DISSENTING OPINION BY
BOWES, J.:¶ 1 I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the release executed by Barbara Lichtman Tayar is not enforceable in this action. I would affirm the March 31, 2006 order granting summary judgment to Camelback Ski Corporation, Inc. (“Camelback”) and Brian Monaghan, Appellees.
*294¶2 Appellant instituted this action to recover damages for injuries she sustained on December 20, 2003, while snow tubing at Camelback. Prior to riding on the amusement, Appellant executed the following release:
CAMELBACK SNOWTUBING AC-KNOWLEDGEMENT OF RISKS AND AGREEMENT NOT TO SUE THIS IS A CONTRACT — READ IT
I understand and acknowledge that snowtubing, including the use of lifts, is a dangerous, risk sport and that there are inherent and other risks associated with the sport and that all of these risks can cause serious and even fatal injuries. I understand that part of the thrill, excitement and risk of snowtubing is that the snowtubes all end up in a common, runout area and counter slope at various times and speeds and that it is my responsibility to try to avoid hitting another snowtuber and but that, notwithstanding these efforts by myself and other snowtubers, there is a risk of collisions.
I acknowledge and understand that some, but not necessarily all, of the risks of snowtubing include the following:
• Variations in the steepness and configuration of the snowtubing chutes, run-out area, and counter slope, and the surface upon which snowtubing is conducted, which can vary from wet, slushy conditions to hard packed, icy conditions and everything in between;
• Fences and/or barriers at or along portions of the snowtubing area, the absence of such fences and/or barriers and the inability of fences and/or barriers to prevent or reduce injury;
• Changes in the speed at which snow-tubes travel depending on surface conditions, the weight of snowtubers and the inter-linking of snowtubes together to go down the snowtube runs;
• The chance that a patron can fall out, be thrown out or otherwise leave the snowtube;
• The chance that a snowtube can go from one run into another run, regardless of whether or not there is a barrier between runs, and the chance that a snowtube can go up and over the counter slope;
• The chance that a snowtube can go up the counter slope and then slide back into the general runout area;
• Collisions in the runout area or counter slope and other locations of the snowtubing facility, between snow-tubes, between a snowtube and another person, between a snowtube and a snowtubing facility attendant, collisions with fixed objects, obstacles or structures located within or outside of the snowtubing facility, and other sorts of collisions; and
• The use of the snowtubing lift or tow, including falling out of a tube, coasting backwards, becoming entangled with equipment and other risks.
I acknowledge and understand that I am accepting AS IS the snowtube and any other equipment involved with the snowr tubing activity, including lifts and tows, and further acknowledge and understand that NO WARRANTIES are being extended to me with respect to any aspect of the snowtubing facility. I agree and understand that snowtub-ing is a purely voluntary recreation activity and that if I am not willing to acknowledge the risks and agree not to sue, I should not go snowtubing.
IN CONSIDERATION OF THE ABOVE AND OF BEING ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SPORT OF SNOWTUBING, I AGREE THAT I *295WILL NOT SUE AND WILL RELEASE FROM ANY AND ALL LIABILITY CAMELBACK SKI CORPORATION IF I OR ANY MEMBER OF MY FAMILY IS INJURED WHILE USING ANY OF THE SNOWTUBING FACILITIES OR WHILE BEING PRESENT AT THE FACILITIES, EVEN IF I CONTEND THAT SUCH INJURIES ARE THE RESULT OF NEGLIGENCE OR ANY OTHER IMPROPER CONDUCT ON THE PART OF THE SNOWTUBING FACILITY. I FURTHER AGREE THAT I WILL INDEMNIFY AND HOLD HARMLESS CAMELBACK SKI CORPORATION FROM ANY LOSS, LIABILITY, DAMAGE OR COST OF ANY KIND THAT MAY INCUR AS THE RESULT OF ANY INJURY TO MYSELF, TO ANY MEMBER OF MY FAMILY OR TO ANY PERSON FOR WHOM I AM SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT, EVEN IF IT IS CONTENDED THAT ANY SUCH INJURY WAS CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER IMPROPER CONDUCT ON THE PART OF CAM-ELBACK SKI CORPORATION. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if I sue Camelback Ski Corporation, I agree that I will only sue it, whether it be on my own behalf or on behalf of a family member, in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County or in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania and further agree that any and all disputes which might arise between Camelback Ski Corporation and myself shall be litigated exclusively in one of said Courts. I understand and agree that this Agreement is governed by the laws of Pennsylvania. I further agree that if any part of this Agreement is determined to be unenforceable, all other parts shall be given full force and effect.
I have read and understood the foregoing ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RISKS AND AGREEMENT NOT TO SUE and am voluntarily signing below, intending to be legally bound hereby. If I am signing on behalf of a minor child, I represent and warrant that I am doing so with the consent and approval of my spouse (if any) and I understand that I may be giving up the rights of my child and spouse to sue as well as giving up my own right to sue.
Motion for Summary Judgment, 2/2/06, Exhibit A (emphases added).
¶ 3 Appellant and her children rode down the chute in a tube until it came to a stop. As Appellant exited her tube and began to walk away, she was struck by another tube and sustained a fractured leg. Mr. Monaghan, a Camelback employee, was responsible for ensuring that the passengers from a tube had cleared the bottom of the chute before permitting the next tube to enter the chute. During his deposition in this matter, Mr. Monaghan admitted that he was not paying proper attention. Mr. Monaghan stated that he had not intended to injure Appellant and had not been aware that she was in danger of being struck. He explained that he had been distracted at the time of the incident.
Q.... When [Appellant’s] tube reached the bottom of the hill, you could see them, I presume?
A. Yes.
Q. And then you sent another tube down without making sure that the bottom of the hill was clear, right?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. And then did that tube hit the people at the bottom of the hill?
A. Yes.
Q. So you saw them actually get hit down at the bottom?
*296A. I didn’t see them get hit because I was just focusing more on what I was trying to do up at the top, you know. I was watching the people, you know. I didn’t really pay attention. I didn’t really see the lady get hit.
Q. It’s fair to say, though, you didn’t pay attention to what was going on down at the bottom of the hill; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Before you sent another tube down the bottom of the hill — before you sent another tube down, you didn’t look to see whether the area was clear?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that a correct statement?
A. Yes.
Q. ' All right. And then you sent another tube down?
A. Maybe. I don’t know. I don’t remember.
Q. You may have?
A. I may have.
Q. Did you know that was wrong to do that?
A. . Yes. I mean, I wasn’t doing it on purpose. I didn’t do it on purpose to intentionally hit the lady. I just wasn’t paying attention. I was focusing on other things. I was thinking about other things.
Deposition of Brian Monaghan, 10/25/05, at 15-16 (emphasis added).
¶ 4 I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the release did not encompass the conduct in question and that it does not serve to release the employees of Cam-elback. First, Appellant clearly and unequivocally was informed twice of the risk of collision with another snow tuber, which is the precise event that caused her injury. Second, she agreed to release Camelback even if her injuries resulted from “negligence or other improper conduct.” Mr. Monaghan’s conduct was negligent and nothing more. He was being inattentive; I cannot agree with the majority’s characterization of Mr. Monaghan’s conduct as “reckless” and therefore not subject to the release’s language.
¶5 Nissley v. Candytown Motorcycle Club, Inc., 913 A.2d 887 (Pa.Super.2006), is instructive. In that case, in order to become a member of a motorcycle club, the plaintiff executed an application that included a release agreement stating he would not sue the club for injuries sustained while on the premises. The plaintiff was subsequently injured when he went over a jump and struck a maintenance vehicle that was hidden from view. He instituted an action to recover damages resulting from his injuries, but the motorcycle club was granted summary judgment based upon the exculpatory language in the executed release. Therein, we examined the legal principles applicable to releases:
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court established the law for interpreting exculpatory agreements in Employers Liability Assurance Corp. v. Greenville Business Men’s Asso., 423 Pa. 288, 224 A.2d 620 (1966). The Court held that an exculpatory agreement was valid if: (1) it did not contravene public policy; (2)[it] was between persons and related to their own personal affairs; and (3) the agreement was not a contract of adhesion. Id. at 623. Drawing upon its decisions in other cases, it held that the following standards must be met to establish that an exculpatory clause relieves a party of liability: (1) the agreement must be construed strictly since it is not favored by the law; (2) such agreements “must spell out the intention of the parties with the greatest of particularity” and show the intent to release from liability “beyond doubt by express stipulation,” because “(n)o infer*297ence from words of general import can establish it”; (3) such agreements “must be construed with every intendment against the party who seeks the immunity from liability”; and (4) “the burden to establish immunity from liability is upon the party who asserts such immunity.” Id.
Id. at 890.
¶ 6 We concluded that since the plaintiff had agreed not to “sue” the defendant for “any injury” suffered while “upon the premises” of the motorcycle club, the release applied to the action in question. In order to overcome the effect of the release, the plaintiff averred that striking a maintenance vehicle was not an inherent risk of riding the motorcycle at the club, and therefore, the release’s language should not apply to his injuries. We disagreed, holding that “the explicit, broad, and valid language of the exculpatory clause bars all claims, regardless of whether they arise from an inherent risk.” Id. at 892 (emphasis in original). Accord Zimmer v. Mitchell & Ness, 253 Pa.Super. 474, 385 A.2d 437 (1978) (en banc), affirmed per curiam, 490 Pa. 428, 416 A.2d 1010 (1980) (enforcing exculpatory clause contained in rental agreement for ski equipment that malfunctioned and caused injuries).3
¶ 7 In the present case, the release does not contravene any public policy, and it was related to the personal affairs between the two contracting parties. No one forced Appellant to ride the snow tube on December 20, 2003. It was a voluntary choice made solely for the purpose of engaging in a recreational activity, and Appellant signed an agreement acknowledging this fact. Thus, it was not a contract of adhesion and should be enforced.
¶ 8 Moreover, the wording of the document applies herein. Appellant agreed not to sue Camelback. She consented to release Camelback “from any and all liability ... while using any of the snow tubing facilities or while being present at the facilities” even if the “injuries are the result of negligence or any other improper conduct” of Camelback. The language in question clearly and unambiguously prevents Appellant from instituting this action.
¶ 9 I also disagree that the record supports an inference that Mr. Monaghan exhibited gross negligence or recklessness. Restatement (2d) of Torts § 500 defines reckless behavior:
The actor’s conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.
¶ 10 Mr. Monaghan did not know that Appellant had not cleared the bottom; he was being inattentive and did not intentionally or recklessly harm Appellant by allowing a tuber to enter the chute knowing that Appellant remained in the run-off area. His conduct falls within the parameters of ordinary negligence. In fact, the release language clearly encompasses both negligence and “other improper conduct.” My conclusion might differ if Camelback *298continued to employ Mr. Monaghan after he had a history of prematurely sending snow tubes down the chute or if Mr. Mona-ghan had allowed the second tube to proceed for sport, knowing that Appellant had not cleared the area, in order to see if she might avoid injury when he sent down the next tube. These later examples constitute reckless behavior and gross negligence; inattentiveness does not fall into this category.
¶ 11 Negligent employees are simply one of the risks envisioned by this release, and Appellant was specifically informed of the risk of collision with another tube. It is a matter of common knowledge that people who are engaged in a routine and repetitive job for hours can become distracted. Such conduct is not reckless and was covered by this release.
¶ 12 I also strongly disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Appellant can sue Mr. Monaghan because the release itself relates only to Camelback and not its employees. As noted by the majority, a corporation is a fictional entity created under the law that has no corporal existence; instead, it performs its activities only through its employees, agents, and officers. Lokay v. Lehigh Valley Co-op Farmers, Inc., 342 Pa.Super. 89, 492 A.2d 405, 408 (1985) (“A corporation is a creature of legal fiction, and must ‘act’ through its officers, directors or other agents.”). In finding that Appellant did not release the corporation’s employees and released only the corporation, the majority negates the contract. Simply put, Camelback cannot act except through its employees. If its employees are not released from liability, neither is the corporation.
¶ 13 Clear and unambiguous contract language must be enforced by the courts. Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Insurance Co., 503 Pa. 300, 469 A.2d 563, 566 (1983); De Lage Landen Financial Services, Inc. v. M.B. Management, 888 A.2d 895 (Pa.Super.2005). We ascertain the parties’ intent from the language of the contract, and “intention is not to be determined merely by reference to a single word or phrase, but rather by giving every part of the document its fair and legitimate meaning.” Kelly v. Hannan, 388 Pa.Super. 638, 566 A.2d 310, 312 (1989).
¶ 14 The majority’s disposition ignores the clear and intended effect of this release. Appellant agreed to release Camel-back from liability for negligent acts and thereby released Camelback’s employees from liability because corporations act through their agents and employees. Mr. Monaghan was acting within the scope of his employment when Appellant was injured, and Appellant expressly agreed not to sue if she was injured as a result of a negligent act.
¶ 15 Hence, I would affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Camelback.
. I also note that our Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal in Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, L.P., 911 A.2d 946 (Pa.Super.2006), appeal granted, 593 Pa. 420, 931 A.2d 630 (2007), wherein a panel of this Court refused to enforce language similar to that at issue herein that was contained in a release that a skier had executed.