Thomas McCarron (landowner) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County that denied a motion which counsel had initially designated as a motion for post-trial relief, in mandamus. The order is affirmed.
Procedural History
The procedural history giving rise to this appeal is as follows. In July of 1988, the landowner filed an application for a building permit with Upper Gwynedd Township for the construction of a single-family dwelling on his lot, which is located on Franklin Street. The township’s zoning officer denied the application and the landowner filed an action in mandamus in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County.
In the trial court, the procedural steps reveal some difficulties in this case with mere nomenclature, rather than substance, which makes Pa.R.C.P. No. 126 appropriate for application here. That rule, entitled “LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION OF RULES,” succinctly states:
The rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding to which they are applicable. The court at every stage of such action or proceeding may disregard any error or defect of procedure which does not effect the substantial rights of the parties.
In essence and actuality, the trial court procedure in this case took the following path: The parties agreed upon a written stipulation of all the facts and presented it to the trial judge, who reached a non-jury decision against the landowner and in favor of the township. The landowner then filed his motion, entitled as a motion for post-trial relief, in accordance with Pa.R.C.P. No. 227.1, and specifying grounds for relief as required by that rule. The trial judge denied the motion, holding that mandamus was not available for relief. The landowner took this appeal from *531that denial. Of course, denial of a post-trial relief motion is a final order, from which the losing party may bring an appeal within this court’s jurisdiction.
The record discloses, however, that the parties encrusted that straightforward procedural course with a good deal of incorrect nomenclature. Although neither party has presented to this court any objection based upon the erroneous labels, we will note them briefly, lest anyone be misled.
First, the parties misnamed their non-jury trial stipulation of facts as a “Case Stated.” But it was not a Case Stated — a discrete common law mode of proceeding by agreement — because it did not contain any agreement for the entry of a described judgment, as is required for a Case Stated. Standard Pa. Practice §§ 43.1, 43.7. Lacking that essential element, the filing constituted nothing more than a stipulation of facts submitted to the judge for a non-jury determination, which is how the parties and the judge have treated it.
This court has uniformly taken the realistic and logical approach in cases involving case-stated mischaracterizations. See County of Allegheny v. Allegheny County Prison Employees’ Independent Union, 53 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 350, 352-53, 417 A.2d 864, 866 (1980), where we declined to treat a stipulation, despite the words “Case Stated” in its title, as a true Case Stated because of the absence of the necessary agreement for entry of judgment. See also Wedgewood Associates v. Caln Township, 54 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 557, 559-60, 422 A.2d 1190, 1191 (1980), where, for the same reason, we declined to accept counsel’s argument that a stipulation was in fact a Case Stated. In both of those cases, we treated the proceeding as a non-jury trial based upon a stipulation, as we do here, but we had to quash those appeals because no post-trial motions were filed, as was done in this case.
When these parties presented their stipulation to the trial judge for decision, the landowner filed a “Motion for Summary Judgment,” which was superfluous because the land*532owner thereafter nevertheless proceeded with the case as if it were to be decided by a judge without a jury on the basis of stipulated facts.
Confirming that non-jury trial approach, the landowner followed the trial judge’s decision with a motion for post-trial relief, as noted above; that was exactly the right post-trial step to be taken after a non-jury trial adjudication. However, both parties then fell again into nomenclature confusion by jointly stipulating that the motion for summary judgment should be deemed to be a motion for peremptory judgment, and that the motion for post-trial relief should be deemed to be a motion to open peremptory judgment. Apparently they mistook the summary-decision option of peremptory judgment in mandamus, under Pa. R.C.P. No. 1098, to be the sole or entire process for reaching a final decision in mandamus. The absence, here, of any motion to quash confirms that the appellee township, like the appellant landowner, regarded the resulting trial court order to be a final one.
This court cannot always follow Pa.R.C.P. No. 126 to save parties from the consequences of misnaming their procedural steps. Indeed, the Superior Court has taken the more rigid approach of holding parties to their choice of labels in cases similar to this one. Clearfield Bank & Trust Co. v. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co., 344 Pa.Superior Ct. 588, 497 A.2d 247 (1985).
However, where the errors of nomenclature have had no effect upon the rule’s concern, the “substantial rights of the parties,” and the parties’ own treatment of the case has established that point, this court will continue to look at the substance of what the parties actually did, as we analyze the procedure. Hence we perceive this case as involving a stipulation of the facts, a decision based on that stipulation, a motion for post-trial relief (actually bearing that correct label initially), and a final order and opinion thereafter — providing a record which enables us readily to *533decide the threshold issue presented by this appeal, which we now proceed to do.
That issue arises from the trial judge’s basis for issuing the final order against the landowner, the conclusion that mandamus is not the proper remedy.
Availability of Mandamus as the Remedy
An action in mandamus is appropriate to secure the issuance of a permit where the right to it is clear and the issuance constitutes no more than the performance of a ministerial act which involves no discretion in the municipal officer. Lindy Homes, Inc. v. Sabatini, 499 Pa. 478, 453 A.2d 972 (1982). Mandamus is not available as a remedy in cases where a proposed land use does not comply with an existing ordinance.
The parties’ stipulation indicates that the lot in question, on which the landowner desires to construct a dwelling, abuts only one street, Franklin Street, and that “Franklin Street is not a public street nor a private street approved by the township, but an easement for passage for persons owning lots in the subdivision” in which the lot is laid out. (R. 20) Section 168-19B-1 of the Upper Gwynedd Township Land Development Regulations provides:
B. Lot Frontage
(1) All lots shall have direct access to an existing or proposed public street or to a private street approved by the township.
Because the landowner stipulated that Franklin Street is not a public street or a private street approved by the township, the landowner has acknowledged that his proposed plan does not comply with this ordinance provision. Hence, mandamus is not the appropriate remedy in this case. Lindy.
Nevertheless, the landowner seeks to rely upon Hunter Construction Company Appeal, 43 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 476, 402 A.2d 1117 (1979), in which this court concluded that a zoning hearing board erred in denying a special exception *534to a landowner who proposed to construct a single-family dwelling on a lot that did not abut a public street. This court determined that the landowner was entitled to a special exception under the terms of the ordinance, despite an ordinance provision that required all building lots to abut “a public street”.
By citing our footnote 1 in Hunter, 43 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 477, 402 A.2d at 1118, the landowner contends that, because Franklin Street is subject to an easement for passage in favor of all lot owners in the subdivision, it is a “public” street and the application therefore fully complies and thus warrants mandamus relief.
However, our footnote actually adopts the contrary view, interpreting “public street”, for the purpose of this type of zoning requirement, to mean a street accepted by a municipality or legislated as a state highway, not one merely subject to an easement for subdivision lot owners.
Under the stipulated facts, the proposed lot does not abut a public street in the sense we require. Hence, absolute compliance is wanting. Because mandamus relief is therefore unavailable, we affirm the order of the trial court.
ORDER
NOW, May 7, 1991, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, at No. 88-112864, dated March 7, 1990, is affirmed.