dissenting:
Contrary to the recommendations of both the Board on Professional Responsibility (Board) and the Hearing Committee, the majority recommends augmenting a thirty-day suspension sanction and other specified conditions, with a fitness requirement before reinstatement.1 The Board *1168rejected recommending a fitness requirement for respondent’s failure to respond to a single ethical complaint because it is not warranted under either the Cater standard, which this court has since adopted,2 or under a comparative case analysis. The Board’s recommendation is consistent with controlling legal principles and reasonable under the circumstances; therefore, there is no sound basis for rejecting it. See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(g)(1) (providing for this court to accept the Board’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence and to adopt its recommended sanction “unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or would otherwise be unwarranted”).
In Cater, this court articulated a clear standard for the imposition of a fitness requirement, approving the Board’s proposed test. Cater, supra note 1, 887 A.2d at 24. This court held in Cater that to justify conditioning reinstatement of a suspended attorney on proof of rehabilitation, there must be clear and convincing evidence in the disciplinary record that casts “serious doubt” on the attorney’s fitness to practice law. Id. Unless the misconduct established is sufficiently grave to support such a doubt, other aggravating factors justifying a fitness requirement must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 25. While ordinarily Bar Counsel does not have to justify a sanction by clear and convincing evidence, “[t]he difference here stems from our holding that the fitness requirement depends on a specific finding beyond the finding of a violation of the Rules.” Id. In Cater, this court sanctioned the Board’s tripartite test for determining the propriety of a fitness requirement in failure to respond cases, such as this one. The factors for consideration are “(1) the respondent’s level of cooperation in the pending proceeding(s), (2) the repetitive nature of the respondent’s lack of cooperation in disciplinary proceedings, and (3)other evidence that may reflect on fitness.”3 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the Board recognized that the misconduct involved in this case is serious and warrants a suspension, citing its own decision in Cater, the Board determined that the circumstances are not “especially aggravated, and there are no other factors in the record that raise serious doubt about Respondent’s fitness to practice law.”4 The *1169Board acknowledges that the first Cater factor is satisfied in that Godette totally failed to cooperate in this disciplinary proceeding; however it found that the second and third factors had not been established. It is the Board’s position that Bar Counsel failed to establish the second factor, repetitive lack of cooperation in disciplinary proceedings, in that the attorney has not been involved in prior disciplinary proceedings, and his failure to respond involves a single, as opposed to multiple, complaints. The Board concluded that the third criterion was not established in that no other evidence was presented that would reflect upon Godette’s fitness.
In its Report and Recommendation to this court and in its brief on review, the Board states that the failure to respond to a single complaint may raise a serious doubt about the attorney’s fitness to practice when coupled with other evidence demonstrating a disregard of the disciplinary process, such as evasion of service of process. However, the Board rejected, as not supported by substantial evidence, an apparent finding of the Hearing Committee that Godette deliberately evaded service of process in this case.5 Bar Counsel does not challenge before this court the Board’s determination that a finding of evasion of service of process was not supported by substantial evidence. Nevertheless, the majority addresses the issue, concludes that the Board was in error in that regard, and therefore, imposes a fitness requirement. I disagree. In my view, the majority’s analysis is factually and legally flawed.
The evidence was that on May 3, 2003 at 6:10 p.m., and on May 12, 2003 at 6:40 a.m., the special process server reported that he received no answer when he attempted to serve Godette with the specification of charges, although it sounded as if someone was inside the premises. The Board found this evidence insufficient to make the inference that respondent was inside the premises at the time and simply not answering the door in order to evade service of process. Contrary to the majority, I conclude that the Board was correct in concluding that the inference could not be made on this evidence alone. It is fundamental that no inference can be drawn from facts that have not been established. Pastor v. Cane, 134 A.2d 95, 98 (D.C.1957) (reversing for a new trial where the trial court’s decision was based on inferences having no support in the record); In re Brown, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 156, 165, 454 F.2d 999, 1008 (1971) (applying the principle that “[a]n inferred fact must find its nexus with a proven fact, and a conviction of a crime cannot rest on evidence that no more supports guilt than innocence”) (citations omitted); see also CRIMINAL Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 2.04 (4th ed. rev. 2002) (stating that the jury is “permitted to draw, from the facts which you find have been proven, such reasonable inferences as you feel are justified in light of your experience”). Absent from this record are any proven facts from which it can *1170be established or inferred that Godette was inside the premises at any time that the process server attempted to serve him. In rejecting the inference, the Board mentioned that it was possible that the noises inside the premises could have come from “a minor not authorized to accept service, someone who had no idea who was at the door and who declined to open the door to an unannounced stranger, or aught we know, an animal.” The majority states that the Hearing Committee was not “required to believe” these possibilities. Indeed, the Hearing Committee had no evi-dentiary basis to determine whether the noise inside the premises came from one of these possible sources or Godette. See Pastor, supra, 134 A.2d at 98. Surmise and speculation is not a substitute for evidence.
The majority suggests that the inference that Godette evaded service of process can be made from his earlier failure to cooperate in the preliminary proceedings. Specifically, the majority cites Godette’s (1) failure to answer Bar Counsel’s letters and motion, (2) his promise to submit a response to Bar Counsel and failure to do so, and (3) the process server’s multiple unsuccessful attempts to serve Godette. None of these facts support the conclusion that Godette deliberately evaded service of process. The first two points are simply irrelevant to that determination.6 The third fact, multiple service attempts, provides no evidence attributing the process server’s lack of success at service to Go-dette’s actions.7 The majority’s conclusion that Godette never intended to accept service voluntarily based on his conduct in the preliminary proceedings is belied by the fact that he ultimately accepted service of the Specification of Charges and Petition Instituting Formal Disciplinary Proceedings by certified mail which he acknowledged by signing a return receipt. If an aggravating factor, such as evasion of service of process, is to be relied upon to enhance a suspension sanction, it must be established by clear and convincing evidence. See Cater, supra note 1, 887 A.2d at 25. That level of proof was clearly not met here.
The majority opinion concludes, alternatively, that Godette defaulted on the issue of whether he deliberately avoided service of process by failing to participate in the proceeding to offer evidence to the contrary. It cites in support of this proposition In re Holdmann, 834 A.2d 887, 889 (D.C.2003). Holdmann, which holds that an attorney in a disciplinary proceeding who fails to raise an issue before the Board cannot challenge it for the first time in this court, is inapposite. See id. Our rules impose upon the Board and this court the obligation to determine whether the factual findings upon which it bases discipline are supported by substantial evidence in the record, whether or not exceptions are filed by a respondent. See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(b) (providing that “[i]f no exceptions are filed, the Board shall decide the matter on the basis of the Hearing Committee record”); In re Temple, 629 A.2d 1203, 1208 (D.C.1993) (recognizing *1171that under D.C. Bar R. XI, § 4(e)(7) the Board has the power to make factual findings, but must accept the hearing committee’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence); D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(g)(1) (providing that “[i]n determining the appropriate order, the court shall accept the findings of fact made by the Board unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence of record....”). Here, the Board, as required, applied the substantial evidence test to the Hearing Committee’s proposed factual findings as set forth in its report, and rejected the conclusion that evasion of service of process had been established by the evidence. Respondent’s failure to participate in the proceeding does not reheve the Board or this court of the obligation to determine whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, I cannot agree that Godette’s failure to participate in the proceeding operates to establish by default a fact that is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Finally, guided by D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 9(g), in considering the appropriate sanction, this court “shall adopt the recommended disposition of the Board unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or would otherwise be unwarranted.” Under this rule, “ “we enforce a general sense of equality in the sanctions handed out, but [the rule] otherwise commands that we should respect the Board’s sense of equity in these matters unless that exercise of judgment proves to be unreasonable.’ ” Temple, supra, 629 A.2d at 1207 (quoting In re Haupt, 422 A.2d 768, 771 (D.C.1980)) (other citations omitted). In a careful comparative case analysis, the Board has demonstrated that the recommended discipline falls within the range of discipline for similar violations. See e.g., In re Scanlon, 865 A.2d 534, 535 (D.C.2005) (for violations of Rules 8.1(b), 8.4(d), and D.C. Bar R. XI, § 2(b)(3)(a), a thirty-day suspension with reinstatement conditioned upon respondent filing a response to the disciplinary complaint and six hours of continuing legal ethics and professional responsibility courses); In re Lilly, 699 A.2d 1135, 1136 (D.C.1997) (thirty-day suspension with reinstatement conditioned upon compliance with Bar counsel’s requests for information). It has distinguished the cases cited by Bar Counsel in support of a fitness requirement. The Board has also demonstrated why this case does not meet the Cater standard for the imposition of a fitness requirement. See Cater, supra note 1, 887 A.2d at 25. The Board’s recommendation is neither unreasonable nor inconsistent with this court’s precedent; therefore, consistent with our rules, we should adopt it.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I must respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court.
. “The fixed period of suspension is intended to serve as the commensurate response to the attorney’s past ethical misconduct. In contrast, the open-ended fitness requirement is *1168intended to be an appropriate response to serious concerns about whether the attorney will act ethically and competently in the future, after the period of suspension has run.” In re Cater, 887 A.2d 1, 22 (D.C.2005). One of the practical effects of a fitness requirement is to prolong substantially the period of suspension. Id. at 25 (adopting "clear and convincing” evidence standard for reinstatement enhancement, in part, in recognition that a fitness requirement "can transform a thirty-day suspension into one that lasts for years”).
. See Cater, supra note 1, 887 A.2d at 24 (approving the Board’s proposed test for the imposition of a fitness requirement).
. We acknowledged that in other types of disciplinary proceedings, the factors identified in In re Roundtree, 503 A.2d 1215 (D.C. 1985), would continue to be useful in determining whether a serious doubt exists as to the attorney’s continued fitness. Cater, supra note 1, 887 A.2d at 25. The Roundtree factors, which are used as a guide in determining whether to reinstate attorneys who have been suspended or disbarred, include:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the misconduct for which the attorney was disciplined;
(2) whether the attorney recognized the seriousness of the misconduct;
(3) the attorney’s conduct since discipline was imposed, including the steps taken to remedy past wrongs and prevent future ones;
(4) the attorney’s present character; and
(5) the attorney's present qualifications and competence to practice law.
Roundtree, supra, 503 A.2d at 1217 (citations omitted).
. Applying the three-prong test set forth in In re Cater, Bar Docket No. 337-99, and In re *1169Miller, Bar Docket No. 55-00, subsequently sanctioned by this court in Cater, supra, the Hearing Committee stated that it could not find by clear and convincing that there is a serious doubt as to Godette’s fitness to practice law. While it found the first factor established, with respect to the second factor, it found no evidence of a prior failure to cooperate with disciplinary proceedings. With respect to the third factor, it found "no evidence of prior discipline or other evidence that may reflect on [Godette’s] fitness.”
. The characterization "apparent” is used only because the Hearing Committee did not include a finding that Godette evaded service of process in its proposed Findings of Fact. Rather, the Hearing Committee made the inference in connection with its recommended sanction to the Board.
. It is not clear that the majority distinguishes between Godette’s acts and omissions in the preliminary proceedings and the circumstances surrounding the efforts to serve him later with a formal specification of charges and Petition Instituting Formal Disciplinary Proceedings. This distinction is important to the analysis. What the Board conceded is that an additional finding that Godette evaded service of process (i.e., service of the petition and specification of charges -in the formal proceeding) would be an aggravating factor supporting an enhancement of suspension with a fitness requirement.
. Indeed, the process server’s first attempt was unsuccessful because "there was no one by [Godette’s] name at the address.” Thereafter, the process server made his attempts at Godette’s secondary address of record in Beltsville, Maryland.