(dissenting). I can agree to no construction of a statute which gnaws out its bowels.* Here is a woman who wants work, who needs work and who has had her job taken from her against her will. When she applies for. compensation, relying on the Statute enacted for her economic security, she is told that what really happened to her was that she asked for a vacation and got it. The result warrants searching inquiry., Whenever the law says that what a person did legally, is the opposite of what he did actually,, that when he shouted “No,” what he really (legally) did was to whisper “Yes,” *481then explanation is dne our people that they may guard against the evils of clear speech and forthright expression.
We will consider in detail the case of Mary Bretes, the first of the petitioners herein. She had worked for the petitioner and appellee' about 3-1/2 months at the time of the incidents about to be described. Prior to that she had been out of work' for about a month. She testified that when petitioner’s plant closed she registered' for other work, was available for it, and would have accepted it. No work being-found, and there being no ineligibility, she claimed unemployment compensation for the week involved and she cites to us section'48 of the statute (CLS 1952, § 421.48 [Stat Ann 1951 Cum Supp, § 17.552]), heading as follows:
“See. 48. An individual shall be deemed ‘unemployed’ with respect to any week during which he performs no services and with respect to which no remuneration is payable to him, or with respect to any week of less than full-time work if the remuneration payable to him is less than his primary weekly benefit rate.”
There is no doubt that she performed no services ■during the week in question and that, with respect to it, no remuneration was payable to her. Tet Mr. •Justice Carr’s opinion holds that she is not entitled to compensation. She is not, we are told, because, in effect, she was on a vacation of her own choosing. We may well ask at this point, if this is a vacation, what is a layoff?
This case, this industry, cannot be divorced from the past. We have here a segment of what is known as the needle trades. It has a long-established custom, that of an annual closing during the week of July 4th. Prior to the time of the union’s “coming-in,” this was merely an annual layoff of 1 week. *482With 2 or 3 exceptions it was without pay. Thus the union contract did not initiate the annual shutdown. What it initiated was regular pay for certain employees during the traditional shutdown period. In other words, this is not a case where the workmen request, and after negotiations, obtain, a vacation period. It was not, as the referee well puts it, “a concession, not a fringe benefit, and not a favor of any kind granted to the employees but, instead, an acknowledgment of a custom for the benefit of the employer.” We note in passing, that our Brother states “Such agreement was not for the sole benefit of the employer but was primarily for the benefit of the employees.” We cannot agree. The referee’s finding, as above quoted, was to the contrary, and we find nothing in the opinion of the appeal board or the circuit court pointing to any weight of the evidence, great or small, in derogation thereof.
Precisely what, then, did the particular union contract say? We will turn to the .contract itself. Article 5 thereof is entitled “Vacations.” It deals, however, not with vacations as such, but with vacation pay. The emphasis is understandable. The plant traditionally closed during the week of July 4th. • What was at issue was pay. Accordingly it provides that “Those employees who have been con-continuously employed for 1 year preceding July 4th, shall be entitled to 1 week’s vacation pay, and those employees who have been continuously employed for 5 years, or more, on the Saturday last preceding July 4th shall be entitled to 2 weeks’ vacation pay.” What does it say of the others, of the junior employees who had not the requisite seniority for pay during the closing period? Nothing. The agreement, as to them, was silent. There is no agreement, express or implied, no hint, no intimation, that those not entitled to vacation pay should be on vacation during such period. The understanding of *483the company, was, in fact, expressly contrary thereto. Thus it is that we find, on June 18th, the employer writing to the Michigan employment security commission a letter reading, in part, as follows:
“Gentlemen: Please find attached list of employees and their social security number who are not entitled to vacations during the period July 2 to July 6. If any other employees are hired between now and the above-mentioned period will advise you so you can make proper notations on their files as they will not be eligible for vacation.”
{The name of Helen Vaughan, one of the claimants herein, was listed thereon and it is stipulated by the parties that the pertinent facts with respect to Helen Vaughan “are identical with the facts in regard to Mrs. Bretes” and other claimants.) Thus the claimants, who were “not entitled to vacations” and not “eligible for vacation,” obviously were unaffected by the additional provision of article 5, that “All vacations shall be taken during the week in which July 4th shall fall.” It was, moreover, further provided in article 5 that they would not receive vacation pay: “It is understood and agreed that any employee who has not worked during the entire 12 months preceding July 1st, shall not be entitled to any vacation pay.”
Not being entitled, then, to either a vacation or vacation pay, I cannot accept the analysis that this case, as appellee puts it, “is really the same as if an employee had signed an individual employment contract which contained a provision that the employee would take a vacation during the first week of July each year, without pay for the first year, but with pay thereafter.” There was no such provision, there was no such understanding on the part of the employer, and it has been abundantly clear from the date of the referee’s hearing to the present that the *484claimants have protested such an interpretation of the contract. In the words of. Judge Crumpacker of the appellate court of Indiana in American Bridge Co. v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 121 Ind App 576, 586 (98 NE2d 193, 197):
“It is difficult to understand why they should be considered as voluntarily on vacation without pay because of a contract which makes.no provision for such vacations and-the undisputed' evidence discloses that they are off work against their will.”
The legal situation with respect to contraeted-for “vacation's” requires clarification. We have here the interpretation of a great remedial statute designed, in its own words, to combat “a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this State.” (CL 1948, §421.2 [Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.502].) As such it is to be construed with a liberality consonant with its objectives: The fact that the word “vacation” has been used to justify what claimants insist was an involuntary layoff settles nothing. We must go deeper in our analysis, beyond what Carduzo described as “the tyranny of tags and tickets,” and behind the facade of labels. “The repetition of a catchword can hold analysis in fetters for 50 years or more.” Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 Harv LR 682, 688, 689.
There is much authority in this field. Many cases, as Justice Carr points out, hold that in this general situation the employee is on a voluntary vacation and, hence, not entitled to unemployment compensation, while others hold squarely the opposite, that the employee is involuntarily unemployed, is, in effect, in a layoff status, and is entitled to compensation. Many of these cases, although reaching contrary results, are perfectly consistent in theory. As a matter of fact, careful courts in certain of the *485States (e.g. Pennsylvania) have held both ways. They correctly regard their decisions as consistent, not' conflicting. The fact of the matter is that we have in this field 2 general types of situations, each having contractual sanction: First, those in which an employer orders a shutdown for his own benefit, and at his own option, for inventory, retooling, in accordance with usual custom, or other matter of his own choice. In this situation, since there is to be a shutdown anyway, why not have the vacations taken then, also ? And so it is frequently provided in these company-union contracts that employees entitled to vacations are required to take them • during this period. Those, however, who are not entitled to vacations are in a layoff status during this week, as, in the instant case, the employer’s letter to the commission, quoted supra, clearly indicates. At this point we would do well to reread the contract before us. It is manifest that there is nothing in it which could give rise, even as a matter of inference, to the conclusion that those employees who were “not en: titled to vacations” were to go payless simply because those entitled to vacations must take them during the. shutdown period. We should exercise the utmost caution in reading into any contract an implication that a rational human being has agreed to do without any of those things' he must have for a normal existence, work with pay, food or shelter. If he expressly so agrees we may be justified in viewing him with wonder, not to say alarm. If we so agree for him, by “implying” such an agreement when the express words are lacking, both wonder and alarm may well remain, but for us, not for him.
As an example of the judicial treatment of a contract wherein the company closes for its own purposes, the contract providing, also, that earned vacations shall be taken during this period, we may refer to American Bridge Co. v. Review Board of the *486Indiana Employment Security Division, supra. Here tlie contract reserved to the company the right of a temporary shutdown between certain dates which, the contract said,, “may be designated as comprising the vacation period for any employees of the department who are eligible for vacations.” In such case, as in the case at bar, the company clearly recognized that not all its employees were eligible for vacations. The company ordered a temporary shutdown for the purposes of inventory, and, in accordance with its contract, also provided that “insofar as possible, this period will be designated for vacations.” We have here the typical closing for the company’s own purposes with the superadded requirement that this shall be the vacation period; In holding that employees not eligible for vacation were entitled to compensation the court held, in part, as follows (pp 581,582):
“One of the express purposes of the Indiana employment security act is to provide for employees who are unemployed through no fault of their own. There is nothing within the provisions of the union contract which would give' rise, even inferentially, to a reasonable construction that employees who were not eligible for vacations were affected in any way'by the designation of the vacation period for eligible employees. Certainly, the employees who were not eligible for vacation have not by any reasonable interpretation to be placed upon, the terms of section 11 (c) 2 of the bargaining agreement consented to any action by the company which, would permit the designation of a period of vacation without pay for them. The agreement specifically says that such period of shutdown may be designated as comprising the vacation period for the employees of the department who are eligible for vacation.”
*487See, also, Schettino v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 138 Conn 253 (83 A2d 217).
It is in the Golubski Unemployment Compensation Case, 171 Pa Super 634 (91 A2d 315, 30 ALR2d 362), that the distinction between the 2 fact situations above noted is most clearly emphasized. In this case the contract reserved to the company the right to a shutdown, which shutdown period, it was provided, might “be designated as * * * the vacation period for any employees * * * who are eligible for vacation.” (Italics in the original, p 636.) (We note, in passing, the similarity to the company’s language in the case at bar, “they will not be eligible for vacations.” ) In allowing compensation the Pennsylvania court referred to the earlier Mattey Unemployment Compensation Case, 164 Pa Super 36 (63 A2d 429), which had denied compensation, as “clearly distinguishable” and held, as to the case then before it, that (p 638):
“In thé instant case the claimants never agreed that they should be' laid off for 2 weeks, and it was wholly the employer’s option whether or not the shutdown occurred. If it did occur the men agreed only to apply their paid vacation to the 2 weeks shutdown. The employees were available for work and their failure to work was because the employer furnished no work.”
In contrast to this situation we have the second above mentioned, that in which a plant-wide shutdown is agreed upon between employer , and union for the purpose of granting vacations to all alike, whether paid or payless. Such was the case in Jackson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 234 Minn 52 (47 NW2d 449), in which the contract provided: “All employees shall take time off equal to the established length of the vacation shutdown, except those employees the company may require to work during the vacation shutdown”. (Italics in the *488original, p 54); In re Employees of Buffelen Lumber & Manfg. Co., 32 Wash2d 205, 207 (201 P2d 194), in which the union negotiated “a supplemental agreement, relating to vacations,” which provided, in .part, that “It is understood that vacations may be given by closing down the entire plant;” Philco Corporation v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 175 Pa Super 402, 405 (105 A2d 176), in which the contract provided that the company might, “at its discretion, shut down its plant for a vacation period,” the court holding (p 409), as. in Mattey, supra, that the shutdown was for the benefit of the employees, rather than the employer. Similar was the.situation in Beaman v. Bench, 75 Ariz 345 (256 P2d 721), in which, with respect to bargained-for vacations (p 348), the “union representative advised that he was cognizant that the plant might have to shut down for. a 2-week period” in order to grant the union’s proposal as to the scheduling of vacations; The court held (p 349) that the “appellee and the claimants he represents must be deemed to have agreed to any shutdown compelled by the, company’s contractual obligation to grant leaves at a specified time.”
The difference, in short, between the 2 situations is the difference between shutdowns ordered in accordance with company policy and practice for its convenience and benefit (whether or not it is added that employees who are entitled to vacations must take them during this period), and those shutdowns for the benefit of employees ordered in compliance with the vacation-terms of the contract.
We would not, in our discussion of the second category of agreements, those in which the bargaining representative, has agreed to a vacation shutdown, be taken as expressing either our approval or condemnation of a contract in which payless “vacations” are provided for certain employees. That *489case is not before us and our decision thereon will await its arrival. For purposes of clarity, however, it should be observed that, should such an agreement be found, questions of the most serious import as to its legality arise, in view of our statutory provision (either not present or not commented upon in many of the cases cited, supra) that:
“No agreement by an individual to waive, release, or commute his rights to benefits or any other rights under this act from an employer shall be valid.” CL 1948, §421.31 (Stat Ann 1950 Rev §17.533).
This statutory prohibition cannot be answered simply by saying that “there may not be a waiver as to a right that does not exist.” Of course not. But such reasoning is circular. The very question we are trying to answer is whether or not the right to unemployment compensation exists. Likewise we answer nothing, by saying that an agreement providing for 2 weeks’ “leave” (presumably without pay) is not an agreement to waive benefits. How about an agreement providing for a 2 weeks’ “layoff”! Six months? Is it good if we call it leave, but bad if we call it layoff? Is this the 16th century, where the word was the talisman? Or must we, in truth, go beyond the words used and find out whether the employee did in fact leave his work voluntarily “without good cause attributable to the employer or the employing unit”?
This latter phraseology (taken from the section of the act imposing disqualification for benefits [CL 1948, § 421.29] .(Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.531)) does not obtain in all jurisdictions. In many, including certain of those having decisions relied upon by Mr. Justice Care, the statutes speak merely of those who “voluntarily” leave their employment. The difference between the 2 types of statutes is significant and is well pointed out by the court in Schettino v. *490Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, supra, in the following terms (pp 257, 258):
“It (the company) points to the authority of Jackson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 234 Minn 52 (47 NW2d 449, 451). This case appears to have been decided upon the authority of cases arising under the Washington, Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Massachusetts statutes. (In re Employees of Buffelen Lumber & Manfg. Co., 32 Wash2d 205, 211, [201 P2d 194]; Mattey Unemployment Compensation Case, 164 Pa Super 36, 39 [63 A2d 429]; Paden City Pottery Co. v. Board of Review, 8 CCH Unemployment Ins Rep, W Va, ¶8090; Moen v. Director of Division of Employment Security, 324 Mass 246 [85 NE2d 779, 8 ALR2d 429]; see, also, Matter of Rakowski, 276 App Div 625 [97 NYS2d 309].) These statutes, in terms, disqualify plaintiffs who ‘voluntarily’ leave their employment. (Minn Stat § 268.09 [Henderson 1949]; Wash Rev Stat Ann § 9998-211 [Supp 1945]; Pa Stat Ann, title 43, § 802 [Supp 1950]; W Va Code Ann § 2366 [78] [1] [1949]; Mass Ann Laws, ch 151 A, § 25 [e] [1] [1949]; NY Lab Law § 593 [1].) The difference in the wording of these statutes from that of our own (Conn 1949 Rev § 7508 [2] [a] necessarily affects the reasoning in those opinions. The test of ‘voluntarily’ leaving: therein, discussed and applied is not the test applied in. this. State.
- “Our rule is that ‘one is not debarred from compensation because he has voluntarily left his employment unless the administrator shall be of the opinion that it was “without sufficient cause connected with his employment.” ’ ”
Likewise, in this jurisdiction, the disqualification for a voluntary quit does not stand without qualification. It is further • provided (CLS 1952, §421.29 [Stat Ann 1951 Cum. Supp § 17.531]) j that the quit must be “without good cáuse attributable'to the, employer or employing unit.” Even though, then, the hurdle of the statutory-prohibition ágainst wai*491ver is cleared, the result with respect to a contract allegedly authorizing a payless vacation is still far from obvious. Not only must we find a “voluntary” leaving but it must be without good cause attributable to the employer. If the cessation of work was, as here, the result of company policy of long standing, for its own purposes, and. not as a result of persbnaT reasons of the employee expressed either individually or through his bargaining agent, the “cause’’ would seem clearly attributable to the employer.
The short of the matter is that Mary Bretes,'and the other claimants, were here unemployed because ■the employer, in accordance with, his long-standing custom and for his own purposes and convenience, closed his plant, during the week of July ,4th. , She was .not entitled to vacation, not eligible for vacation, ajid. not paid for vacation. ■ She did not leave her ■work, “voluntarily without good cause attributable to her employer.” On the contrary, if in fact it could be. said that her leaving was “voluntary,” which is doubtful, she had ample cause directly attributable to her employer, namely, she had no work to go to because her employer had closed the plant. . Behind all of. this we must constantly bear 'in mind, is a statutory ■ remedy against the real menace of economic insecurity. A period" of no work and no pay, to those of our society who look to their paycheck for their Weekly bread, is precisely the kind of economic insecurity that this act was intended to cure and it should be so construed;
The judgment of the circuit court should be reversed. No costs, a public question.
Edwards and Black, JJ., concurred with Smith, J.Viperina est expositio quae corrodit viscera textus.