DISSENTING OPINION BY
Senior Judge FRIEDMAN.I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that, in a proceeding to reinstate benefits as of January 31, 2007, an employer seeking an immediate suspension is entitled to a presumption under Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Henderson), 543 Pa. 74, 669 A.2d 911 (1995), and Pennsylvania State University v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Hensal), 948 A.2d 907 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008), that the claimant voluntarily removed himself from the entire labor market where: (1) the claimant took Social Security retirement benefits after the employer refused reinstatement; (2) the claimant took a union pension on some unknown date; (3) the claimant had not applied for or taken a pension from the employer; (4) the claimant credibly testified that he would return to work in a suitable position with the employer; and (5) the claimant actually attempted to return to work in March 2008. For the following reasons, I cannot agree the presumption was triggered in this case.
Seph A. Zuhosky (Claimant) sustained a work-related injury to his left knee on March 26, 2003. Claimant received workers’ compensation benefits from Duferco Farrell Corporation (Employer) and returned to modified duty. However, on January 27, 2007, Claimant was unable to continue working and, a few days later, underwent total knee replacement surgery. Claimant filed a petition for reinstatement of benefits as of January 31, 2007, (R.R. at 7a-8a), and hearings were held on the matter before a workers’ compensation judge (WCJ). Employer defended against the reinstatement petition by attempting to show that Claimant voluntarily removed himself from the labor market, i.e., that any reinstatement of benefits should be immediately suspended.
I. Employer’s Burden
In Henderson, our supreme court held that an employer need not prove under Kachinski v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 516 Pa. 240, 532 A.2d 374 (1987), that it referred the claimant to an *68available job within the employee’s medical clearance where the employer establishes that the claimant has voluntarily removed himself from the labor market by retiring. The employer met that burden in Henderson by showing that: (1) the claimant was receiving Social Security retirement benefits; (2) the claimant took pension benefits from his employer on July 1, 1989; and (3) the claimant testified that he was not looking for work. The court upheld the suspension of claimant’s benefits as of July 1, 1989, the date the claimant began receiving pension benefits from his employer.
Here, Claimant sought a reinstatement of benefits as of January 31, 2007. At the hearing on September 23, 2008, Employer established through Claimant’s testimony that Claimant took Social Security retirement benefits on the advice of his attorney after Employer refused to reinstate his benefits. (R.R. at 53a.) Such evidence does not establish that Claimant took Social Security retirement benefits as of January 31, 2007. Moreover, such evidence does not establish any other date that a suspension could commence based on Claimant’s receipt of Social Security benefits. In addition, such evidence establishes that Claimant did not voluntarily take Social Security benefits but, rather, was forced to do so because Employer refused to reinstate workers’ compensation benefits. If a claimant is forced into retirement because of his work injury, he is entitled to continued disability benefits. Henderson.
Employer also established through Claimant’s testimony that Claimant took a union pension. (R.R. at 53a.) However, Employer never asked Claimant when he began receiving the union pension. Thus, Claimant’s testimony about his union pension does not support a suspension of benefits as of January 31, 2007, or any other date. Inasmuch as Employer failed to establish any date for the commencement of Claimant’s Social Security benefits or union pension, there can be no presumption that Claimant voluntarily removed himself from the labor market as of January 31, 2007, or any other date.
II. Employer Pension
In Hensal, the claimant retired from his position with the employer on February 21, 2002, and applied for a disability pension in January 2004 to maintain health insurance, hospitalization, vision and other benefits provided by the employer. The employer filed a suspension petition, arguing that it was entitled to a suspension as of June 13, 2005, because the claimant had retired and was not engaged in a good faith job search. This court held that, under Henderson, because the claimant accepted the pension, the claimant was presumed to have left the workforce, and, to rebut the presumption, the claimant needed to show that he was actively applying for employment within his restrictions in good faith or that he was incapable of working any job in the entire labor market. Hensal.
It is important to recognize that the holdings in both Hensal and Henderson do not extend to fact situations such as the one before us here, where the pension Claimant took was not from Employer but, rather, was from another source. Where a claimant takes a pension from his employer, the employer is not required to offer suitable employment under Kaehinski because the employer knows that the claimant would not accept it. See Mason v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Joy Mining Machinery), 944 A.2d 827 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008) (stating that an employer is not required to offer suitable employment when a claimant has left the work force because the claimant would not accept it when offered); see also Hensal. *69However, in cases where the claimant has not taken a pension from his employer and has not retired from his job, the employer has no reason to believe that the claimant would reject an offer of suitable employment. Indeed, the employer knows that the claimant has not removed himself from the entire labor market because the employer knows that the claimant has not retired from his job with the employer. Thus, in my view, the fact that Claimant took a union pension did not trigger the presumption that Claimant removed himself from the entire labor market.
III. Presumption of Voluntary Removal
In Henderson, our supreme court declined to place on employers the burden of proving that a claimant has no intention of continuing to work after voluntarily retiring. In Mason, this court stated that, under Henderson, by voluntarily accepting a pension, a claimant is presumed to have voluntarily left the workforce. In Hensal, this court altered the rule by eliminating the element of voluntariness, simply stating that, by accepting a pension, a claimant is presumed to have left the workforce.
I submit that this court should reconsider its elimination of the element of volun-tariness in Hensal. I note that, when jobs are difficult to find, fewer and fewer people near or at retirement age voluntarily retire. In tough times, more people take a pension or Social Security retirement benefits out of necessity, not because they want to leave the workforce. In addition, I submit that this court should reconsider the requirement in Hensal that claimants taking a pension establish entitlement to continuing benefits by actually applying for jobs, when suitable jobs may not exist. In other words, I submit that Hensal ig-ñores the realities of today’s economy and needs to be overruled.
Based on the foregoing, I would affirm.