concurring.
I concur. However, I fear possible misinterpretation of a statement in the opinion. In considering the general judgment lien provisions of I.C. 34-1-45-2 (Burns Code Ed.1973) vis-a-vis the security provision of the dissolution statutes, I.C. 81-1-11.5-15 (Burns Code Ed.Repl.1980), we state:
"As these more specific statutes were designed to precisely meet the needs of the divorcing citizens of Indiana, we conclude that the dissolution statutes control over the more general judgment lien statute, hence pursuant to the specific language of the dissolution decree, no lien arose."
It is my fear that some may read that conclusion to indicate mutual exclusivity. Such an interpretation would be unwarranted.
Under our opinion today, the trial court retains flexibility. The court may enter a monetary judgment with respect to a particular property distribution obligation and have that judgment attach as a lien upon real estate pursuant to I.C. 34-1-45-2. In addition thereto, the court may direct additional security under 1.0. 31-1-11.5-15 for payment of a different obligation.
Subject to this caveat, I concur in the opinion of my colleagues.