A landlord appeals from three orders of the motions court: (1) granting summary judgment for the tenant in an action for possession, on the ground that the landlord, by accepting rent for the month after the notice to quit had expired, thereby waived his right to demand possession; (2) awarding the tenant attorney’s fees and expenses pursuant to Super.Ct.Civ.R. 37(a)(4), without a hearing, in connection with the tenant’s motion to compel answers to interrogatories; and (3) releasing to the tenant funds which she had paid into the court registry under a protective order. We affirm as to the first two orders but reverse and remand as to the third.
I.
The tenant-appellee, Marie Thurston, leased an apartment “by the month” from the landlord-appellant, Nathan Habib. On October 21, 1983, the landlord served a notice to quit or cure by November 30, citing “overcrowding in breach of lease and D.C. Housing Regulations.” The tenant did not surrender the premises; instead, she tendered to the landlord, on December 1, a money order for the December rent.1 Although the landlord endorsed and deposited this money order, he filed a complaint for possession on December 3, alleging both nonpayment of rent for December and overcrowding of the premises.
On December 19, the tenant filed a verified answer and a counterclaim. In her answer, she presented various defenses, including a denial of rent due for December, a claim of retaliatory eviction, and allegations of substantial housing code violations that entitled her to a recoupment of any rent “found to be due and owing.” The tenant’s counterclaim sought judgment against the landlord for “overpayments of rent” because of housing code violations, as well as for expenditures the tenant had made to correct some of these conditions. In addition, the tenant sought injunctive relief and specific performance of her landlord’s obligations under the implied warranty of habitability.
That same day, the landlord obtained a protective order directing the tenant to pay $87.50 into the court registry immediately and $197.50 each month thereafter “during the pendency of this case.”
In February 1984, the tenant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that her landlord, as a matter of law, had waived his right to demand possession by accepting rent for a new term after the notice to quit had expired. The landlord filed a cross motion for summary judgment, claiming entitlement to possession, as a matter of law, because the tenant had acknowledged facts showing conclusively that the premises were overcrowded. The landlord also sought summary judgment on his tenant’s counterclaim. He asserted that all the alleged code violations predated a November 1982 default judgment of possession against the tenant, that the tenant could have litigated those alleged violations at the time, and thus that res judicata barred relitigation through the present counterclaim.
On March 13, the parties executed a praecipe dismissing both the landlord’s claim for possession based on nonpayment of rent, with prejudice, and the tenant’s counterclaim, without prejudice. The prae-cipe further noted that the landlord’s action for possession based on alleged over*5crowding and the tenant’s corresponding defenses “survive this praecipe.”
The next day, the trial court dismissed the landlord’s complaint, granted summary judgment for the tenant, and thus left her in possession.
II.
The landlord contends the trial court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that the landlord, by accepting rent after expiration of the notice to quit for alleged overcrowding, had waived his right to demand possession based on that notice (the common law waiver rule). He argues, more specifically, that under the Rental Housing Act of 1980, D.C.Code §§ 46-1501 to -1597 (1981 & Supp.1985) (1980 Act), all tenants — even those under a month-to-month lease — acquire, in effect, a “life tenancy” or at least an indeterminate tenancy, subject to divestment only for nonpayment of rent, for breach of the lease terms, or for other reasons specified in the statute. See id. § 45-1561.2 Under this scheme, according to the landlord, a notice to quit is therefore merely a procedural prerequisite to terminating a lease on a statutory ground; it no longer affords an independent basis for terminating a putative month-to-month tenancy.3 This distinction, he argues, is legally significant, for it reveals that pre-1980 Act cases recognizing the common law waiver rule for month-to-month tenancies 4 are inapposite.
More specifically, he says, such cases are premised on an irrelevant analysis: that a 30-day notice to quit is itself legally suffi*6cient to terminate a month-to-month tenancy, that the tenancy therefore terminates upon expiration of the notice, and thus, that acceptance of rent for a future period must be interpreted as a waiver of the notice because (and only because) such acceptance creates a new term. See supra note 4. In contrast, says the landlord, the 1980 Act, by effectively creating an indeterminate tenancy, permits a landlord’s notice to quit for breach of lease to survive the continued acceptance of rent, since such acceptance cannot be construed as a waiver of the notice (and the related breach) in the only manner justified at common law: creation of a new tenancy.
The landlord’s argument is misplaced. It overlooks the more general body of law holding that acceptance of rent for a period extending after a breach of covenant5 or after the expiration of a notice to quit— whether based on a breach6 or on the expiration of a term7 — may, or may not, amount to a waiver of the breach or termination, depending on the landlord’s intent derived from all the circumstances. See Kaiser v. Rapley, 380 A.2d 995, 997 (D.C.1977); In re Wil-Low Cafeterias, 95 F.2d 306, 309 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 567, 58 S.Ct. 950, 82 L.Ed. 1533 (1938).
Accordingly, even though the 1980 Act should be understood to create a tenancy for a term of years, or a periodic tenancy, terminable only on the occurrence of an event specified by statute — such as the violation of an obligation of the tenancy, D.C. Code § 45-1561(b), supra note 2 — the common law rule is still applicable: “the receipt of rent by a landlord, after notice to quit, ... for a new term or part thereof, amounts to a waiver of his [or her] right to demand possession under that notice,” Byrne, 25 App.D.C. at 75,8 unless it is clear from all the circumstances that, by accepting rent from a holdover tenant, the landlord did not intend to waive an “expressed intention to enforce the lease.” Kaiser, 380 A.2d at 997.9 Nothing in the 1980 Act or its legislative history indicates that the Council of the District of Columbia has abrogated this common law rule which has long survived under periods of rent and housing controls. See, e.g., Dunnington, 96 A.2d at 274-75 & n. 2.
*7The question therefore becomes whether a landlord who receives rent tendered for a period after expiration of a notice to quit actually intends to accept it as such, see Rhodes, 310 A.2d at 251-52, and, if so, has implicitly waived the notice or, instead, has accepted the rent without prejudice by expressly reserving the right to enforce the notice to quit. See Kaiser, 380 A.2d at 997. These are questions of fact, see Rhodes, 310 A.2d at 252, with the landlord having the burden of rebutting the implication that, in receiving funds tendered as future rent, he intended to waive termination of the lease. See In re Wil-Low Cafeterias, 95 F.2d at 309. The trier’s findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidentiary support. See Rhodes, 310 A.2d at 252; D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (1981).
In this case, there is no provision in the lease stating that acceptance of rent for a period after a breach, or after expiration of a related notice to quit, does not waive the landlord’s option to terminate. Moreover, the landlord concedes that the “December rent ... was subsequently paid.” At the time the tenant tendered the money order for the December rent, the landlord did not disclaim his intention to accept it as such, let alone express his intention to reserve the right, under the notice to quit, to terminate the lease for overcrowding. Compare Donnelly Realty Co., 78 R.I. 333, 335, 82 A.2d 173, 175 (1951) (no evidence that landlord, by unqualifiedly accepting rent in advance on date notice to quit was to become effective, did not intend to waive notice), with Rhodes, 310 A.2d at 251-52 (no intent to accept rent and thus no waiver of right to demand possession where landlord’s agent cashed tenant’s money order tendered as rent for term beyond expiration of notice to quit).
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding that the landlord, in accepting the rent for December, had waived the notice to quit and the alleged breach (overcrowding) pertaining to the rental period expiring November 30. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint for possession, as well as its summary judgment for the tenant.
III.
A.
The landlord next challenges the court’s award of attorney’s fees to the tenant pursuant to Super.Ct.Civ.R. 37(a)(4).10 On December 19,1983, the tenant submitted written interrogatories to the landlord. The landlord filed answers on January 30, 1984 but failed to respond to interrogatories 3, 7, 9 and 10.
Interrogatory 3 requested information on the levels of rent charged throughout the tenancy. The landlord objected to this question as “[irrelevant, [since the landlord] has dismissed its claim for rent in the pending action.” In fact, however, he did not dismiss his claim for possession based on nonpayment of rent until March 1984, over a month later. Nor did the landlord object to the relevance of this interrogatory to the tenant’s counterclaim, which was still pending.
Interrogatories 7, 9 and 10 addressed the condition of the premises dating from the inception of the tenancy. They asked the landlord to describe repairs made within the apartment, to state reasons for repairs not made, and to recount complaints received from the tenant. The landlord answered these questions but limited his responses to the period after January 1,1983, the approximate date of an earlier default *8judgment for possession he had obtained against the tenant.11
In February 1984, the tenant moved to compel the landlord to furnish complete answers to these four interrogatories. She also moved for an award of attorney’s fees incurred in preparation of the motion to compel. The landlord filed no written opposition to either motion.
The parties appeared for a hearing on the tenant’s motion to compel on February 14, 1984. The landlord’s counsel, citing Davis v. Bruner, 441 A.2d 992 (D.C.), vacated per curiam, id. at 1000 (1982), judgment aff'd, 470 A.2d 1248 (1984) (as amended), argued that the earlier default judgment constituted an adjudication on the condition of the premises before 1983 and, accordingly, that res judicata barred any defense based on housing code violations before 1983. This, he said, precluded any obligation to respond to interrogatories 7, 9, and 10. Counsel proffered no explanation, however, for the landlord’s failure to answer interrogatory 3.
The tenant’s counsel reminded the court that she had raised a defense of retaliatory eviction to the landlord’s complaint for possession. She argued that discovery of the tenant’s complaints about defective conditions for the entire period of the tenancy was therefore relevant to preparation of this defense, based on the landlord’s motive, without regard to whether res judica-ta barred litigation of these conditions for purposes of recovering a rent rebate.
The court granted the tenant’s motion to compel as to all four interrogatories. Thereupon, the tenant’s counsel renewed her request for attorney’s fees, without objection from the landlord. The court awarded her $100. The landlord later filed a “motion to vacate order granting sanctions,” which the court denied.
B.
On appeal, the landlord contends, without elaboration, that his refusal to answer interrogations 7, 9 and 10 was “substantially justified,” Super.Ct.Civ.R. 37(a)(4), supra note 10, and, in any event, that the court erred in awarding attorney's fees to the tenant without a hearing. We reject these contentions.12
1.
Rule 37(a)(4) provides that, if a motion to compel is granted, “the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party ... to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney’s fees, unless the Court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified_” Supra note 10. Thus, in the absence of substantial justification for a refusal to comply, “the award of expenses is mandatory against a party whose conduct necessitated a motion to compel discovery....” Merritt v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 649 F.2d 1013, 1019 (5th Cir.1981) (construing Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4)).13
*9“Opposition to a motion is ‘substantially justified’ if the motion raised an issue about which reasonable [persons] could genuinely differ on whether a party was bound to comply with a discovery rule.” Smith v. Montgomery County, 573 F.Supp. 604, 614 (D.Md.1983), appeal dismissed, 740 F.2d 963 (4th Cir.1984); accord Harlem River Consumers Cooperative, Inc. v. Associated Grocers of Harlem, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 551, 553-54 (S.D.N.Y.1972); Fed. R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4) advisory committee note (“On many occasions, ... the dispute over discovery between the parties is genuine, though ultimately resolved one way or the other by the court. In such cases, the losing party is substantially justified in carrying the matter to court.”). Cf. Reygo Pacific Corp. v. Johnston Pump Co., 680 F.2d 647, 649 (9th Cir.1982) (request for discovery substantially justified “if reasonable people could differ as to whether the party requested must comply”).
The trial court, however, has discretion to evaluate the justification proffered. See Floyd v. Leftwich, 456 A.2d 1241, 1244 (D.C.1983); accord Marquis v. Chrysler Corp., 577 F.2d 624, 642 (9th Cir.1978); cf. In re Multi-Piece Rim Products Liability Litigation, 209 U.S.App.D.C. 416, 425, 653 F.2d 671, 680 (1981) (determination whether motion to compel discovery is substantially justified “is committed to the sound discretion” of the trial court).
In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that the landlord had no substantial justification for refusing to provide the requested answers, we must evaluate whether the interrogatories were relevant to any of the tenant’s defenses or to the counterclaim, since neither the landlord’s claim for nonpayment of rent nor the tenant’s counterclaim had been dismissed by consent prae-cipe at the time of the motion to compel or of the subsequent hearing.
The tenant alleged in her answer to the landlord’s complaint that “[t]he instant action is in retaliation against [tenant] for prior complaints directed] to [landlord] concerning the unsafe or unsanitary conditions existing on the subject premises” and for “prior complaints to the District of Columbia Department of Licenses and Inspections....” See Golphin v. Park Monroe Associates, 353 A.2d 314, 318 (D.C.1976) (“the states’ judicial processes may not be used to accomplish an eviction for retaliatory purposes”) (emphasis omitted); Edwards v. Habib, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 126, 129, 397 F.2d 687, 690 (1968) (“proof of a retaliatory motive does constitute a defense to an action of eviction”), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016, 89 S.Ct. 618, 21 L.Ed.2d 560 (1969); D.C.Code § 45-1562 (1981) (“retaliatory action”), recodified at D.C.Code § 45-2552 (1981, Replacement Vol. 1986).
The tenant’s interrogatory 7 asked in part: “[s]ince the inception of [her] tenancy, have you received any oral or written complaints from [the tenant] regarding conditions in [her] apartment?” Interrogatories 9 and 10 sought to discover the landlord’s responses to these complaints. These questions clearly related to the retaliatory eviction “defense of the party” seeking discovery, and thus were “relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.” Super.Ct.Civ.R. 26(b)(1); see D.C. Code § 45-1562(b)(l) (1981), recodified at D.C.Code § 45-2552(b)(l) (1981, Replacement Vol. 1986).
In attempting to prove that the “landlord who seeks to evict her harbors a retaliatory intent,” Edwards, 130 U.S.App.D.C. at 129, 397 F.2d at 690, the tenant must prove that the landlord intended to evict her because of her complaints about code violations, but she need not prove the alleged violations themselves. See D.C.Code § 45-1562(b) (1981), recodified at D.C.Code § 45-2552(b) (1981, Replacement Vol. 1986). Thus, even if the landlord were correct in asserting that the November 1982 default judgment for possession precluded the tenant from asserting a counterclaim for overpayment of rent based on earlier housing code viola*10tions,14 the tenant was still entitled to litigate a defense of retaliatory eviction based on her complaints about such violations from the beginning of the tenancy, for the greater the number of complaints over a long period, the more likely a trier of fact would be to infer retaliatory motive.15
Accordingly, even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that the landlord was substantially justified in believing that res judicata barred the tenant’s counterclaim for excessive rent, see supra note 14, there was no such bar against the tenant’s effort to prove retaliatory motive for the present *11effort to evict her, based on her complaints since the inception of the tenancy. Any preclusion of a rent overpayment claim derived from the November 1982 default judgment cannot be said to have resolved, preclusively, the issue of the landlord’s present motive to evict, since that issue could not have been “essential to the judgment.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982). The landlord therefore had no substantial justification for refusing to answer questions 7, 9, and 10.
Interrogatory 3, which requested information regarding the various rent levels charged since the inception of the tenancy, was apparently intended to aid the defendant’s counterclaim for alleged overpayment of rent. This interrogatory, therefore, also sought matter discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1). The landlord made no effort to explain his refusal to answer; he. did not even attempt to limit his response to the period after the November 1982 default judgment on the ground that the tenant was barred from litigating earlier rent charges. In the absence of any asserted justification for his refusal to answer, the landlord was required to answer or face sanctions for failure to do so.
In sum, the information sought in interrogatories 3, 7, 9 and 10 was discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1). The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under Rule 37(a)(4), after granting the motion to compel, since the landlord proffered no substantial justification for refusing to answer.
2.
The landlord also argues that the court erred in granting the tenant’s motion for attorney’s fees and expenses without an evidentiary hearing. We disagree.
Rule 37(a)(4) provides that a court shall award expenses of a motion to compel to a successful movant “after opportunity for hearing.” Courts have held, however, that this requirement may be satisfied by allowing both parties to express their positions to the court in writing. Persson v. Faestel Investments, Inc., 88 F.R.D. 668, 670 (N.D.Ill.1980); Addington v. Mid-American Lines, 77 F.R.D. 750, 752 n. 1 (W.D.Mo.1978); see also Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Brode, 508 F.2d 895, 897 (7th Cir.1974). We conclude that the landlord had an adequate opportunity to oppose the tenant’s motion and may not now complain that the trial court failed to hold a separate eviden-tiary hearing.
The tenant’s motion to compel discovery specifically requested an award of expenses incurred in preparation. The landlord failed to file a written opposition to this motion. When the tenant raised the matter in the subsequent hearing on her motion to compel, the landlord again had the opportunity to object and state his position; he failed to do so. The court, however, thoroughly explored the interrogatories at issue to determine whether the landlord’s refusal to answer was substantially justified before granting the tenant’s motions. Not until after the award of attorney’s fees did the landlord file a “motion to vacate order granting sanctions” challenging the court’s failure to hold a separate hearing. After still another hearing, the court denied his motion. Under these circumstances, we are satisfied the court discharged its obligation to provide the landlord with an opportunity to be heard. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and expenses.
IV.
Finally, the landlord contends that the trial court erred in releasing to the tenant the $680 she had paid into the court registry under a protective order during the course of the litigation.
A.
On March 14, immediately after the court had ruled on the summary judgment motions, the tenant asked the court to release the funds in the registry to her. Relying on several Superior Court decisions, she argued that, “[w]hen a [tenant] prevails on a summary judgment motion, it is the prac*12tice of this Court to release those [registry] monies to [her],” since the protective order “serves the purpose of protecting ... a plaintiff who prevails in a suit in this branch of the Superior Court.” After argument, and at the tenant’s request, the court agreed to delay ruling on the disposition of the funds until after the parties had submitted briefs.
Both parties did so in late March. The tenant elaborated her earlier argument; the landlord maintained, as he does on appeal, that “[i]n dismissing her counterclaims and claims for abatement of rent” (without prejudice), the tenant “has conceded that she had no interest in the monies paid into the registry of the Court, since she had used and occupied the premises during [that] period_” Accordingly, “no further hearing is necessary to determine who is entitled to the money.”
The trial court, in a memorandum order referring to the landlord’s dismissal of his claim for nonpayment of rent, released the funds to the tenant. The court observed that “[t]he character of [the landlord-tenant] relationship takes on a distinctly unequal pallor when the [landlord], having nonsuited himself on the merits, then asks the court to dis[burse] to him the [tenant’s] monies entered into the Registry of the court in good faith.”
After the trial court’s order, this court issued its decision in Temple v. Thomas D. Walsh, Inc., 485 A.2d 192 (D.C.1984), rejecting the Superior Court decisions on which the tenant had relied. We ruled that “a disposition favorable to the tenant in the underlying landlord-tenant action does not preclude the trial court ... from releasing to the landlord any funds which the tenant may have deposited into the registry of the court” when the tenant has offered no evidence warranting a rent abatement. Id. at 194.
On appeal, the tenant’s counsel notes that in Temple we held that the trial court, after a hearing under McNeal v. Habib, 346 A.2d 508 (D.C.1975), “acted well within its discretion as a court of equity in releasing the funds in the registry to the landlord.” Temple, 485 A.2d at 194. Counsel urges us to rule that, in the present case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the funds to the tenant. Alternatively, counsel argues, in derogation of Temple, that the trial court actually had no equitable discretion to award the funds to the landlord because a claim for unpaid rent is legal in nature, the landlord has an adequate remedy at law (a civil action) for pursuit of arrearages, and the tenant correspondingly has a right to a jury trial in the event that the matter has to be litigated. See Dameron v. Capitol House Associates Ltd., 431 A.2d 580, 584 (D.C.1981) (dicta).
As of the time of disbursement, the tenant had withdrawn her counterclaim, as well as her defenses to the landlord’s dismissed claim for nonpayment of rent. Thus, she had no pending claim or defense which would have entitled her to an abatement of the rent (or, if she were deemed a holdover tenant, an abatement of the amount found to be the reasonable value of the apartment during her continued occupancy). As elaborated below, the absence of such a claim or defense is dispositive in the landlord’s favor here.
B.
We have often observed that a protective order is an “equitable tool” designed to protect both parties during the pendency of a landlord-tenant action. Dameron, 431 A.2d at 583; accord Temple, 485 A.2d at 193; Davis v. Rental Associates, Inc., 456 A.2d 820, 823 (D.C.1983) (en banc) (plurality opinion); Mahdi v. Poretsky Management, Inc., 433 A.2d 1085, 1090 (D.C.1981) (per curiam). This device protects the tenant from falling further in arrears and risking forfeiture of her lease, Dameron, 431 A.2d at 583 n. 4, 584; McNeal, 346 A.2d at 512, and “ ‘provides a fund from which the tenant may receive an abatement if housing code violations ... are ... found.’ ” Temple, 485 A.2d at 193 (quoting Dameron, 431 A.2d at 584). The landlord, however, “is entitled to judicial protection of his fair *13compensation ‘for the possession he loses during the period of litigation.’ ” Dameron, 431 A.2d at 584 (citations omitted); accord Temple, 485 A.2d at 194. Payment of funds into the registry thus assures that, at the conclusion of the proceedings, the landlord will receive the reasonable value of the premises during tenant’s continued occupancy. See Temple, 485 A.2d at 193; Mahdi, 433 A.2d at 1088.
More specifically, at the conclusion of a possessory action, “the court has an obligation, irrespective of the outcome of that action, to distribute in an equitable fashion, any funds deposited in the court registry pursuant to the protective order.” Temple, 485 A.2d at 193. If the tenant alleges substantial housing code violations entitling her to an abatement of rent and the “proportionate rights of the parties” were not settled in the underlying possessory action, the court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine what portion of the payment otherwise due should be abated. City Wide Learning Center, Inc. v. William C. Smith & Co., 488 A.2d 1310, 1314 (D.C.1985); Goodwin v. Barnes, 456 A.2d 1246, 1247 (D.C.1983); McNeal, 346 A.2d at 514; see also Smith v. Interstate General Corp., 462 A.2d 1133, 1134 n. 3 (D.C.1983). Such a hearing “is solely for the purpose of examining evidence of housing code violations or other defects...” Goodwin, 456 A.2d at 1247.
In Temple, a landlord sued his tenant for possession after serving a thirty day notice to quit. The tenant moved to dismiss on the ground that the notice to quit was invalid. The court granted the motion. Both parties sought release of funds paid into the court registry pursuant to a protective order. During a hearing on the issue, the tenant argued — as the tenant does here — that she was entitled to the funds because she had prevailed in the underlying action for possession. The landlord countered that the tenant had enjoyed full use of the property during the pendency of the action and thus that the funds should be released to the landlord. The trial court agreed with the landlord. 485 A.2d at 193.
We affirmed, observing that “[tjhere can be no doubt that the landlord had a right to be compensated in some measure for the tenant’s use and enjoyment of [the] property” and that “[t]he disbursement of [registry] funds often depends on factors not at issue (or not resolved) in the underlying action, particularly the presence or absence of housing code violations which might entitle the tenant to a reduction in rent.” Id. at 194. Because the tenant in Temple had failed to “offer any evidence which would warrant a reduction in the amount of rent due under her lease,” we concluded that the court acted properly in releasing the funds to the landlord. Id.; accord City Wide Learning Center, Inc., 488 A.2d at 1314.
This case is indistinguishable from Temple. At the time the court granted the tenant’s summary judgment motion, she had voluntarily dismissed all defenses, as well as her counterclaim, based on housing code violations. Therefore, whether the tenant’s payments into the registry should be characterized as “rent” due under a subsisting tenancy, or characterized instead as the reasonable value of the premises during her continued use (the description commonly used for payments due from a holdover tenant), she had asserted no claim tending to show that the landlord was entitled to less than the amount paid into the registry.16 Accordingly, “[w]here, *14as here, ... no entitlement to an offset is even alleged, the court may properly release the funds in the registry to the landlord without an evidentiary hearing.” City Wide Learning Center, Inc., 488 A.2d at 1314 (citation omitted).
The trial court accordingly erred, as a matter of law, in releasing the funds to the tenant. When this court in Temple referred to the trial court’s action as “well within its discretion as a court of equity in releasing the funds in the registry to the landlord,” 485 A.2d at 194, we were not suggesting that, absent an issue of abatement requiring adjudication of the equities, the court has discretion, nonetheless, to release the funds to the tenant. This is not a determination committed to trial court discretion; rather, it is a determination subject to rules of law “that fi[x] the results produced under varying sets of facts.” Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 361, 363 (D.C.1979). We therefore must reverse and remand for entry of a judgment in favor of the landlord in the amount of the funds the tenant paid into the registry.17
We note, as a postscript, that because the tenant dismissed her counterclaim without prejudice, she is free to pursue it in a separate judicial proceeding. Davis, 456 A.2d at 829-30; Mahdi, 433 A.2d at 1089-90; Hsu v. Thomas, 387 A.2d 588, 589 (D.C.1978) (per curiam). We express no opinion on the preclusive effect of the November 1982 default judgment obtained by the landlord. See generally Davis v. Bruner, supra note 13.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
. The lease provides that rent is due and payable on the first day of each month "as rent in advance for the ensuing month."
. D.C.Code § 45-1561 (1981) provides in part: Evictions.
(a) Except as provided in this section, no tenant shall be evicted from a rental unit, notwithstanding the expiration of his or her lease or rental agreement, so long as he or she continues to pay the rent to which the landlord is entitled for such rental unit. No tenant shall be evicted from a rental unit for any reason other than for nonpayment of rent unless he or she has been served with a written notice to vacate which meets the requirements of this section. Notices to vacate for all reasons other than for nonpayment of rent shall be served upon both the tenant and the Rent Administrator. All notices to vacate shall contain a statement detailing the reason(s) for the eviction....
Section 45-1561(b) to -1561(i) enumerates the other grounds for eviction, including: a tenant’s violation of an obligation of the tenancy (30-day notice to vacate); a tenant’s performance of an illegal act within the rental unit (30-day notice to vacate); a good faith intention of the landlord to either occupy personally (90-day notice to vacate), renovate (120-day notice to vacate), or demolish the unit (180-day notice to vacate); and a contract in good faith to sell the unit (90-day notice to vacate).
. The landlord is correct that the 1980 Act in effect creates, for all residential rental property in the District of Columbia, tenancies for a term of years, or periodic tenancies, terminable only on the occurrence of an event specified by statute (it does not, of course, create a life estate). See Dunnington v. Thos. E. Jarrell Co., 96 A.2d 274, 275 (D.C. 1953) (District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act (of 1941), codified, as amended, at D.C.Code § 45-1605 (1951), converts "monthly tenancies]” into "indeterminate tenancies”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) PROPERTY, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 1.7 comment e (1977) (tenancy subject to a condition subsequent). Accordingly, although the District of Columbia Code retains provisions, enacted years earlier, recognizing periodic tenancies, see, e.g., D.C. Code §§ 45-221, -1402 (1981) (month-to-month, quarter-to-quarter), as well as tenancies at will, D.C.Code §§ 45-222, -1403 (1981), or by sufferance, D.C.Code §§ 45-220, -1404 (1981), the 1980 Act in a number of ways supersedes them. We have ruled on several occasions that rent control statutes prevail over provisions adopted earlier that govern evictions, to the extent that the provisions conflict. See Merriweather v. D.C. Bldg. Corp., 494 A.2d 1276, 1279 (D.C.1985) (D.C.Code § 45-1561 (1981) supersedes D.C. Code §§ 45-222, -1403 (1981)); Adm'r of Veterans Affairs v. Valentine, 490 A.2d 1165, 1170 (D.C.1985) (per curiam) (same); Jack Spicer Real Estate, Inc. v. Gassaway, 353 A.2d 288, 291-92 (D.C.1976) (D.C. Rent Control Reg. No. 74-20 § 10 supersedes D.C.Code § 45-904 (1973)); Dunnington, 96 A.2d at 275 (under 1941 Act, as amended, landlords whose "monthly tenancies]” were converted into "indeterminate tenancies” have implied right to enter premises to prevent waste).
.See, e.g., Hamilton v. William Calomiris Investment Corp., 461 A.2d 466, 468 n. 2 (D.C.1983); Rhodes v. United States, 310 A.2d 250, 251 (D.C.1973); Dunnington, 96 A.2d at 275 n. 2; Shapiro v. Christopher, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 114, 117, 195 F.2d 785, 789 (1952); Byrne v. Morrison, 25 App.D.C. 72, 75 (1905).
. Compare Walsh v. Cooper, 31 A.2d 883, 884 (D.C.1943) (waived breach of covenant not to sublet), with City Wide Learning Center, Inc. v. Wm. C. Smith & Co., 488 A.2d 1310, 1312-13 (D.C. 1985) (did not waive breach of covenant restricting use of premises to commercial purposes), and Shannon & Luchs Co. v. Tindal, 415 A.2d 805, 806-07 (D.C.1980) (did not waive breach of no-pet covenant), and Kaiser v. Rapley, 380 A.2d 995, 997 (D.C.1977) (did not waive breach of covenant to pay rent when due), and Klein v. Longo, 34 A.2d 359, 360 (D.C.1943) (did not waive breach of covenant not to commit waste).
. See Woollard v. Schaffer Stores Co., 285 N.Y.S. 68, 74, 246 App.Div. 157, 163 (1936) (landlord waived breach of covenant against subletting by accepting rent "after the breach and after declaring forfeiture” through notice cancelling lease).
. Compare Edwards v. Totten, 48 App.D.C. 416, 418-19 (1919) (waived notice to quit after expiration of one-year lease) (citing Byrne) and Donnelly Realty Co. v. Langevin, 78 R.I. 333, 335, 82 A.2d 173, 175 (1951) (waived notice to quit after expiration of five-year lease), with Rhodes, 310 A.2d at 251 (did not waive notice to quit month-to-month tenancy).
. Accord Insurance Company v. Norton, 6 Otto 234, 242, 96 U.S. 234, 242, 24 L.Ed. 689 (1877) ("when a lease has become forfeited, any act of the landlord indicating a recognition of its continuance, such as ... accepting rent which ac-' crued after the forfeiture, is deemed a waiver of the condition") (dicta); 3A Thompson on Real Property § 1360, at 695 (1981) ("[a] notice to vacate leased premises on a designated date is waived by the landlord accepting rent for tenure and use beyond that date”).
. In contrast, the acceptance of rent already in arrears at the expiration of a notice to quit does not affect a landlord’s right to judgment for possession. Shapiro, 90 U.S.App.D.C. at 118, 195 F.2d at 789. Nor, in pursuing a forfeiture through a suit for possession, does a landlord waive the right to recover from a holdover tenant the reasonable rental value of the property during the pendency of the action — a matter typically addressed through a protective order requiring the tenant to make periodic payments into the court registry until the case has been resolved. See generally Davis v. Rental Associates, 456 A.2d 820 (D.C.1983) (en banc).
. Super.Ct.Civ.R. 37(a)(4) provides in part:
Award of expenses of motion [to compel discovery]. If the motion is granted, the Court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party ... to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney’s fees, unless the Court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
. The parties agree that the landlord had obtained this default judgment on November 23, 1982. According to the landlord, this judgment “la[id] to rest the condition of the premises through that time.”
. The landlord also challenges the propriety of awarding attorney’s fees to Neighborhood Legal Services, a publicly funded organization which provides free legal services for its clients. This contention is frivolous. Martin v. Tate, 492 A.2d 270, 274 (D.C.1985); see generally Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984).
. The Advisory Committee Note to the 1970 amendment of Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4) provides that "expenses should ordinarily be awarded unless a court finds that the losing party acted justifiably in carrying his point to court.” Accord Reygo Pac. Corp. v. Johnston Pump Co., 680 F.2d 647, 649 (9th Cir.1982); 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2288, at 789 (1970) ("Rule 37(a)(4) ... requires an award against a party unless his [or her] position ‘was substantially justified.’ Thus the burden of persuasion is ... on the losing party to avoid assessment of expenses and fees....’’)
Super.Ct.Civ.R. 37(a)(4) is "substantially identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37.” Super.Ct.Civ.R. 37 comment. Superior Court rules must be construed consistently with the Federal Rules. Floyd v. Leftwich, 456 A.2d 1241, 1245 n. 4 (D.C.1983).
. The landlord’s claim of justification for refusal to answer, based on this argument, presents a more difficult question. In Davis v. Bruner, 441 A.2d 992 (D.C.), vacated per curiam, id. at 1000 (1982), judgment aff’d, 470 A.2d 1248 (1984) (as amended), a division of this court affirmed a trial court ruling that a tenant may not raise, as an affirmative defense to an action for possession, housing code violations that predated an earlier default judgment in the landlord’s favor. 441 A.2d at 998. This court, sitting en banc, later vacated the panel’s opinion and ordered the case reheard. On September 30, 1983, the en banc court affirmed the judgment on appeal by per curiam order (published in our slip opinion series but not in West) stating that opinions would follow, thus adopting without elaboration the result reached by the original panel. Therefore, when the landlord submitted his interrogatory responses in January 1984 limiting his discussion of alleged housing code violations to the period following the earlier default judgment, "reasonable [persons] could differ” Reygo Pac. Corp., 680 F.2d at 649, as to whether information about pre-existing violations were "relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending'action_’’ Super.Ct.Civ.R. 26(b)(1). Accordingly, had the tenant raised only defenses and counterclaims based on housing code violations, the landlord may have been substantially justified in limiting his answers. As it turned out, the mystery of this court’s views on the Davis issues deepened after the trial court ruled on the attorney’s fees issue here. On February 8, 1984, the en banc court issued an amended order in Davis stating, without opinions, that "the judgment on appeal is affirmed by an equally divided court.” 470 A.2d at 1248.
. D.C.Code § 45-1562(b) (1981), recodified at D.C.Code § 45-2552(b) (1981, Replacement Vol. 1986) provides in relevant part:
(b) In determining whether an action taken by a landlord against a tenant is retaliatory action, the trier of fact shall presume retaliatory action has been taken, and shall enter judgment in the tenant’s favor unless the landlord comes forward with clear and convincing evidence to rebut this presumption: Provided, that within the 6 months preceding such landlord’s action, the tenant: [has requested the landlord to make repairs necessary for "compliance with the housing regulations,” has reported "existing" or "suspected” code violations to District government officials, etc.].
This "presumption” provision of the 1980 Act (retained in the Rental Housing Act of 1985) accordingly strengthened the following language contained in both the Rental Accommodations Act of 1975, D.C.Code § 45-1654(b) (Supp.1976), and the Rental Housing Act of 1977, D.C.Code § 45-1699.7(b) (Supp.1980), where the burden of persuasion remained with the tenant: “In determining whether an action taken by a landlord against a tenant is retaliatory action, the trier of fact shall take into consideration whether, within the six (6) months preceding such landlord's action, the tenant:
None of the three statutes has addressed the implications of allegedly retaliatory action taken more than six months after the tenant’s last complaint. The legislative history, moreover, is silent on this question. See Report, Council of the District of Columbia, Committee on Housing and Economic Development, Bill 3-321, "The Rental Housing Act of 1980,” October 23, 1980; see also Report, Council of the District of Columbia, Housing and Urban Development Committee, Bill 1-157, “Rental Accommodations Act of 1975,” July 31, 1975; Report, Council of the District of Columbia, Committee on Housing and Urban Development, Bill 2-152, "Rental Housing Act of 1977,” September 22, 1977; Memorandum, Council of the District of Columbia, from Chairperson, Committee on Government Operations, Bill 2-158, "District of Columbia Housing Assistance Act of 1977, May 13, 1977.”
We construe § 45-1562(b) of the 1980 Act, which was retained in the Rental Housing Act of 1985, D.C.Code § 45-2552(b) (1981, Replacement Vol. 1986), to permit a tenant — in at least one situation — to introduce evidence of code violation complaints more than six months before the landlord's allegedly retaliatory action: where the tenant has complained within six months and the tenant seeks to buttress the retaliatory motive argument against the landlord by showing earlier complaints as well. We do not address the question whether the statute precludes a tenant from claiming retaliatory action (and assuming the burden of persuading the trier of fact) when a landlord acts more than six months after the last tenant complaint.
In this case, at the discovery stage, the tenant’s interrogatories were entirely proper.
. Presumably, when a tenant prevails in a pos-sessory action under an unexpired lease, as we have here under the circumstances, see supra note 3, the tenant is still in possession under the lease and thus the payments into the registry under a protective order are properly characterized as "rent” after the right to possession is confirmed. If, however, the landlord prevails on a notice to quit, the tenant will have been in possession, after the notice expired, in the status of a holdover tenant. In that case, the landlord will be entitled not to the rent specified in the expired lease but to the reasonable value of the premises during the tenant’s continued occupancy. This, theoretically, can be more or less than the rent specified in the lease. Typically, how*14ever, such reasonable value is determined, presumptively, by the rent the tenant had been paying. Unless the parties have validly agreed otherwise in the lease, “[i]n the absence of evidence that the rental value of the leased property has increased or diminished since negotiation of the rent at the time of agreement to lease, that negotiated rental rate will determine the rate a which the holdover must pay for his [or her] continued use and occupation,” Restatement (Second) of Property, Landlord and Tenant § 14.5 comment a (1977).
. Because we conclude that the court need not have held an evidentiary hearing, see generally City Wide Learning Center, Inc., 488 A.2d at 1314; Goodwin v. Barnes, 456 A.2d 1246, 1247 (D.C.1983); Smith v. Interstate General Corp., 462 A.2d 1133, 1134 n. 3 (D.C.1983), we need not reach the tenant’s contention that the court may not adjudicate the parties’ respective claims to funds in the court registry, at a McNeal hearing, without affording the right to a jury trial. Quite simply, because of the posture of this case at the time of disbursement, there was nothing left to adjudicate; "there were no material facts in issue to submit to a jury.” Brown v. Young, 364 A.2d 1171, 1174 n. 5 (D.C.1976) (citations omitted).