dissenting:
Errors and procedural irregularities that would not be tolerated in other civil litigation and in criminal proceedings are often overlooked in mental health cases. When the State points the finger at a person and says you are mentally ill and we want to involuntarily confine you, the State should be required to follow the rules.
The failure to follow statutory procedures does not automatically invalidate an order of commitment. (In re Nau (1992), 153 Ill. 2d 406, 419-20, 607 N.E.2d 134, 140-41; In re Splett (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 225, 230-31, 572 N.E.2d 883, 885-86.) However, Nau and Splett should not be read to permit the State to only follow those statutory mandates it pleases.
The hospital failed to comply with its statutory duty to file proof of service of the petition for involuntary commitment with the court. There is no evidence in this record respondent was provided with a copy of the petition within 12 hours of his involuntary admission. Both Nau and Splett involved, in part, notice of hearings about which the respondent had actual notice, not the failure to provide respondent with a copy of the petition which alleges he should be deprived of his liberty.
We are unable to discern from this record whether respondent was admitted on December 22 or December 24. We do not know who the psychiatrist was who examined respondent on December 23. If respondent was admitted on December 22, the petition in order to be timely should have been filed on December 23. It was not. If respondent was admitted on December 24, then he should have been examined by a psychiatrist within 24 hours of admission. He was not.
The majority concludes that if respondent could be examined by a psychiatrist and a certificate executed before admission, so much the better. Section 3 — 610 of the Code specifically provides for this examination after involuntary admission. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 91V2, par. 3 — 610.) The first certificate under section 3 — 602 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 91V2, par. 3 — 602) must be completed within 72 hours prior to involuntary admission. The second certificate, under section 3 — 610, is required to be executed by a psychiatrist upon examination of the respondent within 24 hours after his involuntary admission.
Section 3 — 610 provides a three-fold safeguard. The second examiner must be a psychiatrist, must not be the same person who executed the first certificate and must examine the respondent after admission. The legislature could not have been more specific. The mental health and condition of an individual is not static. The respondent who is in need of involuntary admission on day one may not be in the same condition on day four after admission. It is not better to ignore the statute and provide a second examination and certificate prematurely. The time line established by the legislature should be followed.
Respondent was not provided with a copy of the petition for involuntary admission. The petition itself was not timely filed, or, in the alternative, respondent was not examined by a psychiatrist within 24 hours after admission. These mistakes are not harmless and they are apparent on the face of the record. I would reverse.