dissenting.
I disagree emphatically with the Court’s approach and the Court’s holding in this case. On an orphans’ court accounting in 1933 on the occasion of the death of Israel DeRoy, life tenant under the testamentary trust of his father, Joseph DeRoy, the question was presented whether Jean DeRoy, an adopted minor child of Israel, was entitled to take the corpus of the trust on Israel’s death. A guardian ad litem was appointed to represent the minor’s interest, and the question was decided adversely to Jean. This was for the reason that, under the Wills Act of 1917, Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 403, § 16(b), 20 P.S. Chap. 2, App. § 228, and the case law thereunder, an adoptive child was not deemed to be embraced within the meaning of the word “children” or “issue”. Yates Estate, 281 Pa. 178, 126 A. 254 (1924); Puterbaugh’s Estate, 261 Pa. 235, 104 A. 601 (1918). The majority con*413cedes that this decision of the court was correct and in accordance with the law as it then stood. More than forty years later, Jean DeRoy, now Aronson, the present appellant, raised precisely the same question in the same court. Applying well-known principles of res judicata, the orphans’ court refused to allow the matter to be relitigated. But because our case law has changed, see, e. g., Estate of Flinn, 479 Pa. 312, 388 A.2d 672 (1978); Estate of Sykes, 477 Pa. 254, 383 A.2d 920 (1978), this Court now holds that Jean is indeed entitled to the entire corpus of the trust share in question.
This holding not only is contrary to the proper construction of the testator’s will but also disregards the salutary and jurisprudentially important principle of finality of judgments. It is, moreover, palpably unfair to the heirs of Joseph DeRoy who since 1933 have had a legitimate right of expectancy1 in the corpus of this portion of the testator’s estate. Hence this dissent.
Upon the death of Israel DeRoy, the original life tenant, it was essential that the orphans’ court decide whether Israel had any “children”, for if so the trust was to end and the corpus was to go then and there to such children. Similarly, if there were no children and Israel’s wife did not survive him, the trust also was to end, the corpus then going to the heirs at law of Joseph, the testator, under the intestacy laws of Pennsylvania. If there were no children of Israel but his wife Helen survived him, the trust continued for the life of Helen as income beneficiary, and on her death was to be distributed to the heirs of Joseph under the intestacy laws. Helen did in fact survive Israel and continued to live for another forty-one years.
*414In the 1933 proceedings the orphans’ court, acting through then President Judge Thomas P. Trimble, decided that Jean, by reason of having been adopted, did not qualify as included within the term “children” of Israel as that word was used in Joseph’s will, and decreed the balance for distribution back to Joseph’s trustees for “purposes specified in will.” That decree meant, and could only mean, that the trustees were to pay the income to Helen Goldman DeRoy as life tenant for the remainder of her life, and that at Helen’s death the entire trust fund as then constituted was, in the words of the will, “to revert to [the estate of Joseph DeRoy] and be distributed in accordance with the intestate laws of the State of Pennsylvania.”2
While it is true that Estate of Flinn, supra; Estate of Sykes, supra, following the lead of the plurality in Tafel Estate, 449 Pa. 442, 296 A.2d 797 (1972) — cases upon which the majority relies — reflect a change in the thinking of this Court as to the presumptions which are applicable in determining whether an adopted child takes under a will or trust, it is equally true that a change in the decisional law will not operate to alter the rights of persons which were determined by a final order of a court of competent jurisdiction entered prior to the announcement of the new law. See Delaware River Port Authority v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 408 Pa. 169, 182 A.2d 682 (1962); Restatement of Judgments, § 1 (1942). Rather, “ ‘the interests of the State and of the parties require that the validity of the claim and *415any issue actually litigated in the action shall not be litigated again by them.’ ” Burke v. Pittsburgh Limestone Corporation, 375 Pa. 390, 396, 100 A.2d 595, 599 (1953), quoting Restatement of Judgments, § 1 (1942). In the case of Safeguard Mutual Insurance Company v. Williams, 463 Pa. 567, 574, 345 A.2d 664, 668 (1975), we held that in the interest of preserving the finality of judgments, the doctrine of collateral estoppel3 operated to bar a party from reasserting a claim when:
“1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the one presented in the later action, 2) there was a final judgment on the merits, 3) the party against whom the plea [of collateral estoppel] is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication, and 4) the party against whom it is asserted has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question in a prior action.”
Accord: Estate of Flinn, supra ; Estate of Ellis, 460 Pa. 281, 333 A.2d 728 (1975).
In my view, the majority is in error in refusing to apply the criteria reiterated in the Safeguard Mutual case, supra, to the facts of this case. When that is done, the following appears: First, the issue upon the audits of both the 1933 account and the 1974 account of the one-eighth share of Joseph DeRoy’s residuary estate was identical, viz., whether a child adopted by the testator’s son, Israel, in 1921 is entitled to take under the provisions of a will made in 1918 by the adopting parent’s father and which specifies “children” of testator’s son as beneficiaries upon the death of the *416son.4 Second, the decree nisi entered May 24, 1933, by its terms, became final ten days following its entry when no exceptions were filed thereto. Third, the “plea” is asserted against Jean DeRoy Aronson who, through her guardian ad litem, was a party to the 1933 decree.5 Fourth, it is clear *417that the appellant, through her guardian ad litem, had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the question in the prior action. It thus becomes clear that appellant is now precluded from asserting again her claim to entitlement to all of the corpus of her adoptive father’s share of the testator’s estate under paragraph NINTH(f) of the will. That issue was settled once and for all in 1933.
The implication of today’s decision is, I fear, that the doctrine favoring the finality of judgments is now subject to the condition that the prior litigation shall have terminated in a manner seen to be agreeable to a majority of this Court as from time to time constituted. Much as one might wish to do so, it is obviously impossible to give the benefit of new judicial insights to all persons whose lawsuits involving the same legal problems were decided before the current wisdom was received and announced in decisional form. Indeed, the attempt to do so not only puts an unwarranted burden on the already overtaxed judicial system, but as here, is frequently unfair to other persons.6 Because the question here raised was finally adjudicated in prior litigation, the orphans’ court division was correct in holding appellant barred from reasserting the issue. The decree below should be affirmed.
EAGEN, C. J., and O’BRIEN, J., join in this dissenting opinion.. Under the terms of paragraph NINTH(f) of Joseph’s will, the remainderman could not be determined conclusively until the death of the second life tenant, Helen Goldman DeRoy, for at that time the corpus was to revert to the testator’s estate “and be distributed in accordance with the intestate laws.” However, a person who was an v intestate heir of Joseph at the time of Israel’s death (or became such at anytime thereafter) knew that he would be entitled to his distributive share as an heir at the time of Helen’s death, subject only to his surviving Helen.
. The 1933 decree of the orphans’ court did not order the trustees to “distribute the trust income to Helen Goldman DeRoy for ‘purposes specified in the will’ ”, as stated in the Court’s opinion, ante at 407. Nor did the court “order the trustees to pay the income of the trust to Helen Goldman DeRoy,” as described in the Court’s opinion, ante at 408, repeated in substantially the same words at 410. These statements are distortions of the 1933 decree which, as stated in the text, was merely to the trustees “for purposes specified in will.” This tampering with the words of the instrument here being construed is obviously to lend support to the Court’s theory that the only issue determined by Judge Trimble was one of entitlement to income, the entitlement to corpus not becoming an issue until the accounting of 1975. This proposition is disingenuous and specious; it is not supported by the record.
. The concept embraced in the phrase “collateral estoppel” is frequently referred to as “issue preclusion”, a term which encompasses both “collateral estoppel” and the doctrine of res judicata. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977). The court below, in the case at bar, held the appellant’s claim barred by the doctrine of res judicata. While such a conclusion is no doubt valid in view of the facts of this case, I am satisfied that the appellant’s action is precluded under collateral estoppel and therefore find it unnecessary to discuss the somewhat more stringent doctrine of res judicata.
. Appellant argues and the Court seems to agree that the issue in 1933 was Jean’s right as an adopted child to take as opposed to her mother, whereas the present controversy is between Jean and the testator’s other heirs-at-law. The record does not support this restrictive reading of what occurred in 1933, see n.2, supra, but if it were to be assumed arguendo, that it is an accurate portrayal of the' proceedings, the resolution of both the 1933 question and the current question still depends on an interpretation of the testator’s intent under his 1918 will. The 1933 decree of the orphans’ court decided that the testator did not intend to include adopted children and “all issues of fact which were actually adjudicated in the former action and essential to the judgment therein are concluded as between the parties.” Pilgrim Food Products Company v. Filler Products, Inc., 393 Pa. 418, 421-22, 143 A.2d 47, 49 (1958). See also Walker v. Ohio River Co., 428 Pa. 552, 239 A.2d 206 (1968); Larsen v. Larsen, 392 Pa. 609, 141 A.2d 353 (1958); Thal v. Krawitz, 365 Pa. 110, 73 A.2d 376 (1950). Cf., Commonwealth v. Ligon, 454 Pa. 455, 314 A.2d 227 (1973). Moreover, there is but one fund here with which both accounts and the hearings relative thereto were concerned. Compare Estate of Flinn, supra. That fund is the principal of the trust for Israel DeRoy which was previously decreed to the trustees in 1933 for “purposes specified in will.” The fact that one of those purposes happened to be payment of income to the life tenant is but incidental to the issue presented in 1933 and simply follows from the initial determination of which party to the 1933 adjudication was entitled to principal.
. See Section 85 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1975) which provides in relevant part:
“(1) A person who is not a party to an action but who is represented by a party is bound by and entitled to the benefits of the rules of res judicata as though he were a party. A person is represented by a party who is:
* * * * * *
“(c) The executor, administrator, guardian, conservator, or similar fiduciary manager of an interest of which the person is a beneficiary; . . . ”
See also Kenna Estate, 348 Pa. 214, 34 A.2d 617 (1943).
In Estate of Ellis, 460 Pa. 281, 333 A.2d 728 (1975), this Court dispensed with a prior requirement of collateral estoppel, viz., that both parties to a controversy be bound by the previous adjudication before either party could claim the benefit of that adjudication. See Restatement of Judgments, § 93(b) (1942). Nevertheless, the appellees herein (the intestate heirs) who assert the plea of collateral estoppel were in fact parties to the 1933 decree through privity with *417the trustees (see Section 85 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, supra ) and obtained at the least a right of expectancy, if not technically a vested interest, see n.l, supra, when the trustees were instructed to retain the funds for the purposes expressed in the will, i. e., payment of the income to the life tenant and upon her death, to distribute the trust property to the intestate heirs.
. It is important to note that under the schedule of distribution filed by the trustee and upheld by the court below, Jean Lois DeRoy is to be considered an heir-at-law of Joseph DeRoy and will, according to the laws of intestacy, receive a 12.5% share of the trust corpus. See the Act of June 30, 1972, P.L. 508, No. 164, § 2, 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 2108 which reenacts prior law (Intestate Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 429, § 16, 20 P.S. § 102). Thus, contrary to the assertion of the majority opinion, the result reached below is fair and equitable to all parties involved.