dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority and am of the opinion that summary judgment was improperly granted in this case. Although I share in my colleagues’ admiration of the “venerable principles” of this state’s workers’ compensation system, it is my opinion that employers and insurers are free to negotiate for less than that to which they are entitled under G.L. 1956 § 28-33-25.1. See 2 John P. Ludington et al., Modern Workers Compensation § 204:16 at 27 (1993) (“A common question is whether a settlement of a tort claim releases a workers’ compensation claim, or whether the settlement of a workers’ compensation claim releases a tort claim”). Counsel for Rhode Island Hospital conceded as much at oral argument. However, the majority forecloses this possibility by interpreting the exclusivity and immunity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act (the act) to apply in all instances in which there is a settlement under § 28-33-25.1. I agree that, at first blush, it would appear that those provisions of the act might bar plaintiffs premises-liability claim. In my opinion, however, that is not a correct analysis because of the act’s definition of the term “injury” and because construing § 28-33-25.1 as foreclosing the ability of the parties to negotiate for less than a full and final release of all liability collides with the well-established canon of statutory interpretation that requires us to give meaning to every sentence in a statute. See Local W0, International Federation of Technical and Professional Engineers v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, 747 A.2d 1002, 1005 (R.I.2000) (“[W]e are mindful that ‘[t]his [C]ourt has long applied a canon of statutory interpretation which gives effect to all of a statute’s provisions, with no sentence, clause or word construed as unmeaning or surplusage.’ ”) (quoting Rhode Island Department *658of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals v. R.B., 549 A.2d 1028, 1030 (R.I.1988)).
The Exclusivity Clause and Waiver of Common-Law Rights
It has not been established that plaintiff suffered an injury, as that term is defined in the act, to trigger the act’s exclusivity provision. See Hawkes v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 764 A.2d 258, 261-62, 265 (Me.2001) (holding that the tort claims of an employee who released any and all claims under Maine’s workers’ compensation act were not barred, in part “because the personal injury claims * * * did not arise in the course of his employment,” thus rendering the immunity and exclusivity provisions inapplicable). The exclusivity provision of the act provides that “the remedy for an injury * * * shall be in lieu of all rights and remedies as to that injury now existing, either at common law or otherwise * * G.L. 1956 § 28-29-20 (emphasis added). However, “injury” is a defined term under the statute, which limits it to a “personal injury to an employee arising out of and in the course of his or her employment, connected and referable to the employment.” Section 28-29 — 2(7)(i). Whether plaintiffs broken femur was an injury as defined by the act was the very point of contention between the parties that led to their eventual settlement and the execution of the release. Further, after they successfully negotiated a resolution to the dispute, the parties asked the court to approve them proposed settlement agreement, and the court specifically found as a fact in the WCC decree that the “claimed injury * * * did not occur in the course of [plaintiff sj employment * * * connected therewith and referable thereto.” (Emphasis added.) Although the parties did not quibble about the fact that plaintiff fell and fractured her femur, it was established that this injury did not occur during the course of her employment. Indeed, they agreed that the injury did not so occur.
If the exclusivity provision contained in § 28-29-20 is construed to bar all claims of an employee against an employer after a settlement of a disputed claim under § 28-33-25.1, then the final sentence of § 28-33-25.1, which gives an employer the right to a duly executed release of all liability, would be rendered a nullity. In other words, the General Assembly’s inclusion of language entitling the employer to such a release after payment in accordance with a settlement under § 28-33-25.1 would be completely unnecessary if the exclusivity provision were interpreted to serve as an automatic bar to any further employer liability in every case in which there was a settlement of a disputed claim. In light of the statutory language, and in consideration of the canon of statutory interpretation requiring that meaning be given to every sentence, I cannot accept such a result.8 See Local 100, International Federation of Technical and Professional Engineers, 747 A.2d at 1005.
I dissent as well from the majority’s holding that Kulawas’s premises-liability claim also is barred because she waived her common-law rights when she did not reserve these rights under § 28-29-17 and because she received a workers’ compensation remedy under § 28-33-25.1. First, as the majority notes, “a payment approved by a judge of the WCC, in accordance with § 28-33-25.1, ‘shall not be deemed to be *659the payment of workers’ compensation benefits, but shall be considered a compromise payment of a disputed claim.’ ” (Emphases added.) This Court has said that “if an employee has not properly reserved his or her common-law rights under the act, he or she is barred from bringing a tort action against his or her employer if workers’ compensation benefits are appropriate.” Cianci, v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 659 A.2d 662, 668 (R.I.1995) (holding that the act immunizes the insurer as well as the employer) (emphasis omitted). In my view, an employee who has not reserved his or her common-law rights is prohibited from bringing a tort action only if workers’ compensation benefits were appropriate, which is not the case here.9 Again, for workers’ compensation benefits to be appropriate, there must be an injury that falls within the definition under the act. Also, in my opinion, construing § 28-29-17 to apply in every instance in which there is a settlement and accompanying remedy received under § 28-83-25.1 further would render the final sentence of that section entitling the employer to a release mere surplusage. Local 100, International Federation of Technical and Professional Engineers, 747 A.2d at 1005.
The Effect of Manzi
I acknowledge that in the case of Manzi v. State, 687 A.2d 461, 461-62 (R.I.1997) (mem.), this Court held, in an order, that a plaintiffs civil action, which was based on the same injuries that were the foundation of his settlement of a disputed workers’ compensation claim under § 28-83-25.1, was barred because the employee had signed an unquestionably comprehensive release of all liability stemming from the claimed injury. In our order, in dicta, we also observed that the exclusivity portion of the act would have barred the plaintiffs civil suit against his employer. Manzi, 687 A.2d at 461-62. In making that observation, however, we did not analyze the act’s definition of the word “injury.” Id. Therefore, I do not agree that the exclusivity clause, in and of itself, operates to bar civil claims in all situations where the parties have executed a release pursuant to § 28-33-25.1, because such a construction would reduce the final sentence of that section, entitling the employer to a release, to mere “surplusage.” Local 100, International Federation of Technical and Professional Engineers, 747 A.2d at 1005.
The Interpretation of the Release
After carefully examining the record, particularly the release, settlement proposal, and WCC decree, in a light most favorable to plaintiff as the nonmoving party, it is my opinion that there are genuine issues of material fact about whether plaintiffs release encompasses only her workers’ compensation claim or, alternatively, whether it extinguishes all claims, including her premises-liability claim. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Farr, 594 A.2d 379, 381 (R.I.1991) (citing Lennon v. MacGregor, 423 A.2d 820 (R.I.1980)). In the absence of a record that could illuminate what, if any, negotiations occurred between the parties concerning the release, and without evidence of their intent when they agreed to its terms, the release, in my opinion, is ambiguous. See 2 Modem Workers Compensation § 204:16 at 27 (explaining that the scope of a release “is primarily a question of intent as manifested by the settlement agreement terms”). Therefore, the extraordinary remedy of *660summary judgment was inappropriate, and I would vacate it. See Canavan v. Lovett, Schefrin and Harnett, 862 A.2d 778, 783 (R.I.2004) (citing Johnston v. Poulin, 844 A.2d 707, 710 (R.I.2004)). For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding.
APPENDIX A
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION RELEASE
WHEREAS, Grazina, Kulawas, of the Town of East Greenwich, State of Rhode Island, claims that on or about April 5, 2005, she suffered a work-related injury, to wit, a right femur fracture, which arose out of and in the course of her employment, which claimed injury is alleged to have been compensable under the provisions of the Rhode Island Workers’ Compensation Act.
WHEREAS, the said employer, Rhode Island Hospital/Lifespan and their workers’ compensation insurance carrier, The Beacon Mutual Insurance Company, denies the claimed work-related injury of the said petitioner, and
WHEREAS, there is a bona fide dispute existing between the parties as to whether or not the said petitioner is entitled to-workers’ compensation benefits for the claimed injury under the Workers’ Compensation Act of the State of Rhode Island, and
WHEREAS, the said petitioner requests and desires the payment from the said respondent of the sum of Forty-Eight Thousand ($48,000.00) Dollars to her in lieu of all payments of workers’ compensation for total, partial or specific compensation and all other expenses including medical and hospital expenses under the Workers’ Compensation Act of the State of Rhode Island, which amount under all the circumstances is admitted by all parties to be fair, adequate and reasonable.
NOW THEREFORE, I, Grazina Kula-was, for and in consideration of the sum of Forty-Eight Thousand ($48,000.00) Dollars to me, paid by Rhode Island Hospital/Lifespan and their workers’ compensation insurance carrier, The Beacon Mutual Insurance Company, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do hereby remise, release and forever quitclaim unto the said Rhode Island Hospital/Lifespan and their workers’ compensation insurance carrier, The Beacon Mutual Insurance Company, its successors and assigns, all due debts, claims, demands, actions or causes of actions, which I now have, ever had or in the future may have against said Rhode Island Hospital/Lifespan and their workers’ compensation insurance carrier, The Beacon Mutual Insurance Company, for the claimed injury under the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Statute of the State of Rhode Island, and more specifically any and all claims for compensation whether total, partial or specific, medical, hospital and any and all other expenses and any and all other payments provided for under the said Workers’ Compensation Act of the State of Rhode Island, by reason of the aforesaid claimed work related injury.
Without in any way limiting the foregoing, I hereby state that I voluntarily seek and desire the payment of the aforesaid sum, that I know of the petition now pending in the Workers’ Compensation Court in the State of Rhode Island wherein I am seeking compensation, medical expenses and other payments under the Workers’ Compensation Act of the State of Rhode Island; that I hereby expressly authorize my attorney, Gregory L. Boyer Esquire, to assent to a decision, decree or stipulation to be filed in the Workers’ Compensation Court whereby my petition for compensation for the claimed injury and all other *661relief under the Workers’ Compensation Act of the State of Rhode Island shall be denied and dismissed as a nonwork-related injury; that I further understand that by my acceptance of the aforesaid sum of money and by the entry of the aforesaid decision, decree or stipulation, I have set up an effective bar against my recovering any additional sum or sums of money for the claimed injury, under the Workers’ Compensation Act of the State of Rhode Island, and that I voluntarily seek and desire payment of the aforesaid sum having full knowledge of the above facts.
This release is specific to the claim that the injury is work-related and does not bar possible nonwork-related claims.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal in duplicate original in Providence on this 2nd day of March, A.D., 2006.
/s/ Grazina Kulawas Grazina Kulawas
Executed in the presence of:
/s/ [Signature]
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
PROVIDENCE, SC.
On this 2nd day of March, 2006, before me personally appeared Grazina Kulawas, to me known and known by me to be the party described in the aforesaid instrument and who executed the above instrument and acknowledged to me that she executed the same.
/s/ [Signature] Notary Public
. In my view, the fact that the 258-page act contains no other provision for an "entitlement” to a release bolsters the conclusion that the General Assembly intended for this provision not to automatically release all liability, but to allow the employer to negotiate it in a release.
. It is worth noting that in Cianci v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 659 A.2d 662, 664 (R.I.1995), the injured worker had collected workers’ compensation benefits for more than a decade before bringing a tort action against the insurer. Clearly, workers' compensation benefits were "appropriate” in that case.