dissenting in part, concurring in part.
The majority affirmed in part and reversed in part the Appellate Division. It reversed the Appellate Division and concluded that “knowingly storing chemicals that are highly reactive to heat and water satisfies the causal nexus” sufficient to impose civil *291penalties against the owner or operator of a chemical facility that releases toxins into the atmosphere under N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a). Ante at 275, 708 A.2d at 1162. Under that holding, the owner or operator of a chemical factory that lawfully and properly stores chemicals would be liable under N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a) for the release of toxins as a result of a fire caused by an arsonist. I do not believe that when N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a) was promulgated in 1969, the Legislature authorized the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) to impose such liability. I, as did the Appellate Division, find that merely storing chemicals on the premises does not satisfy the causal nexus requirement of N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a).
I do, however, agree with the majority when it affirmed the Appellate Division, and held that the notice the DEP received from the operator of the chemical company was timely under N.J.S.A 26:2C-19(e).
I
The facts are undisputed. Alden Leeds manufactures and packages swimming pool chemicals for consumer use. On April 10,1993, the plant was closed for the Easter holiday. A fire broke out of unknown origin, causing a release of chemicals into the air. The chemicals were legally and properly stored at the factory. The administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the fire was ignited by an unknown third party.1 There is no allegation that the fire was caused by the negligence of Alden Leeds or any of its employees.
The DEP filed administrative charges against Alden Leeds for violations of N.J.S.A 26:2C-19(e) and N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a). A hearing was held before an ALJ who concluded that “no mens rea ” was required to establish a violation of the statute and the regulation. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Alden Leeds violated both. Although the Commissioner of the DEP adopted the ALJ’s *292decision with respect to liability, he concluded that “[c]ertainly neither intent to release the air pollutant, nor fault is a necessary element of the violation. Yet some causal nexus between Alden Leeds and the offending release must be established.” (Emphasis added). The Commissioner found such a causal nexus merely from the legal and proper storage of the chemicals. I disagree.
I agree with the majority that N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a) imposes strict liability. I also agree with the majority that a causal nexus must be established between Alden Leeds’ activities and the release of contaminants into the atmosphere. However, from an examination of the plain language of the statute, relevant case law, and legislative history, I conclude that something more than the mere lawful storing of chemicals is required to establish a causal nexus under N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a). Stated differently, the mere happening of a fire caused by an unknown third party is insufficient to impose liability.
A.
N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a) provides:
Notwithstanding compliance with other subchapters of this chapter, no person, shall cause, suffer, allow or permit to be emitted into the outdoor atmosphere substances in quantities which [sic] shall result in air pollution as defined herein.
[ (Emphasis added).]
Although the words “cause, suffer, allow or permit” are not defined in N.J.S.A 26:26-19(e) or N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a), the plain language of the regulation — “no person shall cause, suffer, allow or permit____” — indicates that some volitional act is required to impose liability. In Department of Health v. Roselle, 34 N.J. 331, 169 A.2d 153 (1961), we interpreted a provision of the New Jersey Air Pollution Control Code (the Code) that had the exact same language. In Roselle, the Department of Health charged the operators of a refuse dump with a violation of the Code, which provided that “[n]o person shall cause, suffer, allow or permit open burning of refuse....” Id. at 336, 169 A.2d 153. (Emphasis added). That charge had resulted from the outbreak of fires of unknown origin, just like the fire at Alden Leeds. Ibid. Chief *293Justice Weintraub, speaking for the Court, found that the defendants could not be. found to have violated the statute (or the injunction issued thereto) without evidence that they somehow started the fires, stating:
The word “cause” is clear enough, and if defendants had set the fires in question, their violation of the injunction would be plain, and the vagueness of the words “suffer, allow or permit” would not relieve them of responsibility. But plaintiff disavowed a charge that defendants started the fires and indeed disavowed knowledge of their origin.
[id. at 349-50, 169 A.2d 153.]
Although the “cause, suffer, allow or permit” language in the two regulations is identical, the majority criticizes the Appellate Division for applying the Roselle Court’s interpretation to the language of N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a). Even though the Code in Roselle targeted a more specific cause of air pollution — the open burning of refuse — than the regulation here — targeting emissions generally — the Court’s treatment of the identical language in a similar environmental statute is significant precedent.
As stated by this Court in Roselle, it is evident that “cause” suggests some catalyst — some act or failure to act by the party charged with “causing” the emission which started, precipitated, or lead to the result — here the release of air contaminants into the atmosphere. If the fire were caused by Alden Leeds’ negligent storing of the chemicals or, indeed, if the fire was the result of the spontaneous combustion of the chemicals, even properly stored, then I would find that Alden Leeds violated N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a). In those situations, Alden Leeds’ actions would have been a catalyst to the release of pollutants. For example, in DeEugenio & Sons v. Division of Envtl. Quality, 92 N.J.A.R.2d (EPE) 47, 1992 WL 257715 (1992), aff'd, No. A-4055-91T2 (App. Div. April 2, 1993), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 480, 634 A.2d 527 (1993), a peach farmer secured the necessary permits to burn peach tree trimmings. Due to wind change, the fire was responsible for the improper emission of smoke into the atmosphere and the farmer was deemed to have violated N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a). Although the farmer did not act negligently, he did set the fire. See also *294Department of Health v. Concrete Specialties, Inc., 112 N.J.Super. 407, 410, 271 A.2d 595 (App.Div.1970) (finding that defendant whose equipment caused smoke to be emitted into air violated regulation promulgated under APCA because defendant allowed and permitted emission of smoke).
But the fire here was started by an unknown third person. Alden Leeds did nothing to cause the fire. There is no evidence that Alden Leeds either by an affirmative act or an act of omission “caused, suffered, allowed or permitted” the release. Causation is not established where the result would have occurred without any action on Alden Leeds’ part. State v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 69 N.J. 102, 111, 351 A.2d 337 (1976) (holding because nuclear power plant was only accelerating condition that would naturally have occurred, it was not charged with polluting creek in violation of N.J.S.A 23:5-28). The mere storage of the chemicals by Alden Leeds was not the catalyst that caused the fire or the subsequent emission of contaminants into the air. By its plain language, N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a) requires the DEP to show by a preponderance of evidence that Alden Leeds “caused, suffered, allowed or permitted” the release of the contaminants into the air. The DEP has failed to do so.
The majority analogizes N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a) to common law strict liability for ultrahazardous activities. However, under common law strict liability, “[t]he strong current of authority” provides that forces of nature and actions of third parties that bring about damaging events from ultrahazardous activities relieve a defendant of liability. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 79, at 563 (5th ed.1984). Therefore, the analogy to common law strict liability provides no support for a construction of N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2a that would hold a defendant liable even when an unknown third party caused the release of pollutants.
B.
The legislative history also supports my conclusion that the Legislature did not intend the DEP to have the authority to *295conclude that the mere happening of a fire is sufficient to impose liability under N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a). I recognize the importance of deference to an administrative agency’s interpretations. Nonetheless, we have repeatedly held, “[a]n administrative agency may not under the guise of interpretation extend a statute to include persons not intended, nor may it give the statute any greater effect than its language allows.” Kingsley v. Hawthorne Fabrics, Inc., 41 N.J. 521, 528, 197 A.2d 673 (1964). The issue is not whether the DEP believes that it is good policy to fine an owner or operator merely because he lawfully and properly stored chemicals, but whether in 1969 when N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a) was enacted, the Legislature intended and authorized the DEP to enact a regulation imposing such liability.
The predecessor of N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2 was promulgated in 1960. Ante at 280, 708 A.2d at 1164. N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2 was subsequently readopted and codified prior to September 1, 1969.2 In 1969, the regulation was promulgated under N.J.S.A. 26:2C-8, which states “[t]he department shall have the power to formulate and promulgate, amend and repeal codes and rules and regulations preventing, controlling and prohibiting air pollution throughout the State----” Neither the notification requirement of N.J.S.A. 26:2C-19(e), the criminal sanctions of N.J.S.A 26:2C-19(f), nor the general fine provision of N.J.S.A. 26:2C-19(d) for violations of the APCA, had been enacted when N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a) was promulgated. The only statutory authority under which the DEP could assess fines at that time was against those who failed to comply with DEP orders. Alden Leeds did not fail to comply with any DEP directive. Therefore, because when the DEP promulgated N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a) it had no authority to fine a company for a release of pollution solely on the basis that the company stored chemicals, the majority’s construction of the regulation exceeds the DEP’s statutory authority.
*296Although the Legislature has strengthened the ability of DEP to control air pollution, it has retained the concept of “cause.” For example, subsection e of N.J.S.A. 26:2C-19, which was enacted in 1985, provides:
A person who carnes a release of air contaminants in a quantity or concentration which poses a potential threat to public health, welfare or the environment or which might reasonably result in citizen complaints shall immediately notify the department. A person who fails to so notify the department is liable to the penalties and procedures prescribed in this section.
[(Emphasis added).]
Therefore, to impose liability under either the statute or N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a), the DEP must show by a preponderance of evidence that a party caused the emission of air contaminants into the atmosphere.
Under the Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act, N.J.S.A. 13:1K-6 to -14 (ECRA), the Legislature imposed liability on the owner of property without regard to fault or causation. N.J.S.A. 13:1K-9. The ECRA was enacted in 1983, L. 1983, c. 330, in response to the problems and delays that arose because of attempts to allocate fault among several owners. As noted in Superior Air Prod. Co. v. NL Industries, Inc., 216 N.J. Super. 46, 63, 522 A.2d 1025 (App.Div.1987), “Responsibility for the contamination plays no part in the ECRA process. Non-compliance subjects the violator to strict liability for costs without regard to fault.” Accordingly, under the ECRA, the Legislature clearly knew how to impose strict liability for a cleanup of a hazardous substance based solely on the ownership of the property, and did so under the ECRA. Likewise, N.J.S.A 58:10-23.11(g) states that any person who “is in any way responsible for any hazardous substance [discharge into water] ... shall be strictly liable ... without regard to fault.” That too indicates that when the Legislature intends to impose liability solely on the basis of ownership of the property, it does so in unmistakable language. It did not do so in N.J.S.A. 26:2C-19(e) and the DEP did not do so in N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a).
Subjecting a party to civil penalties for a release of contaminants it neither volitionally nor even accidentally caused is a harsh *297result. The intention to do so should be explicit from the regulations and from the enabling statute. Such a dramatic expansion of an agency’s authority should be left to the Legislature and not the Commissioner.
II
To summarize, the words “cause, suffer, allow or permit” presume some catalyst leading to an effect. As the Appellate Division recognized, “[t]he record is barren of any evidence that the manner in which appellant stored the chemicals was a cause of the fire.” It was the fire, and whatever or whomever caused the fire, that must be viewed as the cause of the release of the contaminates into the air.
I concur in the Court’s reversal of the DEP’s claim under N.J.S.A. 26:2C-19(e). I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division.
Justice STEIN joins in this opinion.
For affirmance in part and reversal in part — Chief Justice PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN and COLEMAN — 5.
Concur in part and dissent in part — Justices GARIBALDI and STEIN — 2.
There is a reference in the police log that an unnamed third party called the Kearny Police Department to claim responsibility for the fire.
It is unclear when N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a) was actually codified, as the subchapter historical note merely states that "all provisions of this subchapter ... became effective prior to September 1, 1969."