dissenting.
I dissent from the Majority Opinion for the following reasons:
1. The Majority has misapplied Price v. State (1998), Ind., 622 N.E.2d 954, authored by Chief Justice Shepard. (Justice Givan and Justice Dickson dissenting.)
2. The Majority has overlooked the proper initial analysis. It gave little or no consideration to the forum employed by Radford and the character of the property at issue. Frisby v. Schultz (1988), 487 U.S. 474, 479, 108 S.Ct. 2495 [2499, 101 L.Ed.2d 420]; Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n (1983), 460 U.S. 37, 44, 103 S.Ct. 948 [954, 74 L.Ed.2d 794].
3. The Majority admits to reweighing the evidence on appeal in Footnote 3 of its opinion. Radford was convicted by the trial court, the finder of fact. The Majority relies on Radford's testimony rather than the testimony of the police officer. Too, as mentioned above, the Majority has not factored in the forum chosen by Radford. In Price, the forum was a residential alley with over twenty people, many from the New Years party, talking and conversing with one another. Price's contribution to the volume of noise already generated was characterized as a "fleeting annoyance" by Chief Justice Shepard. By contrast, the forum chosen by Rad-ford was a hospital hallway near the OB-GYN clinic and close to the nursery of newly born babies who could not escape the bombardment of Radford's loud, intrusive speech. A hospital is a forum where the privacy of others is guarded and the volume of disturbing noise limited for the health and safety of those hospitalized.
4. The Majority in its analysis has turned a blind eye to the content-neutral nature of Indiana Code 35-45-1-8(2). In Radford's cireumstances, the volume of her speech and the intrusiveness of her conduct in the forum was the issue. The trial court found that the volume and intrusiveness of her speech was unreasonably noisy and convicted her. The evidence supports the judgment of the trial court.
5. Radford's unreasonably noisy speech was abusive and intrusive. Her remarks were not political in nature. Her remarks were those of a person avoiding discovery of wrong doing-defensive and repelling. She had been terminated as an employee of the hospital. The police had been dispatched *1334to intercede before she left with hospital property. She was well aware of where she was and the need for quiet. Her loud and raucous speech was used as a weapon to avoid detainment and discovery. There is no political speech here.
The Majority has misapplied Price v. State which is the entire foundation for its reversal of Radford's conviction. There are several reasons for the misapplication of Price. First, the Majority has assumed that the forum in Price can be superimposed in Rad-ford's cireumstances. By doing so the Majority has skipped over the most important part of the analysis. The fora are in considerable contrast.
The forum in Price was a residential alley in the 1600 block of Prospect Street in Indianapolis, Indiana. The time was 3:00 a.m. on the morning of January 1 right after a New Year's Eve party. The group was described as a "boisterous knot of quarreling party-goers." Price, supra at 956. Besides numerous police, there were approximately twenty spectators-many from the party. Coleman had resisted arrest and after a chase, he had to be subdued. Price's comments regarding the manner in which Coleman was being subdued and placed under arrest were not of a loud enough volume as to be intrusive in this pandemonium setting. It was referred to as a "fleeting annoyance" by Chief Justice Shepard. In Price, the Indiana Supreme Court found that there was insufficient evidence to sustain her conviction of disorderly conduct, but it did find her guilty of public intoxication.
By way of contrast, the Radford forum was a quiet hallway of a hospital. She was adjacent to the OB-GYN clinic and close to the recently born baby nursery. There were patients, doctors, and nurses in the hallway. Radford had been fired by the hospital. A policeman had been dispatched to the second floor of the hospital to intercept Radford. He had been told that Radford may be leaving with hospital property. When the policeman stopped Radford, he requested that she step into an alcove where their presence would be less obstructive and less disturbing to those passing by in the hallway. She refused. Three times the policeman asked Radford to quiet down. She refused. She "continually got angry and in a very loud and abusive voice." Record, at 27. When the policeman asked to look into the box she was carrying, Radford loudly protested. She "very loudly complained about being hassled by me ... and our department." Record, at 20. She "again loudly refused, told me she was leaving, that I was hassling her...." Id. at 22. Radford's abusive and harmful speech invaded the privacy of those patients in the hospital and destroyed their right to a quiet and peaceful environment. Patients with heart conditions and patients with nervous disorders, among others, come to the hospital expecting quietude. The intrusiveness, harm, and abuse in Radford's forum is a thousand times more sensitive than the forum in Price-a residential alley at 3:00 in the morning.
The Majority's analysis had to deal with Radford's chosen forum before rushing to a "political speech" conclusion under Art. 1, § 9 of the Indiana Constitution. Price a. State, supra, at 28. The "core value" here is to avoid abusive speech and recognize responsibility. The state's interest here is obvious.
I would affirm the trial court.