Bomarko, Inc. v. Rapistan Corp.

Reilly, P.J.

Following a final judgment, defendant filed this appeal as of right from the trial court orders that granted plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary disposition with regard to their breach of contract claim and denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration.1 We affirm.

Plaintiffs, James D. Azzar and his assignee, Bomarko, Inc., claimed breach of contract because of Rapistan Corporation’s failure to pay the 1990 summer and winter taxes on certain real property in Grand Rapids sold by Rapistan to plaintiffs. All the parties filed motions for summary disposition with regard to the meaning of the tax liability language. Plaintiffs contend that paragraph 6 of the purchase contract is clear and unambiguous and, as a matter of law, requires defendant, the owner of the property on December 31, 1989, to pay the 1990 taxes. Paragraph 6 provides:

Property Taxes and Assessments which are due and payable, or a lien or both, on the property on or before this date, shall be paid by Seller without proration. After this date all special improvements now installed but not yet a lien shall be assumed by Buyer. Exceptions: Seller to be respon*652sible for all taxes due and/or payable at time of close. Note per this paragraph the term "this date” to be date of close.

The last sentence of paragraph 6, beginning "Exceptions” was a handwritten addition made by Mr. Azzar, and reviewed by defendant’s representatives and legal counsel before defendant accepted Mr. Azzar’s offer.

Defendant agreed that the interpretation of paragraph 6 was a matter of law, but argued that the language should not be interpreted to include taxes billed after the closing on February 16, 1990. Defendant also claimed that, although it agreed to the addition of the "Exceptions” provision, there was a question of fact with regard to the intent of the parties regarding the additional language.

The trial court did not err in determining that the parties’ dispute concerned a mistake of law and not a question of fact. A mistake of law is usually not a ground for equitable relief absent inequitable conduct. The record reveals no evidence of inequitable conduct by plaintiffs. Schmalzriedt v Titsworth, 305 Mich 109, 118-120; 9 NW2d 24 (1943); Sinka v McKinnon, 301 Mich 617, 626-627; 4 NW2d 32 (1942); Kamalnath v Mercy Memorial Hosp Corp, 194 Mich App 543, 548; 487 NW2d 499 (1992); Heritage Broadcasting Co v Wilson Communications, Inc, 170 Mich App 812, 818; 428 NW2d 784 (1988).

Also, the trial court did not err in its legal interpretation of the applicable statutes and its holding that the 1990 taxes became a debt due on December 31, 1989. The taxable status of the subject property, its value, and defendant’s responsibility as the owner of record for the 1990 taxes were determined as of December 31, 1989, the day designated as the "tax day.” In 1990, MCL 211.2; MSA 7.2 provided, in pertinent part:

*653The taxable status of persons and real and personal property shall be determined as of each December 31, which shall be deemed the tax day
* * *
In any real estate transaction between private parties in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, the seller shall be responsible for that portion of said annual taxes levied during the 12 months immediately preceding, but not including, the day title passes, from the levy date or dates to, but not including, the day title passes and the buyer is responsible for the remainder of such annual taxes. As used in this paragraph "levy date” means the day on which any general property tax becomes due and payable. [Emphasis added.]

In 1990, MCL 211.40; MSA 7.81 provided, in pertinent part:

Notwithstanding any provisions in the charter of any city or village to the contrary, all taxes shall become a debt due to the township, city, village and county from the owner or person otherwise to be assessed on the tax day provided for in sections 2 and 13 of this act, and the amounts assessed on any interest in real property shall, on the first day of December, for state, county, village or township taxes or upon such day as may be heretofore or hereafter provided by charter of a city or village, become a lien upon such real property, and the lien for such amounts, and for all interest and charges thereon, shall continue until payment thereof. [Emphasis added.]

The trial court correctly ruled that on December 31, 1989, the tax day, all 1990 taxes became a "debt due” to the city, and defendant, as the owner of record, was the party obligated for pay*654ment.2 The property taxes were not "due and payable” until the date of levy. The proration of 1990 taxes between the buyer and seller provided for by the statute was inapplicable because the parties agreed to a different method of payment.

The designation of December 31 of the year preceding the calendar year in which the property taxes are levied has implications beyond the situation considered here. We note that in 1958, the tax day was moved back from January 1 to December 31 of the preceding year to permit accrual-basis taxpayers to take advantage of property tax deductions for federal income tax purposes in an earlier year accounting period than was possible under the former schedule. 2 Cameron, Michigan Real Property Law (2d ed), ch 28, Notes, p 1340. We also note that in 1994, the Legislature enacted 1994 PA 80, which amended MCL 211.40; MSA 7.81 to provide that, for taxes levied after 1994, the amounts assessed on any interest in real property shall become a lien on the real property on the tax day. Both of these changes in the law clearly indicate the Legislature’s intent that "the owner or person otherwise to be assessed” is obligated for the taxes for the ensuing year as of the tax day.

Plaintiffs’ reliance on Roseborough v Empire of America, 168 Mich App 92; 423 NW2d 578 (1987), and Bishop v Brown, 118 Mich App 819; 325 NW2d 594 (1982), is misplaced. In Roseborough, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant bank had failed to pay timely their real estate taxes as required by the parties’ mortgage agreement. The plaintiffs contended that the bank’s agreement to *655pay the taxes "when due” required payment of the 1984 winter taxes on December 1, 1984, the day collection commences and the amounts assessed become a lien on the property. The mortgage agreement provided that the plaintiffs were to make advance monthly installment payments on the taxes and insurance premiums, and the bank was obligated to pay the taxes and premiums "when due.” This Court held that the taxes were "due,” in the sense of being payable, at any time between December 1 and February 15, the date on which the unpaid taxes become delinquent, not just on December 1.

In Bishop, this Court construed a land contract whereby the purchaser agreed to pay all taxes when due. The question presented was when did the purchaser, who did not pay the taxes until after penalties were incurred, breach the land contract. As in Roseborough, the term "due” was equated with the word "payable.” This Court held that application of MCL 211.40; MSA 7.81 to the terms of the land contract required the conclusion "that though property taxes first become due in the sense that they may ñrst be paid on December 1, they do not become delinquent or past due until the following February 15.” Bishop, supra, p 827. (Emphasis added.)

Neither Roseborough nor Bishop interpreted the language "due and/or payable” in a buy/sell agreement whereby the parties were allocating the obligation to pay property taxes. In the case before us, the parties agreed that the seller was to be responsible for all taxes "due and/or payable at time of close.” The word "due” is not equated with the word "payable,” but is clearly distinguished from it. Thus, we cannot say that the parties intended that the word “due” be used in the same sense as the word "payable,” as was the case in *656Roseborough and Bishop. Rather, the phrase "due and/or payable” must be interpreted to distinguish the date on which the property taxes were "due” and the date on which they were "payable.”

We agree with the trial court that the "Exceptions” provision was clear and unambiguous. It took precedence over any other provision and, as a matter of law, obligated defendant to pay all the 1990 taxes because they were "due” at the time of closing in February 1990, even though they were not "due and payable” until the date of levy. Michigan Natl Bank v Auburn Hills, 193 Mich App 109, 110-111; 483 NW2d 436 (1992).

Affirmed.

Taylor, J., concurred.

Counts ii and m were later resolved by judgment and are not addressed in this appeal.

The word "due” is defined in The Random House College Dictionary: Revised Edition, as: "1. immediately owed: This bill is due. 2. owing or owed, irrespective of whether the time of payment has arrived. . . .”