concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur, generally, in the opinion of the court except for Part V(B) — The Waiver in This Case.
By all accounts, appellant Dr. Shao T. Hsu is a gentleman of education, intelligence, confidence and arrogance. He is *988wealthier than most, and while our solicitude extends to the rich and to the poor when evaluating a waiver of the right to representation by counsel, we must bear in mind that we are concerned here with the retention of counsel of one’s choice and not the appointment of counsel by the court.1 The controlling authorities must, in my view, be read in light of this fact, for it is not without significance that the accused in those cases were almost without exception persons who have no ready access to counsel. E. g., Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). There is no question here of offering counsel to appellant or denying appellant’s request for counsel. Nevertheless, while appellant had an absolute constitutional right to represent himself at his trial, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), and the court could not have forced him to retain an attorney,2 it is a fact that
When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must “knowingly and intelligently” forgo those relinquished benefits. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S., at 464-465, 58 S.Ct. 1019. Cf. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-724, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (plurality opinion of Black, J.). Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that “he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. at 279, 63 S.Ct. at 242. [Id., 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541.]
The majority faults the trial judge for not being more explicit in his questioning of Dr. Hsu about his decision to proceed to trial pro se, suggesting that appellant failed to appreciate the seriousness of the charges against him. Actually, the conduct with which appellant was charged was simple: that in a specified previous trial, on one occasion, he lied under oath.3 The indictment so charged, in one concise count. The record is clear that appellant understood this charge; that he persistently denied that he had lied (charging, in turn, that the witnesses against him perjured themselves); and, indeed, that he did consider the matter trivial. But the trial judge did not, and patiently explained to appellant each step in the criminal proceedings. The significance of appellant’s statement that the trial court could easily determine who was right and who was wrong, in which the court acquiesced, is not apparent. The statement was made in the context of the government’s insistence that the trial be by jury, but the trial was not a difficult one, even for a jury.4 The fact that appellant was *989charged with perjury, a felony, made it no more complex.
The majority dismisses appellant’s previous trial experience, including jury trials, as inconsequential.5 It is fair to say, however, that from these experiences appellant was thoroughly familiar with his right to counsel and preferred — indeed insisted — on representing himself. I do not suggest that appellant was as knowledgeable in substantive law or legal procedure as an experienced attorney. Yet he did receive considerable assistance from the court, and displayed surprising aptitude in the handling of his ease. For example, appellant moved well before trial to dismiss the indictment, albeit on factual rather than legal grounds, and appeared at the time to be familiar with the criminal rule of the trial court. Before trial,6 Dr. Hsu participated with competence in a lengthy voir dire of the jurors and the court’s rather intricate process of jury selection. The trial judge was concerned because of the extensive publicity about Dr. Hsu’s business activities, and was careful to voir dire the prospective jurors for possible bias. In all, eleven prospective jurors were stricken for cause. During the trial itself, appellant exhibited considerable skill in his examination and cross-examination of witnesses, in making objections,7 and presenting his defense. True, his own opening statement and testimony tended to be argumentative, but the court, where necessary, directed his remarks to the elicitation of facts. For my part, after scrutiny of the record, Dr. Hsu’s conduct of this trial cannot be categorized as inept.
Appellant’s motion for new trial also demonstrated his comprehension of the criminal proceedings against him and his confidence in his ability to proceed pro se. In it he alleged that because a majority of jurors were tenants, the jury was prejudiced against him; because of the widespread publicity about his affairs, the jury was biased against him. He also alleged that the jury did not understand that according to the statute (D.C.Code 1973, § 22-2501), to return a verdict of guilty on the charge of perjury, the jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt not only that the accused testified falsely but also that he did not, at the time, believe his testimony to be true; and, further that perjury cannot be proved by the uncorroborated testimony of one witness. These alleged errors were preserved for appeal, but have not been sustained in the opinion of the court.
The court’s opinion commends to the trial court’s consideration the concerns of Mr. Justice Black in Von Moltke v. Gillies, supra, that is, apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included therein, the range of allowable punishments, circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter (whatever they may be). In my opinion, Dr. Hsu understood the nature of the charges. No lesser-included statutory offenses have been suggested, nor any mitigating or “other facts” advanced to indicate that Dr. Hsu’s decision, which the majority recognizes was unhesitating and unequivocal, was less than knowing or intelligent. Only the range of allowable punishments (which appear in the statute with which appellant was familiar) does not appear to have been' told to appellant. I would not hold this one flaw to be fatal, however, in the circumstances of this case.
The authorities speak often about the old saying that one who represents himself in court has a fool for a client. It is clear, *990however, that whatever else he is,8 Dr. Hsu is no fool. This is one instance, probably a rare one, where I would conclude that
. although explicit warning and advice by the court may be necessary in some cases, ... to give adequate assurance that any waiver of the right to counsel is knowing and voluntary, on the facts of this case, we find that the court’s failure to do so was not error. [United States v. Rosenthal, 470 F.2d 837, 845 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909, 93 S.Ct. 2298, 36 L.Ed.2d 975 (1972) (citations omitted).]
I would affirm.
. Despite some rather expansive language, I do not read the majority opinion as saying that Dr. Hsu was entitled to appointed counsel.
. “[I]t is one thing to hold that every defendant, rich or poor, has the right to the assistance of counsel, and quite another to say that a State may compel a defendant to accept a lawyer he does not want.” Faretta v. California, supra at 833, 95 S.Ct. at 2540.
. Dr. Hsu was charged with saying: “Anyway, I have never received any order from Marshall. I have never received it. If I knew about the order, I would be looking for it, but the first time I knew about it was on that day the Clerk of Judge in Chambers called me and said I should come down here. That’s the first time I knew anything about it. He called me at home by telephone. That’s the first time I ever heard about the order.” Hsu adamantly maintained in the trial court that this statement was true.
.The trial judge instructed the jury at the start of trial that “[t]he nub of this case is the issue of did the doctor, or did he not, not tell the truth on the issue of service of this document.”
.Some of the cases in which Dr. Hsu appeared pro se are cited in the government’s brief, p. 8. See also sentencing transcript, R. 184 et seq. Dr. Hsu has retained counsel on appeal for the purpose of writing the brief. E. g., Hsu v. District of Columbia, Nos. 11227, 11228, 11241.
. Jury selection was completed on the evening of September 9, 1976. The trial itself began and ended on September 10, 1976.
. One such objection, which illustrates appellant’s perception of the proceedings was: *990“Your Honor, this is a perjury case, not going through a landlord case again. The housing violation, it has nothing to do with it.”
. At sentencing the trial judge expressed his opinion to Dr. Hsu: “You have no respect for the truth. You have no respect for the American justice system. You have spread the cancer of lies and deceit throughout this court unparalleled in my memory. There is not a division of this court that has not suffered from the lies . . . .”