concurring and dissenting:
I join in Judge Beck’s acknowledgment of our supreme court’s call to “keep pace with the threat to privacy engendered by new electronic devices.” See Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32, 46, 403 A.2d 1283, 1290 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032, 100 S.Ct. 704, 62 L.Ed.2d 668 (1980). Additionally, I join in sections I, II, III(A), III(B), and III(C)(1) of the opinion, and find them well reasoned. I agree that no constitutional violation occurred when the young boys videotaped appellants, as private conduct does not render evidence inadmissible. I am also of the opinion *618that the appellants had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place which was videotaped, their bedroom, and that this expectation of privacy was transferred to the tape itself at the time of its creation. Moreover, I join in Judge Beck’s reasoning that the appellants’ privacy interests in the tape were not eroded when various citizens viewed the tape; their legitimate expectations of privacy were frustrated, but not altered. However, I must note my disagreement with the applicability of Commonwealth v. Latshaw, 481 Pa. 298, 392 A.2d 1301 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 931, 99 S.Ct. 2050, 60 L.Ed.2d 659 (1979), the case relied upon for the proposition that the officer’s screening of the videotape without a warrant fell within the third party consent exception to the warrant requirement. As such, I disagree with the conclusion in section 111(C)(2), and hence the result in this case. In my opinion, the search violated the defendants’ fourth amendment rights, and the film should have been suppressed.
In Latshaw, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, applied the third party consent doctrine. The court held that the fourth amendment does not preclude a warrantless search of property when consent is given by a person possessing authority to consent to such search. 481 Pa. at 303, 392 A.2d at 1304 (Per Nix, J., with two Justices concurring and one Justice concurring in the result). I do not subscribe to the view that the fourth amendment issue in this case can be properly disposed of by reliance upon Latshaw or the third party consent doctrine.
The basis for the principle of third party consent is that the consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, non-consenting person with whom that authority is shared. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). In Latshaw, Justice Roberts dissented, stating:
The majority concludes that State Police officers lawfully opened, searched, and seized appellant's] ... closed box*619es and footlockers and their contents, even though no magistrate ever made an independent determination that probable cause supported government intrusion. The majority justifies today’s exception from the well-settled warrant requirement of both the federal and Pennsylvania Constitutions on the theory that Minnie Bubb, owner of the bar in which the closed boxes and footlockers were found, but not the owner of these storage containers, could “consent” to the officers’ opening of the containers____ [Appellant] did not in any respect give up the privacy interest manifested upon closing the boxes and footlockers to the outside world____ “So long as a person seeks to preserve his effects as private, even if they are accessible to the public or to others, they are constitutionally protected.”
Latshaw, 481 Pa. at 308, 309, 311, 392 A.2d at 1306, 1307, 1308, (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)) (emphasis added).
My colleague states that “[the third party consent] exception ordinarily applies in situations in which the defendant permits a third party to have joint access and control over his property and so assumes the risk that the third party will consent to a police search of the property.” Clearly, this is not the situation before the panel in Kean. Judge Beck goes on to state: “Nevertheless, in [Latshaw ], the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that in certain exceptional circumstances, a third party may consent to a search of effects which the defendant did not knowingly place under the third party’s control. The instant case is analogous to Latshaw.” I disagree, and suggest that these are not the circumstances to which Latshaw applies.
Unlike Latshaw, the appellants’ expectations of privacy were not “greatly limited by the legitimate interest of [the consenting party] in the subject property.” Latshaw, 481 Pa. at 307, 392 A.2d at 1306. Cherelynn was not the “undisputed owner” of the contents of the film, and thus did not have “the unimpeded ability to act at will with *620regard to the contents of the [film].” Id. She was merely in possession of the film. Clearly, Cherelynn voluntarily relinquished the film to the officer. However, the fact that the officer may have lawfully been in possession of the film did not give him the authority to search its contents. “An officer’s authority to possess a package is distinct from his authority to examine its contents.” Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 651, 100 S.Ct. 2395, 2398, 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980).
Moreover, I believe it is also important to keep in mind that here, unlike Latshaw, we are not dealing with a landlord/tenant situation, to which we can easily resort to concepts of real property law to analyze fourth amendment issues. We cannot say that Cherelynn’s rights or interest in the contents of that film “were superior to the appellants’] rights____” Id.
In my opinion, the case of Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 100 S.Ct. 2395, 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980), is more analogous, although it applies federal constitutional law. In Walter, twelve cartons of films, each of which bore a drawing suggestive of homosexuality and a description of the film indicating that it depicted homosexual activity, were mistakenly delivered to “L’Eggs Products, Inc.,” rather than to “Leggs, Inc.” The FBI was contacted, and took custody of the films. The films were then viewed on a projector by FBI agents. The FBI made no attempt to obtain a warrant before screening the films. After an unsuccessful attempt to suppress the films, the defendants were convicted.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, over Judge Wisdom’s dissent, affirmed. The United States Supreme Court reversed. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Stewart, concluded that the government’s unauthorized screening of the films constituted an unreasonable invasion of their owner’s constitutionally protected interest in privacy. The fact that FBI agents were lawfully in possession of *621the films did not give them authority to search their contents. Nor did the fact that the boxes had been opened by private parties before they were given to the FBI excuse the failure to obtain a search warrant. 447 U.S. at 654, 100 S.Ct. at 2400.
Justice White, joined by Justice Brennan, concurred in part and in the judgment, agreeing that the government’s warrantless projection of the films constituted a search that infringed petitioners’ fourth amendment interests even though the government had acquired the films from a private party. Id. at 660, 100 S.Ct. at 2403.1 In Justice White’s view, the notion that private searches insulate from fourth amendment scrutiny subsequent governmental searches of the same or lesser scope is inconsistent with traditional fourth amendment principles.2 Id.
In my opinion, Justice White’s reasoning is applicable here. I do not believe the third-party consent doctrine is applicable in this case as an exception to the warrant requirement. Even though the officer acquired the film from Cherelyn, a private party, the warrantless projection constituted a search. The search cannot be justified under any of the traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement. The search was not incident to an arrest. There were no exigent circumstances. The search could not be justified under the plain view doctrine. The officer had ample opportunity to secure a warrant from a neutral magistrate. The fact that Cherelyn had the film in her possession was entirely fortuitous; she had no authority to consent to a search of the film. The search, therefore, was unreasonable under these circumstances.
. In a footnote to the opinion, Justice White disagreed with the suggestion that it is an open question whether the government’s projection of the films would have infringed any fourth amendment interest if private parties had projected the films before turning them over to the FBI.
. Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined.