On July 31, 1984, appellant Backman pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute heroin. D.C.Code § 33-541(a)(l) (1986 Supp.).1 Pursuant to the mandatory minimum sentencing provision, id. § 33-541(c)(1), Backman was sentenced to a prison term of four to twelve years. Renewing the same argument he raised before the sentencing judge, Backman claims that, as a cocaine addict, he is eligible for waiver of the mandatory minimum sentencing requirement because he falls within the addict exception. See id. § 33-541(c)(2).2 After reviewing the statute and its legislative history, we must agree with the trial court that Backman was ineligible for a § 33-541(c)(2) waiver of the minimum four-year sentence under § 33-541(c)(l).
I
In 1981, the Council of the District of Columbia adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act of 1981 (UCSA),3 D.C. Law 4-52 (codified at D.C. Code §§ 33-501, -567 (1986 Supp.)), to combat the problems of drug abuse and drug dependence in the District. See Council of the District of Columbia, Report of Committee on Judiciary, D.C. Uniform Controlled Substances Act of 1981 at 1 (April 8, 1981) (Judiciary Comm. Report). The UCSA classifies the substances it controls into five categories called schedules. These schedules are primarily based upon the medical use of the substances, their potential for abuse, and *925their potential to produce psychological or physiological dependence. D.C. Code §§ 33-513, -515 (1986 Supp.). The penalty structure of the UCSA distinguishes between “those substances controlled under Schedule[s] I and II which are narcotics and those which are non-narcotics.” Judiciary Comm. Report at 5.
In this regard, the UCSA amended the definition of “narcotic drug” to exclude cocaine. Judiciary Comm. Report at 18. Compare D.C. Code § 33-501(14) (1981) with id. § 33-501 (15) (1986 Supp.). The Council’s decision to remove cocaine and any of its derivatives from the earlier statutory listing of narcotic substances was based upon the opinion of the medical community and the Drug Enforcement Administration that “[cocaine] is not a narcotic.” Judiciary Comm. Report at 18. The result of this amendment was to punish cocaine abuse more leniently than narcotics abuse. Compare D.C. Code § 33-541(a)(2)(A), -(b)(2)(A) (1986 Supp.) with id. § 33-541(a)(2)(B), -(b)(2)(B).
On June 7, 1983, District voters passed the Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Initiative of 1981. The intiative created several amendments to the UCSA, including those contained in D.C. Code §§ 33-541(c)(l) and (2) (1986 Supp.). Pursuant to § 33-541(c)(1)(A), anyone convicted of possession with intent to distribute a Schedule I or II “narcotic drug” must serve a mandatory minimum sentence of not less than four years, whereas under § 33-541(c)(l)(B), anyone convicted of possession with intent to distribute “any other” substance classified under Schedule I, II, or III must serve a mandatory minimum sentence of not less than 20 months.
Under § 33-541(c)(2), known as the addict exception, a first-time offender of the UCSA may, in the sentencing court’s discretion, be exempted from mandatory minimum sentencing if the court determines that the offender, who distributed or possessed with intent to distribute a Schedule I, II or III substance, was (1) an “addict” at the time of the violation and (2) committed the offense “for the primary purpose of obtaining a narcotic drug which he [or she] required for his [or her] personal use because of his [or her] addiction to such drug” (emphasis added).
In appellant’s case, the conviction for possession with intent to distribute heroin, a Schedule I narcotic substance, triggered the mandatory sentencing provision of the UCSA. At the time of sentencing, however, Backman stated that he had sold the heroin to support his cocaine habit. He then invoked the addict exception to § 33-541(c)(1)(A), claiming that, as a cocaine addict, he was eligible for possible waiver of the mandatory sentencing requirement.
The sentencing judge ruled that the statutory definition of an addict included only those individuals who were addicted to a narcotic substance. Since Backman was addicted to cocaine, a substance the UCSA classifies as a non-narcotic, the sentencing judge found him ineligible for waiver of the mandatory minimum sentencing provision.
II
The voter initiative, which proposed the addict exception, defined an “addict” as “any individual who habitually uses any narcotic drug so as to endanger the public morals, health, safety, or welfare, or who is or has been so far addicted to the use of such narcotic drug as to have lost the power of self-control with reference to his [or her] addiction.” D.C. Code § 33-501(24) (1986 Supp.) (emphasis added). Backman challenges his exclusion from the addict exception of the UCSA, arguing that the statutory definition of an addict should be interpreted to include cocaine addicts. He reasons that the meaning of the word “narcotic” is ambiguous because the UCSA amendments were enacted through the voter initiative process, as contrasted with a bill enacted by the Council. He speculates that the District voters, as distinguished from the Council, intended the dictionary definition of narcotic — which, includes cocaine — rather than the statutory defini*926tion.4 He also argues that to interpret the addict exception to exclude cocaine addiction leads to the anomalous result of denying cocaine addicts the possibility of drug rehabilitation counseling without incarceration—an alternative sentencing mechanism available to heroin addicts—even though the same statutory scheme sentences heroin abuse more severely than cocaine abuse.
We are unpersuaded by appellant’s reasoning. The manner in which the statute was enacted has no bearing on interpreting the statute. We must hold the legislature and the citizenry to the same standards when interpreting the laws they enact. We must treat amendment by initiative the same as amendment by Council legislation, for once the District voters approve an initiative, it becomes an “act of the Council, ... and thus ‘law’ through the channel designated for the particular type of act adopted.” Convention Center Referendum Committee v. District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics, 441 A.2d 889, 896-97 (D.C.1981) (en banc) (citations omitted).
When the District voters passed upon the 1981 initiative, they were instructed that the initiative was intended to amend certain portions of the pre-existing UCSA. Thus, they could be expected to use the UCSA as a reference point for any term that was not defined by the initiative itself. We must assume that the District voters relied on the statutory definition of “narcotic” in D.C. Code § 33-501(15) (1986 Supp.). In this instance, therefore, the plain language of the statute is dispositive. United States v. Bailey, 495 A.2d 756, 760 (D.C.1985) (citing Peoples Drug Stores v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 753-54 (D.C.1983) (en banc). The initiative defined “addict” by reference only to a “narcotic drug.” D.C. Code § 33-501(24) (1986 Supp.). Cocaine and its derivatives are specifically excluded from this statutory definition. Id. § 33-501(15).
We observe that the exclusion of cocaine or any of its derivatives from the definition of narcotic substances was not the result of an oversight in drafting the statute. The legislative history of the UCSA shows that the Council consciously decided to remove cocaine from the earlier statutory listing of narcotic substances. The Council’s decision was based upon the then prevailing medical and scientific opinion that cocaine was not a narcotic. See Judiciary Comm. Report at 18 & nn. 10, 11.
Given that appellant was allegedly addicted to cocaine, a substance the UCSA classifies as a non-narcotic drug, the sentencing judge was not empowered to invoke the addict exception to the mandatory minimum sentencing requirement.
Ill
Appellant also raises an equal protection challenge to the sentencing scheme of the UCSA. He argues that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between addiction to cocaine and addiction to heroin when considering one’s eligibility for the addict exception.
Since appellant does not claim that the statute’s sentencing provision impinges upon a fundamental right or involves a suspect class, we can validly presume that statute’s constitutionality. City of New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2517, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976). The statute will withstand appellant’s challenge if its sentencing distinctions are rationally related to a legitimate state interest. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1104-05, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Wilson v. District of Columbia, 338 A.2d 437, 438 (D.C.1975).
*927Our inquiry into the existence of a rational basis for the distinctions of the UCSA is limited to “whether any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for it.” United States v. Thorne, 325 A.2d 764, 766 (D.C.1974) (quoting United States v. Carotene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-54, 58 S.Ct. 778, 784, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938)).
At the time the addict exception to the UCSA was enacted, cocaine was not considered to be pharmacologically addictive. Hence, there was a rational basis for excluding cocaine users from a provision that was intended to benefit first-time offenders of the UCSA, who violated the statute because of their physical dependence on a narcotic substance. Apparently, the Council and District voters reasoned that these latter offenders would benefit from a sentencing mechanism that would include drug rehabilitation counseling as an alternative to incarceration.
Recently, there has been an increasing debate in the scientific community over the physiological and psychological effects of cocaine.5 Some authorities opine that cocaine is pharmacologically addictive, while others maintain that it is not. In view of this scientific uncertainty, there is still some rational basis for the distinctions contained in the UCSA.
We are not free to disregard the constraints of the law in resolving this issue. The Council and District voters enacted the UCSA to combat the District’s pervasive drug problem. Any need to revise the statute because of the hardships which appellant alleges are faced by cocaine addicts because of the drug’s current classification under the UCSA must be addressed in the first instance, to the Council or the District voters. Accordingly, appellant’s sentence is
Affirmed.
. Appellant’s conviction under the statute arose in connection with a sale to an undercover police officer.
. In addition to filing a timely notice of appeal from his conviction, Backman also appealed from the trial judge’s denial of his motion to modify or reduce the challenged sentence. Both appeals have been consolidated into this one action.
.The UCSA replaced the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, D.C.Code §§ 33-501 et seq. and the Dangerous Drug Act for the District of Columbia, id. §§ 33-701 et seq.
. Webster’s Seventh New College Dictionary defines "Narcotic” as “1: a drug (as opium) that in moderate doses dulls the senses, relieves pain, and induces profound sleep but in excessive doses causes stupor, coma, or convulsions 2: something that soothes, relieves, or lulls.” The same source defines "cocaine” as a "bitter, crystalline alkaloid C17H21NO4 obtained from coca leaves and used as a narcotic and local anesthetic.”
. Appellant urges that more recent scientific evidence suggests that cocaine may be more powerful than heroin, pointing to Marvin Snyder, the director of preclinical research at the National Institute on Drug Abuse, and to findings by a psycho-pharmacologist, Ronald K. Siegel, that cocaine is physically addicting; he also notes the clinical use of drug treatment of cocaine abusers which is similar to that used for heroin abusers, citing Science Digest, October 1984.