DISSENTING OPINION
Gilkison, C. J.I am unable to agree with the majority opinion, for the following reasons:
I think the teacher’s contract in question is, in every particular, a legal contract. It is the uniform standard contract prepared by the administrative and legal experts of the state of Indiana, and is the product of many years of experience, of many scores of legislative sessions, of the legal staffs of many governors, and the *605best efforts of fifty or more attorneys general and their numerous deputies and assistants. These and similar teacher’s contracts have been before the court in innumerable cases during the past one hundred years and always heretofore they have been held legal and enforceable.
Appellant’s connection with this contract was limited to signing her name to it after it had been fully prepared by appellees, and was presented to her by appellees, solely for her signature, agreeable with §§28-4303, 28-4304, Burns’ 1948 Replacement. It is the universal rule that if there is any ambiguity or uncertainty or illegality in such a contract, such ambiguity, uncertainty or illegality must be construed against the party so making and presenting the contract. Jenkins v. King (1946), 224 Ind. 164, 175, 65 N. E. 2d 121; Illinois Pipe Line Co. v. Fitzpatrick (1934), 207 Ind. 1, 8, 188 N. E. 771; 17 C.. J. S., Contracts, §324, p. 751, 755; 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, §252, p. 795; Am. L. Institute Restatement, Contracts, Vol. 1, §236, Cl. d, p. 330. When such a contract is so prepared, presented and signed it is inconceivable that any uncertainty, ambiguity or illegality in the contract can be construed against the party so signing it and because thereof he may be denied his legal rights after he has fully performed his services and covenants under the contract. Except in the majority opinion, I am unable to find a case in which the rules of construction have been so transposed and applied. It has been well said that:
“In the construction of a contract the court must bear in mind the situation of the parties, the subject-matter of the contract and the intention and purposes of the parties in making it, and should carry that intention into effect so far as the rules of language and the rules of law will permit. 2 Parsons, Contr. 7th Ed. 631. All parts of the contract will be so construed as to give force *606and validity to all of them, and to all of the language used, where that is possible. Id. 636. Comparatively unimportant parts or provisions, which may be severed from the contract without impairing its effect or changing its character, will be suppressed or subordinated, if in that way, and only in that way, the contract can be sustained and enforced. Id. 637.”
Rhoades v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. (1901), 49 W. Va. 494, 39 S. E. 209, 55 L. R. A. 170, 87 Am. St. Rep. 826; 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, §251, pp. 793, 795.
To me it is wholly inconsistent to permit the assumption that the contract in question was sufficiently legal to bind the appellant to teach for the full school year 1948-1949 for the appellees, and to justify appellee in paying appellant for her services for the full school year, from the school funds allotted to the appellees to pay its teachers, including the appellant as one of the teachers therein, but is not sufficiently legal to give appellant the expressed privileges granted to all teachers under §28-4321, Burns’ 1948 Replacement, providing:
“. . . . Contracts wherein a township school corporation is a party shall be deemed to continue in force for the succeeding school year on the same terms and for the same wages plus any increases as provided by the provisions of chapter 101 of the Acts of 1907 and acts amendatory thereof, known as the Teachers’ Minimum Wage Law, unless on or before the day during which the teacher has completed his customary reports regarding the promotion of pupils and has filed a copy of same at the office of the township trustee, but in no case later than five [5] days after the expiration of the school term the teacher shall be_ notified by the school corporation in writing delivered in person or mailed to him or her at last and usual known address by registered mail that such contract will not be renewed for such succeeding year or *607unless such teacher shall deliver or mail by registered mail to such trustee his or her written resignation as such teacher or unless such contract is superseded by another contract between the parties.”
I am wholly unable to understand how it is possible to have degrees of legality and illegality. If such is possible, some definite rules should be established defining these degrees. It should not be left to the unpredictable exercise of discretion by the courts. To so leave it is to say it is a matter for arbitrary action. If it is impossible to define the several degrees of legality, the reason must be because they do not exist.
As noted in the majority opinion, there was some talk between appellant and defendant trustee prior to executing the written contract. But since under the law these are all merged in the written contract, their presence in the opinion is unexplainable. The talk between the parties on the last day of the school year and the so-called understanding of appellant are likewise meaningless in the opinion unless it is intended thereby to indicate that these talks and understandings in some way have influenced the opinion. This I refuse to believe.
The opinion quite correctly states, “. . . the contract was in the usual form, without special provisions of any kind. The appellant alleged, and on the record before us it must be taken as true, that she neither resigned in writing, received another contract, nor was timely hotified in writing that her contract would not be renewed for the succeeding year, in the absence of either of which a valid contract of the kind under consideration must be deemed to continue in force for the succeeding year under the provisions of Burns’ 1948 Replacement, §28-4321,”
*608But it is contended that at the time of contracting appellant did not hold a valid and subsisting license to teach in the grade schools of Indiana. The license she held is sufficiently described in the opinion. Licensing of school-teacher is vested in the state board of education, through the state superintendent. §§28-4201, 28-4202, 28-4208, Burns’ 1948 Replacement. A properly executed license, in the absence of fraud affecting it, is conclusive evidence that the person to whom it is issued has the legal qualifications of a teacher. State ex rel. Benham v. Bradt (1908), 170 Ind. 480, 84 N. E. 1084.
It was the duty of the appellee trustee to know that appellant held a proper license and that it was registered with the proper superintendent when he employed her. I think the record sufficiently shows that she had such a license properly registered and the opinion so states. On the back of this license among other things, it is stated that her first grade elementary license was renewed “1-16-46” which I think means on January 16, 1946; and that this renewal made it valid until 7-24-50, which I think means until July 24, 1950. Thus it is shown that her license was good for teaching in the elementary grades, from one to four, during the entire period covered by the contract in question, and following until July 24, 1950.
For some reason, not shown in the evidence, the license did not come to the trustee until appellant had taught two weeks. Apparently the trustee and the superintendent, with whom the license was recorded, approved the license and believed it authorized appellant to teach the primary grades one and two, and she was so assigned by these authorities. No one connected with the schools from the state superintendent of public instruction down to the township trustee, *609and the superintendent or principal of the school in question ever questioned the license until this action was brought, months after the close of the 1948-1949 term of school. If there was any material defect in the license it was the duty of the school officials to detect, and correct it at the time of employment or as soon thereafter as possible. If it was not in all things correct, it could, and no doubt would have been corrected, even by permit if necessary under §48-4204 Burns’ 1948 Replacement, so that no question could arise concerning it. After an act has been performed the law will presume that to have been done which should have been done to authorize the act. Kain v. Rinker (1890), 1 Ind. App. 86, 91, 27 N. E. 328; Gilchrist v. Hatch (1914), 183 Ind. 371, 375 to 378, 106 N. E. 694; State, ex rel. Hitchcock et al. v. Farris et al. (1925), 197 Ind. 128, 133, 150 N. E. 18.
As indicated in the opinion, in order to detect any defect or error in the license it is necessary to wade deviously through a veritable maze of administrative rules and from them rather arbitrarily detect something, that escaped the attention of all the school authorities including the appellees, and also the appellant, which it is claimed makes the contract void. This discovery comes too late and its penalty falls unilaterally, wholly upon the only innocent party to the contract.
I am unable to follow this plan. I think the judgment should be reversed.
Note.—Reported in 105 N. E. 2d 161.