dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Although the majority recognizes that tax exemption statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of taxation (Fairview Haven v. Department of Revenue (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 763, 770, 506 N.E.2d 341), it fails to properly apply the rule in the present case. Section 19.7 of the Revenue Act of 1939, on which the taxpayer relies, exempts property used for charitable purposes only “when such property is actually and exclusively used for such charitable or beneficent purposes.” (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 120, par. 500.7.) The majority fails to consider the word “actually” in the statute when it concludes that property in the process of development for possible future charitable use qualifies for exemption under this provision. Statutes should be construed so that no term is rendered superfluous or meaningless. (Niven v. Siqueira (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 357, 365, 487 N.E.2d 937; Bloese v. Board of Education (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 460, 464, 485 N.E.2d 1276.) Moreover, when terms of a statute are not specifically defined, they should be given their ordinary and popularly understood meanings. (Niven v. Siqueira (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 357, 366, 487 N.E.2d 937; Department of Revenue v. Smith (1986), 150 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 1047, 501 N.E.2d 1370.) The word “actually” is defined as “in act or fact *** at the present moment *** in point of fact: in truth” (Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1975).) It seems apparent from the use of the word “actually” in section 19.7 of the'Revenue Act that vacant property not now applied to any charitable purpose does not qualify for tax exempt status. The fact that the taxpayer owner of the property presently plans to devote unspecified portions of it to charitable purposes at some time in the future should not be deemed sufficient to permit the property an exempt status now. It is the actual use of the property which governs the issue and it is undisputed that no charitable purposes have been served thereon in the tax year 1983, or subsequent years.
The cases relied upon by the majority do not alter the plain meaning of the language used in section 19.7 of the Revenue Act. In re Application of County Collector (1977), 48 Ill. App. 3d 572, 362 N.E.2d 1335, was decided under section 19.9 of the Revenue Act, which did not contain the word “actually.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 120, par. 500.9.) Likewise, neither Illinois Institute of Technology v. Skinner (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 59, 273 N.E.2d 371, nor People ex rel. Pearsall v. Catholic Bishop (1924), 311 Ill. 11, 142 N.E.2d 520, were decided under statutory provisions which explicitly required that the property actually be used for the exempt purpose. Skinner concerned a tax exemption under section 19.1 of the Revenue Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 120, par. 500.1), and Pearsall involved an exemption provision which exempted “[a]ll property used exclusively for religious purposes, or used exclusively for school and religious purposes or for orphanages.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1923, ch. 120, par. 2; People ex rel. Pearsall v. Catholic Bishop (1924), 311 Ill. 11, 15, 142 N.E.2d 520.) None of the cases relied on by the majority addressed a situation where, as here, the statute unequivocally requires actual use for the exempt purposes. This court should follow the mandate of the legislature and require evidence that the property is actually used for charitable purposes before allowing it to be exempt from taxation.
. I also agree with the defendants’ argument that In re Application of County Collector is factually distinguishable from the present case. In County Collector the court held that publicly owned land being developed for the purpose of constructing a highway was exempt from taxation. (In re Application of County Collector (1977), 48 Ill. App. 3d 572, 581, 362 N.E.2d 1335.) This court is considering privately held property for which the owners seek a charitable tax exemption while a planned Urgent Care Center is under construction. This court has recently found that in order for a medical facility to qualify for a tax exemption under section 19.7 of the Revenue Act the exempting use must be the facility’s primary use and any nonexempting use be merely incidental. (Highland Park Hospital v. Department of Revenue (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 272.) In this case, the developers acknowledge that substantial portions of the property will be used for noncharitable purposes and, at this stage, there is no way of knowing whether the proposed medical facility will ever, in fact, be used primarily for charitable purposes.
Finally, the majority mistakenly suggests that plaintiff is qualified for a tax exemption for the entire year of 1983. Under section 27a of the Revenue Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 120, par. 508a) property which is transferred for a use which is exempt from taxation is only “exempt from taxes from the date of the right of possession, payment or deposit of the award therefor.” Hence, even if plaintiff was entitled to an exemption for 1983, the amount of the exemption must also be prorated from the date of plaintiff’s acquisition of the property for charitable purposes.
I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County which upheld the decisions of the Du Page County board of review and the Illinois Department of Revenue in denying the claimed tax exemption.