concurring in part and dissenting in part. The result announced herein is incomplete inasmuch as it does not make Countiss whole by providing that she be reimbursed for the heavier teaching/coaching load, as compared to male coaches, which she shouldered for three years. In addition, the majority fails to address a troublesome issue in this case — the propriety of the hearing examiner’s finding that a doctorate was not the terminal degree in physical education, notwithstanding the Iona fide belief of educators at Trenton State University that it was the terminal degree. Finally, I cannot accept the majority’s implication that the *600Division on Civil Rights may lack the power to order reinstatement with tenure. Such a suggestion contravenes N. J. S. A. 10:5-17, which explicitly grants the Division authority to order any person who has violated the provisions of the Act to “take such affirmative action * * * as * * * will effectuate the purpose of this act * *
I
The hearing examiner found that Countiss had been the victim of discrimination in the scheduling of her work:
* * * [T]he work schedule for coaches was such that it discriminated against women and imposed greater burdens upon them which made it difficult for the complainant to arrange doctoral study time.
The Director of the Division on Civil Rights adopted the above finding and went on to find that,
* * * Respondents discriminated against the Complainant by imposing a heavier work load on her than on male teacher-coaches under the policy on release time for coaching discussed by the Hearing Examiner.
Averaged out over the year, the men’s varsity basketball coaches had to teach only seven hours of classes a week, while the women’s varsity basketball coach, Countiss, had to teach ten hours of classes.1 She received credit for four hours *601of teaching, out of a required twelve hour per week load, during the second and third quarters of the school year when women’s basketball was in season. The men’s varsity basketball coaches received five hours of credit over the entire year, even though their season was at most two weeks longer than the women’s season. I concur in the holding of the Court that this disparity in work load discriminated against Countiss on the basis of sex, see ante at 594-595 and would uphold that finding of the Division on Civil Rights as affirmed by the Appellate Division.
However, the majority does not address the consequences of this act of discrimination against Countiss. Since we have found that Countiss, in effect, was forced to work longer hours than male coaches because of unlawful sex discrimination, justice requires that she be made whole for her extra work. On the present record, it would be improper for this Court to fix an amount which would reimburse 'Countiss for her work above and beyond that normally required in a twelve-hour teaching week. I would therefore remand this ease to the Division on Civil Rights to determine the amount of back pay owed Countiss for the heavier teaching responsibilities imposed upon her.2 Such a remedy is expressly authorized by N. J. 8. A. 10:5-17 which mandates that the Director order a violator of the Law Against Discrimination to take such affirmative action, "including, but not limited to, hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of employees, with or without bach pay * * * as * * * will effectuate the purpose of this act * * *” (emphasis added). Since N. J. S. A. 10: 5-4 makes freedom from sex discrimination a civil right, back pay to make the victim of such discrimination whole is surely consistent with the Act’s purpose.
*602II
A troubling aspect of this case, which was not fully addressed by the majority, is the hearing examiner’s conclusion that “* * * the respondents did not establish clearly that the terminal degree for coaches is a doctorate.” This finding was not relied upon by the Director of the Division on Civil Rights, as he held that even assuming the validity of such a requirement, discrimination in release time prevented Coun-tiss from acquiring a significant number of credits toward the doctorate. However, I believe that the hearing examiner acted improperly, given the record before him, in not adopting the criteria for tenure set by Trenton State College. As the majority points out in a different context, the considerations which apply with respect to qualifications for employment or promotion in private employment and those applicable to a college instructor are not the same. See ante at 596-598.
The highly regulated sphere of public education is not analogous to a private factory with various production units. Tenure requirements are more subjective because the needs of a particular department in a particular school are generally unique. Moreover, the commitment of employment made to a tenured faculty member is without counterpart in the private sector. Thus, I can only conclude that the hearing examiner erred in applying the strict business necessity test of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 434, 431-433, 91 S. Ct. 849, 38 L. Ed. 3d 158 (1971), when judging the propriety of Trenton State’s selection of the doctorate as the terminal degree for members of the Department of Health and Physical Education.
It was well known that for several years the Chancellor of the New Jersey Department of Higher Education had been urging state colleges to require doctorates of those to whom they granted tenure. Moreover, in the fall of 1971 the National Association of State Directors of Teacher Education Certification’s team of evaluators found a serious need *603for additional faculty members with doctorates in the Department of Health and Physical Education. With respect to that department’s masters degree program, the need for more faculty with doctorates was deemed critical. In light of these factors, the hearing examiner abused his discretion in refusing to credit Trenton State’s determination that a doctorate was the proper terminal degree for members of the Department of Health and Physical Education.
The Division on Civil Eights is not competent to select or reject tenure criteria for colleges. That is a matter for the expertise of educators. Since the selection of a doctorate as the terminal degree in Countiss’ department was not shown to be bottomed on an improper discriminatory motive, the Division on Civil Eights could concern itself only with assuring non-discriminatory implementation of that valid criterion for tenure. While I sympathize with Countiss’ frustration in not receiving tenure despite her demonstrated ability to teach and coach, it would be equally as improper for a court to determine the proper criteria for tenure as it would be for the Division on 'Civil Eights.
Ill
Lastly, I am troubled by the dicta in the majority opinion which implies that the Division on Civil Eights may not order reinstatement with tenure to remedy a college’s act of discrimination. See ante at 596-598. While such a remedy must be granted sparingly, and only where it will not harm the educational institution, it is plainly contemplated by the Law Against Discrimination. The following provisions of that Act make manifest the legislative intent:
The Legislature finds and declares that practices of discrimination against any of its inhabitants, because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, sex, marital status, liability for service in the Armed Forces of the United States, or nationality, are a matter of concern to the government of the State, and that such discrimination threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of the inhabitants *604of the State but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic State; * » *
[W J. S. A. 10:5-3]
There is created in the Department of Law and Public Safety a division known as “The Division on Civil Eights” with power to prevent and eliminate discrimination in the manner prohibited by this act against persons because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status or sex ^ *
IN. J. S. A. 10 :5 — 6]
Where discrimination is found, the Legislature intended that the Division on Civil Rights have broad remedial powers:
If, upon all evidence at the hearing the director shall find that the respondent has engaged in any unlawful employment practice or unlawful discrimination as defined in this act, the director shall state his findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall issue and cause to be served on such respondent an order requiring such respondent to cease and desist from such unlawful employment practice or unlawful discrimination and to take such affirmative action, including, but not limited to, hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of employees, with or without back pay, or restoration to membership, in any respondent labor organization, or extending full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges to all persons, as, in the judgment of the director, will effectuate the purpose of this act, and including a requirement for report of the manner of compliance. * * * The director shall have the power to' use reasonably certain bases, including but not limited to list, catalogue or market prices or values, or contract or advertised terms and conditions, in order to determine particulars or performance in giving appropriate remedy.
IN. J. S. A. 10:5-17 (emphasis added)]
In Jackson v. Concord Co., 54 N. J. 113 (1969), this Court commented on the legislative policy expressed in N. J. S. A. 10:5 — 17.
* * * it is patently clear that the Legislature intended to create an effective enforcement agency in order to eradicate the cancer of discrimination.
[54 N. J. at 124]
*605Although reinstatement has been a common remedy in situations where an already tenured faculty member is wrongfully discharged, see Endress v. Brookdale Community College, 144 N. J. Super. 109 (App. Div. 1976); Viemeister v. Prospect Park Boro Bd. of Ed., 5 N. J. Super. 215 (App. Div. 1949); American Ass’n of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 129 N. J. Super. 249 (Ch. Div. 1974), aff’d 136 N. J. Super. 442 (App. Div. 1975); Walker v. Wildwood Bd. of Ed., 120 N. J. L. 408 (Sup. Ct. 1938), the remedy of requiring a college to grant tenure to a faculty member is relatively novel. However, in Flanders v. William Paterson College, 163 N. J. Super. 225 (App. Div. 1976). the Division on Civil Eights made such an order. Where the Division properly found that age was “at very least a conscious factor” in the decision to deny retention and tenure to Dr. Elanders, its order that he be offered reinstatement with its accompanying tenure plus back pay was upheld.
I would have difficulty with any expansive use of the Division’s power to grant reinstatement with tenure. However, this does not mean that the Division on Civil Eights may never order a college to grant tenure to a faculty member. Given the wording of N. J. S. A. 10:5-17, such a holding would seem to fly in the face of the express intent of the Legislature that victims of employment discrimination be made whole. In the instant case, for example, the record indicates that Countiss was a respected member of the faculty. Thus, if the Court were convinced that sex discrimination was indeed the cause of her denial of tenure, affirmance of the order below that Countiss be accorded tenure would be proper. Were we to conclude that the doctorate requirement was discriminatorily motivated, or that male teacher-coaches were not required to have doctorates, there would be no reasonable alternative to that of granting Countiss tenure. Surely we would be duty bound to make her whole by ordering her reinstatement with tenure. Of course, where a given instructor clearly lacks *606an important qualification for tenure, a remedy other than ordering tenure must suffice, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff was the victim of discrimination.
In sum, I concur in the holding that the discrimination suffered by Countiss was not the cause of her failure to achieve tenure. I also concur in the vacating of the earnings differential reflective of what Countiss would have earned had she been a tenured faculty member from 1973, which had been awarded to her by the Division on Civil Rights. However, I dissent from the Court’s failure to require that Countiss receive back pay reflecting her heavier work load than comparable men’s team coaches.
In my view, the Court should use the full panoply of remedies at its disposal to guarantee that victims of illegal discrimination, like Countiss, are made whole. Only then will such wrongful conduct cease.
For reversal — Chief Justice Hughes, Justices Sullivan, Clieeoed, Scheeibee and Handles and Judge Coneoed —6.
For remandment — Justice Pashman — 1.
The following chart shows the hours of teaching required per week at various times in the year, based on the fact that these persons coached varsity basketball.
By adding these figures and dividing by four, the average number of hours per week taught comes out to ten for Countiss and seven for the men’s coaches.
Any and all remedies for back pay through the Commissioner of Education remain available to Countiss.