specially concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ claims survive only if they have pled sufficient facts to invoke the discovery rule. I also agree that the trial court did not err in exercising subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims. I disagree with the majority’s reasoning leading to its conclusion that plaintiffs’ complaints fail to invoke the discovery rule. I find that an ingenuous review of the pleadings under the applicable standard of review must lead to the conclusion that the allegations of plaintiffs’ complaints are sufficient to invoke the discovery rule and, therefore, that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaints. Accordingly, I dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion.
The majority’s reasoning is flawed in two respects. First, it mistakenly concludes that the case at bar is “on all fours with Clay.” 367 Ill. App. 3d at 155. The majority completely fails to engage in the comparison of the allegations at issue in Clay and those involved here that is necessary to reach such a conclusion and instead expands Clay’s holding beyond its clearly stated reach. Second, the majority’s analysis virtually ignores the well-pled allegations in plaintiffs’ complaints.
Turning first to the majority’s mistaken reliance on Clay, its only basis for the conclusion that these two cases are “on all fours,” and for affirming the dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaints, seems to me to be the fact that in each case, the plaintiffs alleged that they did not realize that the defendants’ conduct caused them to suffer injuries for many years after reaching majority. However, closer scrutiny of the factual allegations in Clay and of those in the case at bar in support of that assertion is not only warranted, it is crucial; because, as the majority correctly noted, whether plaintiffs’ complaints survive depends on whether plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts to invoke the discovery rule. That is, the inquiry for purposes of this appeal is whether the instant plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that they did not know nor reasonably should have known of their injuries or that they were wrongfully caused (see Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 415, 430 N.E.2d 976, 980 (1981) (“the statute starts to run when a person knows or reasonably should know of his injury and also knows or reasonably should know that it was wrongfully caused”)) “ ‘until 2002 when [they] heard of pedophile priest litigation involving other priests and dioceses and began to realize that [their] own experiences may been victimization [sic] possibly having a causal relation to [their] emotional and psychological disturbances’ ” (367 Ill. App. 3d at 151). I also note, and will address in greater detail below, that the inquiry is whether plaintiffs have made sufficient allegations, not provided conclusive proof, of the proposition stated above.
Clay may have held that “ ‘Illinois law presumes an intent to harm and a resulting injury’ from sexual abuse of a minor” (367 Ill. App. 3d at 156, quoting Clay, 189 Ill. 2d at 611), but that is not the same as saying that Illinois law presumes the injured party knows he was injured by sexual abuse. If such a presumption existed under Illinois law, the Clay court would not have needed to find that “the plaintiff had sufficient information about her injury and its cause to require her to bring suit long before the date of discovery alleged in the complaint.” Clay, 189 Ill. 2d at 610, 727 N.E.2d at 221. The knowledge of her injury would have been imputed to her regardless of what information she possessed. Thus, Clay does not stand for the general proposition, found by the majority, that the assertion by plaintiffs that they did not perceive the wrongfulness of sex between an adult and a minor is unreasonable as a matter of law. Rather, Clay’s holdings is based on an examination of the allegations of the plaintiffs complaint in that case as it related to what she knew and when she knew it. The court found, based on the allegations in the complaint, that the plaintiff in Clay knew the abuse occurred and that it was harmful. Clay, 189 Ill. 2d at 613, 727 N.E.2d at 223. The plaintiff did not deny this, but sought to invoke the discovery rule because “she did not discover, until years later, the full extent of the injuries she allegedly sustained.” (Emphasis added.) Clay, 189 Ill. 2d at 613, 727 N.E.2d at 223. The court declined to apply the discovery rule because “[t]here is no requirement that a plaintiff must know the full extent of his or her injuries before suit must be brought under the applicable statute of limitations.” Clay, 189 Ill. 2d at 611, 727 N.E.2d at 222.
Here, plaintiffs claim they did not realize the wrongfulness of defendants’ actions at all until hearing of other cases of sexual abuse against minors involving priests. The majority notes that “[t]here is no allegation in plaintiffs’ complaints that defendants or anyone tried to convince the plaintiffs, after they reached their majority, that sex between a priest and a child is not wrongful but, rather, beneficial to the child’s growth.” 367 Ill. App. 3d at 157. No one had to. Defendants, according to plaintiffs’ allegations, imprinted that belief — cruelly and effectively — on plaintiffs as minors; and they continued to believe those teachings until scores of others stepped forward to say defendants were wrong.
The Clay court relied heavily on the fact that, there, “[t]he plaintiff [did] not contend *** that she was not aware that [the alleged abuser’s] misconduct was harmful.” (Emphasis added.) Clay, 189 Ill. 2d at 613, 727 N.E.2d at 223. Here, on the contrary, plaintiffs clearly alleged that they “lacked sophistication *** to perceive psychological or emotional harm or injury proximately resulting” from defendants’ behavior. Plaintiffs also alleged they “did not, in fact, begin to perceive the wrongfulness of the conduct of defendant^] *** until 2002.” The allegations in the instant case are different from those in Clay. I do not find, and the majority does not offer, a basis for extrapolating the Clay court’s narrow holding to other cases.
Not only is Clay factually distinguishable, the scope of its holding is explicitly limited to the facts of that case. See Clay, 189 Ill. 2d at 610, 727 N.E.2d at 221 (“We believe that the circumstances alleged in this case allow this issue to be resolved as a matter of law” (emphasis added)). Certainly Clay, which draws its holding singularly from the meaning of and reasonable inferences to be drawn from the factual allegations in that case, does not provide the proper foundation for a general proposition of law that adults who suffer childhood sexual abuse know instantly — one might say magically — upon attaining 18 years of age that the abuse was harmful and resulted in an injury. Here, unlike Clay, plaintiffs’ factual allegations directly contradict the conclusion that they were aware that their psychological injuries were caused by the alleged abuse.
Further, I find the majority’s dismissal of the reasonableness of plaintiffs’ allegations as to when they first began to perceive the harm of defendants’ conduct to be inappropriate. Plaintiffs’ factual allegation, taken as true (Salisbury v. Majesky, 352 Ill. App. 3d 1188, 1190, 817 N.E.2d 1219, 1221 (2004)), is that they were repeatedly assured that sex between a priest and a child is not wrongful but is, indeed, beneficial to the child’s growth. This factual allegation supports plaintiffs’ conclusion that they did not perceive the wrongfulness of defendants’ conduct until hearing of other litigation involving priests. Plaintiffs’ allegations are not clearly unreasonable.
“A motion to dismiss accepts *** all reasonable inferences favorable to the nonmoving party which can be drawn from those facts.” Album Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 87 Ill. App. 3d 338, 344, 408 N.E.2d 1041, 1046 (1980). The majority finds that plaintiffs’ allegations “do not lead to a reasonable inference sufficient to invoke the discovery rule.” 367 Ill. App. 3d at 157. I agree that it is reasonable to infer that plaintiffs knew that what they suffered from defendants was wrong. However, I believe that a reasonable inference which can also be drawn from plaintiffs’ complaints, read in their entirety and in plaintiffs’ favor, is that they, unlike the plaintiff in Clay, were not aware the misconduct was harmful to them. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant priests repeatedly assured them that their teachings (that their conduct was not harmful but was in fact beneficial) were “perfect and infallible and superior to imperfect human laws.” One could reasonably infer that plaintiffs believed the alleged teachings of their faith.
Further, to say, as the majority’s holding suggests, that plaintiffs’ allegations are per se unreasonable simply because they, at some point, became adults would effectively obliterate the discovery rule for adult plaintiffs in cases such as these. The majority would find that their causes of actions accrued on an arbitrary date established as “adulthood” rather than when they actually knew or reasonably should have known of their injury and that it was wrongfully caused. The discovery rule protects against such “mechanical application of the statute of limitations” and the “harsh consequences” that could result from barring plaintiffs’ from bringing suit before they even knew they were injured. Golla v. General Motors Corp., 167 Ill. 2d 353, 360, 657 N.E.2d 894, 898 (1995).
Moreover, “[i]f there is a disputed question of fact about when an injured party knows or reasonably should have known of his injury and that it was wrongfully caused, it is to be resolved by the finder of fact.” (Emphasis added.) Holladay v. Boyd, 285 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 1012, 675 N.E.2d 262, 266 (1996), citing Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hospital, 46 Ill 2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970). Here, a question of fact remains as to when plaintiffs discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, that their injuries were caused by the alleged abuse. In Clay, no question existed as to when the plaintiff discovered her injury or that it was caused by the abuse. The court found, based on the plaintiffs own allegations, that she always knew. See Clay, 189 Ill. 2d at 610.
I understand that the majority believes that it is unreasonable for adults to not know they were harmed by what happened to plaintiffs. But resolving the motion to dismiss in plaintiffs’ favor would not equate to finding plaintiffs were in fact reasonable in failing to discover either their injuries or the causal relationship between those injuries and the alleged abuse. The determination of the objective reasonableness of plaintiffs’ allegations as to their subjective beliefs and perceptions should be made by the trier of fact, not the majority. See Boyd, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 1012, 675 N.E.2d at 266. Thus, permitting plaintiffs to proceed with their cause of action would not “ ‘create a subjective standard by which accrual of a cause of action would have to be measured.’ ” 367 Ill. App. 3d at 157, quoting Clay, 189 Ill. 2d at 613.
The majority cites no case law — other than its misreading of Clay — that actually says that it is objectively unreasonable for an adult not to recognize that a childhood sexual abuse they may have suffered was harmful. That allegations seems especially reasonable where, as here, plaintiffs were told that what they experienced was beneficial in spite of their “innate but inferior and inadequately informed sense of propriety or rectitude,” an allegation, I note, not present in Clay. The majority’s finding necessarily ignores the potentially long-term effects of childhood psychological trauma and the effects of defendants’ manipulation of plaintiffs.
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that whether plaintiffs’ causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations is not clear from the pleadings and reverse the trial court’s order dismissing them.