dissenting.
In this case, the Worker's Compensation Board denied appellant James J. Hill disability benefits. The Board based its denial on the fact that appellant Hill bore the burden of proof on the issue of his entitlement to benefits and failed to meet it. The claim of appellant is that this conclusion is error. I would not reach the merits of the claim, but would remand to the Board, because its findings of fact fail the test of legal sufficiency.
It is basic, as the majority opinion recognizes, that the role of the judiciary is restrict ed in the area of workmen's compensation to the review of awards and decisions of the Worker's Compensation Board for errors of law. Ind.Code Ann. 22-3-4-8 (West 1986); Ind.Appellate Rule 4(C). This Court has carefully considered its role:
Orders of an administrative body are subject to judicial review and ... they must be so to meet the requirements of due process. Such review is necessary to the end that there may be an adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction that the agency has acted within the scope of its powers; that substantial evidence supports the factual conclusions; and that its determination comports with the law applicable to the facts found.
Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co. (1940), 217 Ind. 93, 105, 26 N.E.2d 399, 404. This passage identifies two questions of law which may be considered by the reviewing court: (1) Are the agency's findings supported by the evidence in the record as a whole? (2) Do the ageney's findings support its decision? Another question of law which may be considered by the reviewing court is: Are the findings sufficiently complete to permit the court to intelligently review the agency's decision. Carlton v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Indianapolis (1968), 252 Ind. 56, 65, 245 N.E.2d 337, 343.
In this case, the Worker's Compensation Board of Indiana made the following relevant findings:
[1] Pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals of Indiana, it is found that Dr. Beghin examined Petitioner on August 15, 1991, and "allowed Mr. Hill to resume normal activities without restriction."
[2] -It is further found that Mr. Hill testified that he has not been able to work after January 9, 1991, and at no time thereafter.
[3] It is further found that no vocational experts were called to testify by the parties in this case.
[4] It is further found that this matter has been reversed and remanded with instructions to make specific findings of fact regarding Mr. Hill's ability to obtain reasonable types of employment in light of his back injury.
[5] It is further found that Dr. Beghin was the treating physician when he examined Petitioner on August 15, 1991, and "allowed Mr. Hill to resume normal activities without restriction."
[6] -It is further found that subsequent to the rendering of the opinion by Dr. Be-ghin, Petitioner disagreed with Dr. Beghin as to his ability to work and has been examined and tested at several medical facilities; that none of those tests or examinations, with one exception, vary greatly with the opinion of Dr. Beghin.
[7] -It is further found that the one exeeption is the report of Dr. Hugh Williams, an orthopaedic surgeon who found that Petitioner will never be able to work again; that determination is based upon a misunderstanding of the results of a diskogram performed by Dr. Peters.
[8] It is further found that the opinion of Dr. Williams is not considered for this reason.
[9] It is further found that no vocational expert testified in this matter for either party.
[10] -It is further found that Dr. Drichorst testified at the hearing that Petitioner's range of motion tests were inconsistent such that he did not believe that the Peti*789tioner was exhibiting maximum effort; that in his deposition he testified that Petitioner was a symptom magnifier.
[11] It is further found that Petitioner was able to return to reasonable types of employment on August 18, 1991.
[12] It is further found that Dr. Hugh Williams, an orthopedic surgeon makes a finding that Petitioner will never be able to work again; that that determination is based on a misunderstanding of Petition, er's diskogram at the hands of Dr. Peters; due to that lack of understanding, Dr. Williams{'s] opinion is not given weight.
[18] It is further found that no other medical doctor comes to a determination of ability to work that is substantially different than that.
Findings of fact must be supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, and those findings which satisfy this requirement must support the agency's conclusion of law.
Initially, it is worth pointing out that Findings 2, 3, 4, 9, and 10 are not proper findings at all. In addition, Finding 18 is not supported by the record. No administrative agency can conclude from the testimony of four physicians that no other doctor reaches some conclusion. There are many doctors and the Board cannot say with any certainty to what conclusions they have come. The Court of Appeals rightly determined that only two of the Board's findings, 5 and 6, were supported by substantial evidence on the record. The Court of Appeals, in spite of their unfortunate concluding statement, Hill v. Worldmark Corp./Mid America Extrusions Corp. (1994), Ind.App., 632 N.E.2d 1173, 1178, in my opinion, correctly reversed the Board's action.
The majority correctly relies on Perez v. U.S. Steel Corp. (1981), Ind., 428 N.E.2d 212. Op. at 786. However, it is important that we be clear on the actual status of the case in Perez. The Court of Appeals had already decided that case and its subsequent procedural history is revealing. See Perez v. United States Steel Corp. (1977), 172 Ind.App. 242, 359 N.E.2d 925, after remand (1981), Ind.App., 416 N.E.2d 864, transfer granted (1981), Ind., 426 N.E.2d 29, after remand (1981), Ind., 428 N.E.2d 212 (affirming award).
The first time that the Court of Appeals heard Perez, it concluded that the Industrial Board's findings were inadequate for review on the issue of whether the claimant was permanently totally disabled and remanded the case for the Board to render adequate findings. Id. at 249, 359 N.E.2d at 929. After remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Board's decision because the court had concluded that findings of fact are adequate where they are sufficient to disclose a valid factual basis under the issues for the legal result(s) reached. Perez v. U.S. Steel Corp. (1981), Ind.App., 416 N.E.2d 864, 865.
When presented with this case on petition to transfer, we granted transfer, reversed, and remanded to the Board. Perez v. U.S. Steel Corp. (1981), Ind., 426 N.E.2d 29. In that opinion, we made the requirements clear:
[Flindings of basic fact must reveal the Board's analysis of the evidence and its determination therefrom regarding the various specific issues of fact which bear on the particular claim. The "finding of ultimate fact' is the ultimate factual conclusion regarding the particular claim before the Board; here, for example, that ultimate question is whether Perez is permanently totally disabled. The finding of ultimate fact may be couched in the legal terms and definitions which govern the particular case. In contrast, the specific findings of basic fact must reveal the Board's determination of the various relevant sub-issues and factual disputes which, in their sum, are dispositive of the particular claim or ultimate factual question before the Board. The findings must be specific enough to provide the reader with an understanding of the Board's reasons, based on the evidence, for its finding of ultimate fact.
Id. at 88. The rendering of such findings enables both the reviewing court and the parties to understand how the administrative agency analyzed the evidence and reached its final conclusion. Id. at 32. The court also emphasized that statements like "A witness *790testified that ...." are not findings at all. Id. at 83.
This all-too-brief review of the relevant case history brings us back to the majority's reliance on the final Peres decision. The majority is correct when it says that we will not disturb the Board's result unless the evidence is such that reasonable men would be compelled to reach a conclusion contrary to that of the Board. Op. at 787 (quoting Perez, 428 N.E.2d at 216). However, that degree of deference applies only where the Board has produced adequate findings in support of its decision. I would never attempt to limit Peres to its particular facts and unique procedural history, but even a cursory comparison of the findings in Perez and those in this case makes it clear that the indulgent deference of the majority opinion is unwarranted. See Perez, 428 N.E.2d at 213-15. Administrative agencies are given broad powers, and it is not too much to ask that they support their actions by developing results that are at least minimally amenable to appellate review. Unfortunately, the Worker's Compensation Board did not meet this standard on remand from the Court of Appeals. Since the majority of the Board's findings are unsupported by the record and the remaining findings do not adequately show the basis of the decision against appellant, intelligent review of that decision on its merits is impossible. I am forced to dissent.