dissenting.
A majority of this Court today concludes that the classification scheme established by Pennsylvania’s Sunday Trading Law (“Blue Laws”) is so arbitrary and confusing that it bears no fair and substantial relationship to the statute’s purpose of providing a uniform day of rest and recreation, and, thus, violates the Commonwealth’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws contained in Article III, Section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
This is not the first time Pennsylvania’s “Blue Laws” have been challenged on equal protection grounds. In Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 81 S.Ct. 1135, 6 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961), the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of those sections of the “Blue Laws” regulating the sale of personal property, presently Sections 7361 and 7363, in response to an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court concluded a state legislature has the power to prohibit all business activity for the purpose of providing a uniform day of rest and then to make exceptions for certain activities it deems necessary and desirable. Further, the Court determined a legislature has the power to impose heavier penalties on the Sunday sale of selected items sold in quantity by large retail establishments in order to deter those stores from violating the closing laws.
The claim rejected in Two Guys is before the Court again today — viz., since statutory exceptions permitting certain businesses to operate on Sunday are not rationally related to the statute’s purpose, the statute is rendered arbitrary and capricious and thus violates the equal protection guarantee. In Two Guys, the Court evaluated appellant’s equal protection claim using the standard enunciated in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961):
*126“The standards under which this proposition is to be evaluated have been set forth many times by this Court. Although no precise formula has been developed, the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. [Citations omitted.]”
One year later this Court, in Bargain City U. S. A., Inc. v. Dilworth, 407 Pa. 129, 179 A.2d 439 (1962), rejected another equal protection challenge to the statute’s retail sales provision, holding that a challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment was foreclosed by the decision in Two Guys and further, holding the “Blue Laws” constitutional under Article III, Section 71 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which prohibits special laws regulating labor or trade.
Next, in Bertera’s Hopewell Foodland, Inc. v. Masters, 428 Pa. 20, 236 A.2d 197 (1967), this Court considered and rejected the claim that exceptions to the “Grocery Act” provision of the statute, presently Section 7364, violated both federal and state equal protection clauses. Finally, in Goodman v. Kennedy, 459 Pa. 313, 329 A.2d 224 (1974), we again upheld the constitutionality of one of the exceptions to the “Grocery Act,” presently Section 7364(c)(1), under both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Pennsylvania Constitution.
In each of the earlier constitutional challenges the United States and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts applied the same standard in evaluating the statute’s prohibitions and exceptions made thereto — viz., the “rational basis” test, which *127requires only that statutory distinctions be reasonably related to the achievement of a legitimate state objective.
The difference in result on the occasion of this most recent challenge to the “Blue Laws” may be attributed to the majority’s use of a different standard of review. While it is unclear which of three separate tests discussed by the majority was actually applied in evaluating appellants’ equal protection claims, it is clear the majority substituted a standard more demanding than “reasonable relationship to a legitimate state objective.”
First, it is suggested that a “strict judicial scrutiny” test is the appropriate standard to apply where the state law under review impinges upon a “fundamental right” — that is, a right explicitly or even implicitly guaranteed by either federal or state constitution.2 However, the majority fails to identify which substantive “fundamental right” is adversely affected by the “Blue Laws.” Instead, it assumes that Pennsylvania’s equal protection clause, Article III, Section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, itself amounts to a “fundamental right” and thus, triggers use of the “strict scrutiny” test. It is clear, however, that an equal protection clause cannot be regarded as “fundamental” for purposes of an equal protection analysis since it is not the source of any substantive rights or liberties. The function of such a clause is simply to measure the validity of classifications created by state laws. See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). Thus, “strict judicial scrutiny” of Pennsylvania’s Sunday Trading Law is neither required nor appropriate in this case, since the challenged statute has not interfered with free exercise of a “fundamental right.”
Next, the majority suggests a standard of review less stringent than “strict scrutiny” but more demanding than *128“rational basis.” This intermediate test is used to examine legislative classifications not “inherently suspect” but nevertheless requiring greater scrutiny — for example, those based on sex, illegitimacy and age.3 Since no such “suspect” distinctions are created by the “Blue Laws,” this standard is of questionable relevance in the instant case.
Clearly, the proper standard of review in this case is the “rational basis” test used by the United States Supreme Court in Two Guys and restated most recently in New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976). In Dukes, the Court rejected an equal protection attack on a city ordinance which prohibited the sale of food by pushcart vendors in the French Quarter, but exempted those vendors who had operated in that area for eight years or more. The Court refused to apply a more stringent standard in reviewing the ordinance and stated:
“Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the constitutionality of statutory discriminations . . . States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.” 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. at 2516.
This Court has adopted and consistently applied the federal “rational basis” test in reviewing federal and state equal protection claims which do not involve “fundamental interests” or “suspect classifications.” See Tosto v. Pennsylvania Nursing Home Loan Agency, 460 Pa. 1, 331 A.2d 198 (1975); Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Labor & Industry, 461 Pa. 68, 334 A.2d 636 (1975); In Re Estate of Cavill, 459 Pa. 411, 329 A.2d 503 (1974); Stottlemyer v. Stottlemyer, 458 Pa. 503, 329 A.2d 892 (1974).
*129The majority implies that this Court in Moyer v. Phillips, 462 Pa. 395, 341 A.2d 441 (1975), approved a more demanding test — viz., that the classification must have a “fair and substantial” relationship to the statutory objective. Since Moyer cited both state and federal cases as authority for its standard of review, see In Re Estate of Cavill, supra; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 40 S.Ct. 560, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920), such an inference is unwarranted. See G. Gunther, “In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection” 86 Harv.L.Rev. 1 (1972).
Courts applying the “rational basis” test may not sit as super legislatures which judge the wisdom of statutes or invalidate them because they might have been drafted differently. As stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in McGowan, 366 U.S. at 535, 81 S.Ct. at 1194:
“[Ejxcept in the case of a statute whose discriminations are so patently without reason that no conceivable situation of fact could be found to justify them, the claimant bears the burden of affirmative demonstration that in the actual state of facts which surround its operation, its classifications lack rationality.”
The Sunday trading laws are neither arbitrary nor irrational. The Court in McGowan and Two Guys pointed out that the roots of the Pennsylvania statutes go back for centuries; the current exemptions from the ban on Sunday trading but reflect our legislature's recognition of the development of a complex, pluralistic society. As noted in McGowan, supra, relative to special Sunday legislation in general:
“[Ejxceptions, giving the laws resiliency in the course of cultural change, proliferated.130
*130This Court has consistently adhered to the rule that an Act of Assembly should not be declared unconstitutional “unless it clearly, palpably and plainly violates the Constitution.” Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 393, 346 A.2d 897, 900 (1975); Tosto v. Pa. Nursing Home Loan Agency, 460 Pa. 1, 16, 331 A.2d 198, 205 (1975); Daly v. Hemphill, 411 Pa. 263, 271, 191 A.2d 835, 840 (1963).
In point of fact, the statutes abrogated by the majority today are little changed from those upheld by the United States Supreme Court in 1961 and (in part) by this Court in 1962. See text of the majority opinion at 115.
Although the various exemptions may be made to appear arbitrary as they have been juxtaposed out of their statutory context in the majority opinion, they are rationally related to a legislatively perceived pattern of preservation of the desired ambiance of Sundays; they are neither arbitrary nor capricious, nor do they sink to the level of invidious discrimination. Since they were passed by the General Assembly as a reasonable exercise of its powers and in good faith, the Sunday trading laws must pass constitutional muster. Bargain City U.S.A., Inc. v. Dilworth, supra.
POMEROY, J., joins in this opinion.. Pa.Const. art. Ill, § 7 is now Pa.Const. art. Ill, § 32, as amended and renumbered (1967).
. Under a “strict scrutiny” standard of review a state must show a compelling interest in order to justify a statutory scheme creating distinctions. This standard is also and most often used where a state creates classifications which are “inherently suspect,” such as race or religion. See, e. g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967).
. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 97 S.Ct. 1459, 52 L.Ed.2d 31 (1977) (illegitimacy); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971) (sex). See also, G. Gunther, Individual Rights in Constitutional Law (2d Ed., 1976), 280-285.
One may trace in these exceptions the evolving habits of life of the people. Compare State v. Hogreiver, 152 Ind. 652, 53 N.E. 921, 45 LRA 504 (1899), sustaining a statute specifically prohibiting Sunday baseball, with Carr v. State, 175 Ind. 241, 93 N.E. 1071, 32 LRA NS 1190 (1911), sustaining a statute excepting baseball from the *130general Sunday prohibition.” 366 U.S. at 529, 81 S.Ct. at 1191 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).