’ ” Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363, 118 S.Ct. 2014, 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 907, 104 S.Ct. 3405). The exclusionary rule is not “a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved” but is “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974).
The majority summarily concludes that suppression of the evidence in this case will have an “appreciable deterrent effect” on police misconduct but fails to demonstrate why that is so. The failure to comply with the nighttime search warrant statute in this case was attributable to the *184judge who issued the warrant, not to the police, and courts do not consider the deterrent effect of suppression on judges and magistrates for purposes of determining whether the exclusionary rule should be applied. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 916-17, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (explaining that the exclusionary rule is not intended to deter the mistakes of judges and magistrates).
The Court in Leon explained that there is rarely a significant deterrent effect when an officer acts in good faith within the scope of a warrant:
In most such cases, there is no police illegality and thus nothing to deter. It is the magistrate’s responsibility to determine whether the officer’s allegations establish probable cause and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate’s probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. “[Ojnce the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law.”
Id. at 920-21, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (quoting Powell, 428 U.S. at 498, 96 S.Ct. 3037 (Burger, C.J., concurring)).
As the majority correctly observes, an officer’s reliance on a judge’s mistaken determination must be objectively reasonable, and this standard requires that the officer have “reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits.” Id. at 919-20 n. 20, 104 S.Ct. 3405. We have held that facts in an affidavit revealing that the defendant is involved in drug-related activity can justify inclusion of a nighttime search provision in a warrant. See Bourke, 718 N.W.2d at 928-29 (nighttime search authorization was valid where the affidavit indicated that defendant, who was aware that the police knew of his activities, was at large and could destroy evidence on his property before morning); State v. Saver, 295 Minn. 581, 582, 205 N.W.2d 508, 508-09 (1973) (nighttime search authorization was valid where the affidavit stated that a witness had seen the defendant selling drugs).
In declaring that the only justification provided to the court in support of the nighttime authorization was the officer’s statement that “[t]his investigation has led your affiant into the nightime [sic] scope of search warrant,” the majority fails to consider the officer’s affidavit in its entirety. The supporting affidavit stated that Jackson’s boyfriend had dropped off methamphetamine at Jackson’s home and that Jackson was selling methamphetamine from there. Because, as explained above, evidence of drug-related activity in a supporting affidavit can justify inclusion of a nighttime search provision in a warrant, it was reasonable for the officers to rely on the judge’s conclusion that the evidence justified the nighttime search authorization. Although the State concedes, and I agree, that the information contained in the affidavit was an insufficient basis for the authorization of the nighttime search, it was sufficient to make it objectively reasonable for the officers to rely on the judge’s determination.
Even if I believed that the nighttime search violation in this case implicates the Fourth Amendment, I would conclude that suppression of the evidence is not required because suppression would not deter wrongful police activity and because the officers reasonably relied on the judge’s authorization of the nighttime search.
I would affirm our holding in Lien that a technical violation of Minn.Stat. § 626.14 does not implicate a defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, and even if Jackson’s Fourth Amendment rights were *185implicated in this case, I would hold that the exclusionary rule does not apply.
. The majority emphasizes that the search in this case took place in "Jackson’s Minnesota home at 9:25 p.m. on December 11 when it would have been dark for several hours.” Why this is relevant is not clear.
. Furthermore, by addressing the constitutional question after resolving the case on statutory grounds, the majority risks that the last 12 pages of its opinion will be read as mere dicta.
. As an aside, I agree with the majority’s recognition that the Supreme Court's decision in Hudson v. Michigan, - U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006), is inapplicable to the suppression issue before us.