dissenting:
The majority holds that the trial court’s prejudicial ruling on Brian Jordan’s pretrial motion under Maryland Rule 4-252 to suppress his confession is not reviewable because Jordan did not testify at his trial.1 In reaching its conclu*163sion, the majority relies on the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984). Luce, however, is totally distinguishable from the case at bar. Even if it were not distinguishable, its reasoning is unsound. Nonetheless the majority, apparently enamored with federal jurisprudence, largely ignores Maryland law and particularly Maryland Rule 4-252 in deciding this case.
I.
The defendant Jordan filed a pretrial motion in accordance with Rule 4-252 in an effort to suppress the confession he made while in police custody. The trial judge held a suppression hearing as required by subsection (f) of the Rule and made a number of factual findings regarding Jordan’s statement. The relevant facts disclosed by the evidence at the suppression hearing are as follows. At approximately 4:00 a.m. on November 23, 1987, Maryland State Police Officers went to the Sykesville Shelter Care Home in response to a call concerning a possible homicide. Brian Jordan was awakened, handcuffed, taken into the living room of the home, and placed on a couch while another police officer searched for the body of the victim. While handcuffed at the home, Jordan complained that the handcuffs were too tight. The officers detaining him sug*164gested ways in which he could alleviate the pressure, but they never did anything themselves to loosen the cuffs. At about 6:12 a.m., over two hours after Jordan was hauled out of bed, the officers holding him were told that the body of the victim had been found. Jordan was then read his rights in accordance with Miranda, and was transported to the Maryland State Police barracks.2
*163“(g) Effect of Determination of Certain Motions.—
(1) Defect in Prosecution or Charging Document.—If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the prosecution or in the charging document, it may order that the defendant be held in custody or that the conditions of pretrial release continue for a specified time, not to exceed ten days, pending the filing of a new charging document.
(2) Suppression of Evidence.—If the court grants a motion to suppress evidence, the evidence shall not be offered by the State at trial, except that suppressed evidence may be used in accordance with law for impeachment purposes. If the court denies a motion to suppress evidence, the ruling is binding at the trial unless the court, on the motion of a party and in the exercise of its discretion, grants a supplemental hearing or a hearing de novo and rules otherwise. A pretrial ruling denying the motion to suppress is reviewable on a motion for a new trial or on appeal of a conviction.”
*164Although it was 23 degrees outside, Jordan was transported in his bare feet and without a coat, dressed only in a tee shirt and blue jeans. Apparently his shoes and jacket were taken as evidence of the crime; there was evidence, however, that a blanket and a pair of boots were available but not provided to him. He was transported in a car which had been sitting idle in subfreezing temperatures without any heat on for more than two hours. At the barracks, Jordan was forced to walk barefoot across a gravel parking lot where there was ice and snow.
Once inside the barracks, Jordan was immediately taken to Corporal Leete who was assigned to interrogate the defendant. Jordan was handcuffed at that point, although it is unclear from the trial judge’s factual findings whether or not Jordan was cuffed to a chair while being interrogated.
Jordan was then read his Miranda rights for the second time. Jordan testified that he asked: “Can I have a lawyer?” He was told that “[y]ou can’t have one now because of the time.” Leete testified that Jordan, in an off-hand manner, asked: “Is there a lawyer here?” Leete stated that he told Jordan that “[w]e have no lawyer available here.” The trial judge found that “there was definitely a discussion about an attorney and having an attorney present” and that “[w]hen the inquiry started about, ‘[i]s there a lawyer here?’ I think that the interrogator’s silence—or statement and following silence was deceptive.”
*165After the discussion regarding a lawyer, Leete continued to talk with Jordan about his willingness to give a statement. A tape recorder was turned on, and Leete once again read Jordan his rights. As the trial court described it, “there was almost an imperceptible amount of time from when Jordan was asked, ‘[d]o you understand your rights?’ ... until the question is asked, ‘[y]our name____’” Jordan subsequently gave an incriminating statement on tape.
After reviewing the above-mentioned facts at the suppression hearing, the judge found the following. Jordan was sixteen years old, had completed the tenth grade with a marginal academic record, had flunked three courses, and was of average intelligence. Jordan had no prior experience with Miranda rights.3 The conditions of his incarceration “were deplorable and unexplainable,” but, after being turned over to Corporal Leete at the Maryland State Police Barracks, his treatment was “fair”. The police made no effort to contact Jordan’s family.
After making findings of fact, the trial judge concluded that Jordan’s confession was made in violation of his right to counsel. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-445, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 706-707 (1966) (“Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed____ If ... he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning”). See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485, 101 S.Ct. *1661880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 386 (1981); Radovsky v. State, 296 Md. 386, 464 A.2d 239 (1983).
Upon determining that Jordan was interrogated in violation of Miranda, the trial judge indicated that he was concluding the suppression hearing. He only reached the issue of the voluntariness of Jordan’s confession after being asked by defense counsel to make a finding of fact that the statement was involuntary. The court replied: “I think the statement was voluntarily given, but I don’t think that there was a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel made, and that is what the Court is basing its ruling on. When the inquiry started about, ‘Is there a lawyer here?’, I think that the interrogator’s silence—or statement and following silence was deceptive.” Jordan’s statement could therefore be used at trial to impeach his testimony if he were to take the stand. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 645-646, 28 L.Ed.2d 1, 4-5 (1971). Although the trial judge made a number of factual findings, as previously set forth, it appears that those findings were made regarding the issue of whether or not Jordan waived his rights under Miranda and Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378. There was no explanation given for the court’s conclusion that Jordan’s statement was voluntary.
At trial, after the close of the State’s case, defense counsel renewed the motion to have Jordan’s confession excluded for any purpose. Counsel informed the trial judge that Jordan would testify in his own defense but for the court’s ruling at the pretrial hearing that his confession could be used by the State for impeachment purposes. The judge declined to reconsider his ruling. Jordan did not testify.
II.
The majority, relying on Luce v. United States, supra, 469 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443, refuses to review *167the trial judge’s voluntariness ruling on Jordan’s pretrial motion to suppress because Jordan did not take the stand at trial knowing that his confession could be used to impeach him.
Luce, however, is entirely different from the case before us. Luce concerned the reviewability of a ruling on a motion in limine on the admissibility of a prior conviction for the purposes of impeachment under Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The case before us concerns a trial court’s ruling on a defendant’s pretrial motion under Maryland Rule 4-252 to suppress a confession. See State v. Brings Plenty, 459 N.W.2d 390, 394-395 (S.D.1990) (Luce does not apply where the defendant, on appeal, challenges a pretrial ruling allowing his confession to be admitted at trial for the purpose of impeaching the defendant). A ruling on a motion in limine is preliminary and can be modified by the court during trial as necessary. The denial of a motion to suppress under Rule 4-252, however, is binding on the trial court unless it grants a supplemental hearing or hearing de novo.
Moreover, whereas the issue addressed in Luce arises frequently, the issue presented in this case does not. The issue before us surfaces only in those cases where the trial judge, in a pretrial ruling, precludes use of the defendant’s confession in the State’s case-in-chief on the grounds that it violated Miranda, but allows it to be used for impeachment purposes because it is deemed voluntary.4
In addition, whereas Luce concerned a non-constitutional evidentiary issue, this case concerns a constitutional claim. The majority in Luce specifically distinguished the case before it from “Fifth Amendment challenges to state-court rulings that operated to dissuade defendants from testifying” or any question “reaching constitutional dimensions.” 469 U.S. at 42-43, 105 S.Ct. at 464, 83 L.Ed.2d 443, 448. *168See Passamichali v. State, 81 Md.App. 731, 739-741, 569 A.2d 733, 737-738, cert. denied, 319 Md. 484, 573 A.2d 808 (1990) (constitutional issue of admissibility of the defendant’s prior conviction under Code (1984 RepLVol.), § 10-905 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, preserved for appeal even though the defendant did not testify at trial); State v. Brings Plenty, supra, 459 N.W.2d at 394-395 (although the defendant did not testify at trial, the court’s pretrial ruling admitting the defendant’s confession for purpose of impeachment is reviewable where the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights were at issue); State v. Brunelle, 148 Vt. 347, 348, 356, 534 A.2d 198, 199-200, 204-205 (1987) (judge’s ruling admitting the defendant’s blood-alcohol-content test results for purposes of impeachment, where the blood sample was taken in violation of Miranda, was reviewable although the defendant did not testify at trial, as the defendant’s constitutional right to testify in his own defense was implicated). See also, Apodaca v. People, 712 P.2d 467 (Colo.1985) (issue of the admissibility of the defendant’s prior conviction was preserved for appeal even though the defendant did not testify, where the defendant raised the question of the constitutionality of the prior conviction).
Most importantly, the present case does not concern Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence; it involves Maryland Rule 4-252. Subsection (f) of Rule 4-252 states that “[mjotions filed pursuant to this Rule shall be determined before trial” and “[i]f factual issues are involved in determining the motion, the court shall state its findings on the record.” Subsection (g)(2) of the Rule states that “[i]f the court denies a motion to suppress evidence, the ruling is binding at the trial unless the court, on the motion of a party and in the exercise of its discretion, grants a supplemental hearing or a hearing de novo and rules otherwise. A pretrial ruling denying the motion to suppress is reviewable on a motion for a new trial or on appeal of a conviction.” (Emphasis added). The case before us falls squarely within the Rule. Jordan’s motion to suppress was *169determined before trial. The judge’s ruling that Jordan’s statement was voluntary was binding on the court. The ruling was harmful to Jordan, as it resulted in Ms not testifying in his own behalf. Under the language of the Rule, the judge’s pretrial ruling denying Jordan’s motion to suppress his confession is reviewable on appeal.
Nowhere in Rule 4-252 is there a requirement that, for a prejudicial ruling on the voluntariness of a confession to be reviewable on appeal, the confession must actually be admitted at trial. On the contrary, the language of the Rule plainly states that the trial judge’s “pretrial ruling denying the motion to suppress is reviewable ... on appeal of a conviction.” While any trial court ruling is subject to the “harmless error” rule on appeal, the ruling on the voluntariness of the confession in this case did prejudice the defendant even though the confession was not admitted at trial. The majority utterly fails to provide an explanation for its ignoring the language of Rule 4-252 and reading into the Rule a requirement that the confession be actually admitted at trial in order for the ruling to be reviewable on appeal.5 I note that the majority, as support for its interpretation of Rule 4-252, cites two cases, one from Arizona and one from New Hampshire. In neither case is there any indication that a rule or statutory provision similar to Rule 4-252 was involved.
The majority’s decision today undermines Rule 4-252. One of the purposes of the Rule is to create a record on the contested evidentiary issue so that it can be reviewed by an appellate court. Logue v. State, 282 Md. 625, 627, 386 A.2d 780, 782 (1978). See Brittingham v. State, 306 Md. 654, 660-661, 511 A.2d 45, 48 (1986). See also Mace Produce v. *170State’s Attorney, 251 Md. 503, 509-511, 248 A.2d 346, 350-351 (1968); Farrow v. State, 233 Md. 526, 532-533, 197 A.2d 434, 437-438 (1964). Where a separate hearing is held and a record on the issue of admissibility of the confession is created, I see no reason to require the defendant to testify at trial. See State v. Whitehead, 104 N.J. 353, 359, 517 A.2d 373, 376 (1986); Commonwealth v. Richardson, 347 Pa.Super. 564, 570-571, 500 A.2d 1200, 1204 (1985), appeal denied, 525 Pa. 644, 581 A.2d 571 (Pa.1990).
Another obvious purpose of Rule 4-252 is to have decisions regarding the admissibility of specified types of evidence settled before trial so that both the State and the defendant can make intelligent tactical decisions regarding trial, such as whether or not the defendant should testify. See Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 657-658, 350 A.2d 665, 677 (1976) (“The abnegation of a particular rule upon which the defense intended to rely may often inflict more damage than initially apparent; a meritorious line of defense may be abandoned as a result; an important witness may not be called; strategies are often forsaken. The future course of the trial inevitably must be changed to accommodate the rulings made.”); State v. Whitehead, supra, 104 N.J. at 358-360, 517 A.2d at 376-377. See also Apodaca v. People, supra, 712 P.2d at 473; People v. Finley, 431 Mich. 506, 538, 431 N.W.2d 19, 32 (1988) (Cavanagh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v. Jones, 271 N.W.2d 534, 536-537 (Minn.1978); State v. Brunelle, supra, 148 Vt. at 353, 534 A.2d at 202 (1987). The majority would have the defendant, where the trial judge in a pretrial ruling deems a confession to be voluntary and therefore admissible for the purposes of impeachment, ignore the judge’s ruling and commit himself to the unwise trial strategy of testifying just to preserve the issue for review.
Not only is the majority’s decision contrary to Rule 4-252, but it impermissibly burdens the accused’s fundamental right to decide whether or not to testify. See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612, 92 S.Ct. 1891, 1895, 32 L.Ed.2d 358, 363-364 (1972) (statute requiring a defendant *171in a criminal case to testify first was unconstitutional; the Court stated that “[wjhether the defendant is to testify is an important tactical decision as well as a matter of constitutional right,” and the issue is reviewable even though the defendant elected not to testify); Apodaca v. People, supra, 712 P.2d 467; State v. Lamb, 84 N.C.App. 569, 583, 353 S.E.2d 857, 865 (1987), aff'd, 321 N.C. 633, 365 S.E.2d 600 (1988) (“If the threatened use of inadmissible evidence can prevent the defendant from testifying altogether and also deny her the opportunity to appeal an erroneous ruling on the admissibility of the evidence, the State would have multiple illegitimate opportunities to silence defendants, and the very purpose of the motion in limine would be lost”); State v. Brings Plenty, supra, 459 N.W.2d at 394-395; State v. Brunelle, supra, 148 Vt. at 353-356, 534 A.2d at 202-205. As pointed out by Judge Bishop of the Court of Special Appeals, “[i]t defies logic to suggest that a defendant must testify in order to preserve for appellate review a claim of deprivation of the constitutional right to testify.” Passamichali v. State, supra, 81 Md.App. at 740, 569 A.2d at 738.
III.
Even if Luce were not distinguishable from the case before us, I would decline to follow it as its reasoning is unsound. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Cordeiro, 401 Mass. 843, 854, 519 N.E.2d 1328, 1335 (1988); People v. Moore, 156 A.D.2d 394, 395, 548 N.Y.S.2d 344, 346 (1989); State v. Whitehead, supra, 104 N.J. at 357-359, 517 A.2d at 375-376; State v. McClure, 298 Or. 336, 342 n. 4, 692 P.2d 579, 584 n. 4 (1984); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 385 Pa.Super. 401, 408, 561 A.2d 335, 338 (1989), aff'd, 526 Pa. 294, 585 A.2d 1001 (Pa.1991); Commonwealth v. Richardson, supra, 347 Pa.Super. 564, 500 A.2d 1200. See also Apodaca v. People, supra, 712 P.2d 467; State v. Ford, 381 N.W.2d 30, 32 n. 1 (Minn.Ct.App.1986); State v. Brings Plenty, supra, 459 N.W.2d at 394-395; State v. Brunelle, supra, 148 Vt. at 356, 534 A.2d at 204-205.
*172The Supreme Court’s primary contention in Luce was that any harm to a defendant who elects not to testify at his trial, based on a trial court’s ruling regarding the admissibility of evidence, would be “speculative.” The Court in Luce stated that “a reviewing court cannot assume that the adverse ruling motivated a defendant’s decision not to testify.” 469 U.S. at 42,105 S.Ct. at 463, 83 L.Ed.2d 443, 448. I believe that it is entirely reasonable to presume that when a defendant seeks an advance ruling in order to suppress a prior incriminating statement or other adverse evidence, he would have testified had his motion been granted. See State v. Whitehead, supra, 104 N.J. at 360-361, 517 A.2d at 377; Commonwealth v. Richardson, supra, 347 Pa.Super. at 570-571, 500 A.2d at 1204; People v. Finley, supra, 431 Mich. at 541, 431 N.W.2d at 33-34 (Cavanagh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This is particularly so where, as in the case before us, defense counsel represents to the court that the defendant’s decision whether or not to testify is solely dependent on the trial court’s pretrial ruling regarding the admissibility of defendant’s confession.
The Supreme Court also stated in Luce that if the defendant does not testify there is no way of knowing whether or not the prosecutor would have used the evidence to impeach the defendant. This conclusion is highly dubious. If the prosecutor before trial is opposed to the suppression of evidence favorable to the State, it is reasonable to assume that he plans to use the evidence at trial against the defendant. People v. Finley, supra, 431 Mich. at 540-541, 431 N.W.2d at 33 (Cavanagh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See State v. Lamb, 321 N.C. 633, 648, 365 S.E.2d 600, 608 (1988).
Finally, the Luce Court reasoned that unless the reviewing court knows the precise nature of the defendant’s testimony, it would be unable to weigh the probative value of the contested evidence against its prejudicial effect. Without the defendant’s testimony, therefore, the reviewing court could not determine if the use of the evidence resulted in “harmless error.” This reasoning is highly suspect, *173particularly in light of Maryland law that, in order for the erroneous admission of evidence to be deemed harmless error, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the improperly admitted evidence did not contribute to the defendant’s conviction. State v. Watson, 321 Md. 47, 58, 580 A.2d 1067, 1072 (1990); Dorsey v. State, supra, 276 Md. at 657, 350 A.2d at 677. This standard applies whether or not the contested evidentiary issue is of constitutional significance. Dorsey, supra, 276 Md. at 657-659, 350 A.2d at 677-678. See Watson, supra, 321 Md. 47, 580 A.2d 1067. Moreover, the case before us concerns the admissibility of a confession. Virtually the only situation where use of an involuntary confession at trial would be harmless error would be where there were multiple confessions and one was given voluntarily. See Arizona v. Fulminante, - U.S. -, -, -, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1261, 1266, 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 327, 333 (1991); Dorsey v. State, supra, 276 Md. at 655, 350 A.2d at 676. This is not such a case; Jordan did not make multiple confessions.
Furthermore, I find the logic of applying harmless error analysis in cases such as the one before us to be skewed. The Supreme Court and the majority are precluding review of a criminal defendant’s substantial claim that evidence was improperly deemed admissible, based on sheer speculation by the State that, had the improperly admitted evidence been used, the State could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence would not make a difference on the determination of the defendant’s guilt. This is an improper use of harmless error analysis.
Finally, we do not need to speculate about the potential impact of improperly admitted evidence where a judge’s pretrial ruling admitting it essentially prevented the defendant from exercising his constitutional right to take the stand in his own defense. Jordan was clearly prejudiced if the trial court’s ruling admitting his confession were erroneous, in light of Jordan’s practical inability to testify in the face of that ruling. The Supreme Court and the majority find it entirely acceptable to force a criminal defendant to *174make the crucial tactical decision of whether or not to testify at trial based on erroneous trial court rulings. In my view, the defendant has a fundamental right to choose to testify based on correct evidentiary rulings. He should not be forced to testify in order to challenge those rulings that are flawed. See State v. Whitehead, supra, 104 N.J. at 358-362, 517 A.2d at 375-377; People v. Finley, supra, 431 Mich. at 535-536, 431 N.W.2d at 31 (Cavanagh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
IV.
Today the majority, relying on Luce, holds that in order for a ruling in a pretrial suppression hearing admitting defendant’s confession for impeachment purposes to be reviewed, the defendant must testify at trial.6 The case before us, however, is not governed by Luce; it falls directly within Maryland Rule 4-252 which states that “[a] pretrial ruling denying [Jordan’s] motion to suppress is reviewable ... on appeal of a conviction.”
. Maryland Rule 4-252 states as follows:
“(a) Mandatory Motions.—In the circuit court, the following matters shall be raised by motion in conformity with this Rule and if not so raised are waived unless the court, for good cause shown, orders otherwise:
******
(4) An unlawfully obtained admission, statement, or confession;
******
"(f) Determination.—Motions filed pursuant to this Rule shall be determined before trial and, to the extent practicable, before the day of trial, except that the court may defer until after trial its determination of a motion to dismiss for failure to obtain a speedy trial. If factual issues are involved in determining the motion, the court shall state its findings on the record.
. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
. Jordan was in the Sykesville Shelter Care Home because three weeks prior to his arrest in the present case he was arrested for theft and the destruction of property. Nevertheless, the trial judge found that his arrest was non-custodial and that he was never read his rights. His mother, with regard to that arrest, was contacted and secured representation for him.
. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 645-646, 28 L.Ed.2d 1, 4-5 (1971); Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 254-255, 513 A.2d 299, 310-311 (1986) (Lodowski II).
. We have emphasized in a multitude of cases that the rules of procedure are not mere "guides” but are “precise rubrics” to be strictly followed. See, e.g., State v. Cook, 322 Md. 93, 103-104, 585 A.2d 833, 838 (1991); Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 280, 523 A.2d 597, 606 (1987); State v. Ricketts, 290 Md. 287, 292, 429 A.2d 1025, 1027-1028 (1981); Countess v. State, 286 Md. 444, 463, 408 A.2d 1302, 1311 (1979); State v. Bryan, 284 Md. 152, 155, 395 A.2d 475, 477 (1978).
. Because the majority does not reach the issue of whether or not Jordan’s confession was in fact voluntary, I need not express a view on the matter. As previously mentioned, however, the trial judge’s factual findings at Jordan’s suppression hearing seemed to relate to his conclusion that Jordan’s right to counsel was violated as opposed to his conclusion that Jordan's statement was voluntary. Therefore, his factual findings as to the voluntariness of Jordan’s statement may have been insufficient under Lodowski II, supra, 307 Md. at 255-258, 513 A.2d at 311-313.