dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion regarding whether appellant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. Additionally, I have some concern regarding the current interpretation of Rule 4-271.
I agree with the majority that under current case law Rule 4-271 was not violated. I must point out, however, that the good cause determination, while based on lack of judge and jury, was not as innocuous as the majority opinion would have us believe. When the administrative judge postponed the trial on October 4, the following colloquy occurred:
“THE COURT:
sic s}c sjc sjc * sjc
“I will say, however, Mr. [Prosecutor], you know, and I know and [counsel for appellant] knows, and everybody else knows it is the primary responsibility for the scheduling of these matters that rests with the State’s Attorney.
“[PROSECUTOR]: I know. I want to specially set this to get this thing resolved.
*695“THE COURT: Perhaps you two can talk about that today; none of this business of looking at the calendar and picking a date.
“[PROSECUTOR]: I want to set it other than with other cases of mine.
“THE COURT: No one talks to anyone — one office to the next office. No one knows what anybody else is doing. What I am saying is don’t just look at your calendars.
“[PROSECUTOR]: I am going to talk to Miss Carter,[1] who has the entire docket for everybody.
“THE COURT: You are going to have to spend time, pick a date, and talk to the assistant or whoever schedules, immediately before that to see what their situation is, and make sure they don’t have a 20-striker to be tried.[2] That’s what happens consistently.” (Emphasis added.)
The only implication possible from these comments is that the method of scheduling was a contributing condition to court congestion in Harford County and that congestion was chronic.
Nevertheless, the law is clear that, in order to obtain a reversal, the postponement must be a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 461-62, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984). In this case, there was no judge or jury to hear the *696case. Thus, the administrative judge had very little choice but to grant a postponement.
The majority acknowledges that one purpose of Rule 4-271 is to further “the public interest in avoiding harm resulting from unjustifiable delays and excessive postponements in criminal trials.” Opinion at 682. The Rule also seeks to promote orderly procedure by setting a time limit for the State to bring the defendant to trial. See Case Note, State v. Hicks, 9 U.Balt.L.Rev. 473, 477 (1980).
The trial judge suggests in his comments that the practice of the State’s Attorney’s Office was to schedule cases without regard to other cases already scheduled. To hold that conflicts arising from that practice constitute good cause eviscerates Rule 4-271 and violates the very purpose of the Rule. If this Rule is to serve its purpose or retain any vitality, then we need to reexamine the interpretation of the good cause requirement. Additionally, when any cause constitutes good cause, it invites trivialization, not only of this Rule, but of other Rules as well.
Regarding the majority’s analysis of any violation of appellant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, I agree that the nearly eight-month delay reaches constitutional dimensions. Opinion at 688. I also agree that appellant’s prompt assertion of his right weighs in his favor. Opinion at 686. I disagree, however, with the majority’s analysis of the reasons for delay and its assessment of the prejudice suffered by appellant because of the delay.
The majority is correct in stating that the four-month delay from the first trial date of July 26 to the day the trial started on November 27 is attributable to the State. Opinion at 687-688.3 I disagree, however, with the majority’s assertion that the period of time from June 16, when a *697bench warrant was issued for appellant for failure to appear for a bond review hearing, to July 19, when he returned to Maryland, is attributable to appellant. The majority acknowledges that the record does not indicate whether appellant’s absence had any bearing on the July 26 postponement, but states that “the fugitivity doctrine directs us to charge the appellant with the period from the date the warrant issued, June 16 to the date he returned to Maryland, July 19.” Opinion at 687-88.
The fugitivity doctrine does not direct us to do so. The fugitivity doctrine provides that
“[ajppellant cannot avail himself of Barker when it is he by his criminal acts in another state or his willful absence from Maryland which prevented the State from proceeding to trial.”
Powell v. State, 56 Md.App. 351, 365, 467 A.2d 1052 (1983), cert. denied, 298 Md. 540, 471 A.2d 745, cert. denied, 299 Md. 137, 472 A.2d 999 motion for reconsideration denied, 299 Md. 656, 474 A.2d 1345 (1984), quoting Isaacs v. State, 31 Md.App. 604, 614, 358 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 278 Md. 724 (1976) (emphasis added). The State has not produced evidence or even argued that it was prepared to go to trial before July 26.4 Because appellant’s absence did not exceed the time reasonably necessary for the State to prepare the case for trial, the period of time from June 16 to July 19, as well as the time from March 29 to June 15, should not be charged to either appellant or the State.
I also disagree with the majority’s statement that appellant was not prejudiced by the delay. Appellant’s counsel proffered that the victim would have testified favorably on appellant’s behalf. Counsel proffered that the victim would have stated that the shooting was accidental and that appellant did not intend to injure him.
*698The majority argues that appellant neither deposed the victim nor did appellant subpoena the victim. Normally, a deposition in a criminal case is taken only to perpetuate the testimony of a witness who will be unavailable for trial. See Rule 4-261. Appellant had no reason to believe that the victim would be unavailable because the victim had been listed as a State’s witness. Moreover, at the hearing on September 14, the State asserted that the victim was “around to testify.” Thus, deposing the victim would have been unnecessary from appellant’s viewpoint. Additionally, because the victim was listed as a State’s witness, it was reasonable for appellant to assume that the State would subpoena him. Finally, appellant did not learn of the victim’s unavailability and whereabouts until the first day of trial.
The majority also states that appellant presented evidence that the victim had substance abuse and psychological problems. The majority argues that any credibility the victim’s testimony would have had would be substantially diminished. Thus, the majority holds that appellant suffered no actual prejudice. Appellant, however, should have had the opportunity to present the victim’s testimony. The trier of fact could then judge the credibility of the victim’s testimony based on his demeanor at the trial and his past history. While the victim’s testimony may not have definitively proved that appellant did not intend to harm him, the victim’s testimony may have raised a reasonable doubt. This reasonable doubt would have prevented a conviction on the attempted murder charge. Thus, I would hold that appellant was actually prejudiced.
Finally, I disagree with the majority’s balancing of the four factors. None of the delay in this case was shown to be attributable to appellant. Moreover, appellant was actually prejudiced by the delay. Additionally, appellant asserted his right to a speedy trial promptly and continued to press the issue. While the delay in this case was not as long as the delay in some cases, see, e.g., Powell, 56 Md.App. at 358, 467 A.2d 1052 (delay of almost 34 months), *699the balance of the other factors points to a violation of appellant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that appellant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated and would reverse his convictions.
. Since the scheduling was the responsibility of the State’s Attorney’s Office, one can assume Miss Carter was an employee of that office. This, however, could not be confirmed in the record.
. A "20-striker” refers to a case where the parties have a large number of peremptory challenges. Under old Rule 4-313, in a case involving the death sentence or imprisonment for 20 or more years, the defendant was allowed 20 peremptory challenges and the State 10. In 1986, that Rule was amended so that the defendant has 20 peremptory challenges and the State 10 peremptory challenges only when the death sentence or life imprisonment are involved. In cases where the defendant could be imprisoned for 20 or more years, but less than for life, the defendant has 10 strikes and the State has five. Rule 4-313. Empaneling a jury in such cases can take a substantial amount of time. Additionally, the trials are usually lengthy because the cases are more serious.
. Arguably, this delay should be weighed more heavily against the State because the State’s Attorney’s Office controls the scheduling of criminal cases. As the majority points out, however, there is no evidence that the State intentionally delayed this case. The delay in this case may be due to routine problems in scheduling cases.
. Interestingly enough, the State had not subpoenaed any witnesses for the July 26 trial.