The defendant appeals from a conviction for obtaining money under false pretenses. The assignments of error relate to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction.
The information charged that from July 1965 to December 1969, the defendant obtained money in excess of $35 from Douglas County, Nebraska, by false pretenses. The jury fixed the value of the money obtained at $3,000.
The evidence shows that defendant is the mother of 9 children and is divorced from William Bohannon, Sr. She applied for Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) in the early 1960’s, and received a grant of $195 per month. In July 1967, the grant was increased to $344 per month. From July 1965 through December 1969, she received $13,654.50 in ADC funds.
Eligibility for a grant under the ADC program is determined in part by the resources of the recipient. A parent and 9 children are allowed a maximum of $1,700 in liquid assets under the plan in force in Nebraska. At 6-month intervals a recipient is required to furnish a written statement of assets to the welfare department. This statement is used by the department to determine *596whether the recipient is eligible to continue to receive a grant under the program.
In 1965, the defendant moved into a house at 4416 North Thirty-eighth Street in Omaha, Nebraska. On July 7, 1965, the defendant, using the name of Ophelia M. Jones, had entered into a contract to purchase this property on an installment basis. The contract was recorded in November 1965. She represented to the welfare department that this property was owned by Clifford E. Jones and that she was renting it for $75 per month.
On April 29, 1966, the defendant opened a checking account in the Ames Plaza Bank, using the name of Ophelia M. Bohannon. On May 9, 1966, the account was changed to a joint account in the names of Clifford or Ophelia M. Jones.
On September 29, 1967, a certificate of title to a 1967 Cadillac automobile was issued to the defendant, using the name of Ophelia M. Jones.
In February 1968, the defendant, using the name of Ophelia Jones, entered into a contract with Clifford E. Jones for the purchase of a property at 2407 Ames Avenue where Jones operated a music shop known as Psychedelic Sounds. The contract was recorded in February 1968.
On July 23, 1969, a certificate of title to a 1966 Chevrolet automobile was issued to the defendant, using the name of Ophelia M. Jones.
The record contains 6 asset statements signed by the defendant dated October 18, 1965, August 26, 1966, March 15, 1967, September 20, 1967, January 30, 1969, and September 15, 1969. The checking account, the real estate, and the automobiles are not listed on any of these statements.
The defendant claims that she has no beneficial interest in any of the items which were omitted from the asset statements. She contends that the checking account, the real estate, and the automobiles, are really the property of Clifford E. Jones and that Jones placed the *597property in her name in an effort to avoid any claim by his divorced wife. Jones testified that he was the owner of the property in question.
The records of the welfare department show that on November 15, 1967, a neighbor complained that the defendant was “buying property, driving a 1968 Cadillac and living with a man.” A caseworker called on the defendant to discuss the complaint. The defendant told the caseworker that Jones, her landlord, was “divorced and desires arrangements to keep his property from his ex-wife and children. Therefore, he wanted to place his new car and some property he had bought in her name.” The caseworker advised the defendant “to have the name changed on this car registration and property.” About 6 weeks later the department ascertained that a Cadillac automobile was registered under the name of Ophelia M. Jones. On February 8, 1968, the caseworker again visited the defendant and “emphasized the importance of Mr. Jones putting the car into his name.”
Apparently, the department did nothing further until 1970 when the records in the courthouse were examined and it was ascertained that the Cadillac was still registered in the defendant’s name and that she was a party to the contract to purchase the property on Ames Avenue. Her grant was then suspended as of January 1, 1970, and her case closed on April 1, 1970, “because of assets in excess of eligibility.”
The gist of the offense is obtaining the money of another by false pretenses, with the intent to cheat and defraud. Dwoskin v. State, 161 Neb. 793, 74 N. W. 2d 847. The evidence of the State tended to prove that the defendant was the owner of the property omitted from the asset statements. The jury was not required to believe the testimony of the defendant and Jones that she had no beneficial interest in the property. It is not the province of this court to determine the credibility of witnesses or weigh the evidence in a criminal case.
An essential element of the offense is that there be re*598liance upon the representations made. Beyl v. State, 165 Neb. 260, 85 N. W. 2d 653. The pretense must be an effective cause in inducing the owner to part with his property, and if the owner has knowledge of the truth, the offense has not been committed. However, the pretense need not be the .sole moving cause that induced the owner to part with his property. Wax v. State, 43 Neb. 18, 61 N. W. 117.
To the extent that the welfare department had knowledge of the defendant’s ownership; of property omitted from the asset statements there was no reliance on the asset statements. The record does not show that the welfare department had any information conoeming the checking account, the property on Ames Avenue, or the 1966 .Chevrolet automobile until after December 1969. As to these items, the jury could find that the welfare department relied upon the asset statements.
The defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish an intent to cheat and defraud the county. The intent to cheat and defraud may be proved by the circumstances surrounding the transaction. State v. Swanson, 179 Neb. 693, 140 N. W. 2d 618.
The defendant argues that she did not want to have the grant continued; that it was reinstated in 1969 without any request from her after a 3-month suspension; and that she did not appeal from the action of the department in closing her case in. 1970. The record shows that the defendant could have terminated the grant at any time by a written request to the department. If the defendant did not want the money, she could have returned the checks instead of cashing them. The fact that she did not comply with the advice of the caseworker in regard to the ,Cadillac automobile and the property on Thirty-eighth Street was a circumstance, to be considered by the jury in determining her intent.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Affirmed.