concurring.
In this appeal we have, sua sponte, raised an issue concerning the avenues of access to this Court in a contract action involving the Commonwealth. The legislature has conferred upon the Board of Claims the exclusive jurisdiction to resolve disputes on contracts entered into by the Commonwealth. See 72 P.S. § 4651-1 et seq.1 We have recognized and fortified this exclusive jurisdiction by prohibiting the Commonwealth Court from issuing injunctive relief for breach of these contracts, Ezy Parks v. Larson, 499 Pa. 615, 454 A.2d 928 (1982); and we have insisted upon this exclusive jurisdiction, even in instances where the Board has not the power to enforce their decision, as in an action for specific performance. See, e.g., Vespaziani v. Commonwealth Dept. of Revenue, 40 Pa.Cmwlth. 54, 396 A.2d 489 (1979).
Today, we hold that all contract actions must proceed first to the Board of Claims, and then to the Commonwealth Court. See 2 Pa.C.S.A. § 701 et seq.2; 42 Pa.C.S. § 763.3 *413It is only after this intermediate step that a litigant may seek our review, and then only by petition for allowance of appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 724; Pa.R.A.P. 1112.
Unfortunately, after announcing this clear rule, the majority in Section V, muddies the water by intimating that in some instances the Board of Claims may not have the power to decide whether or not a contract has been “entered into”. I believe that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board of Claims includes the power in all instances to rule on whether or not a contract has been “entered into”. See, e.g. Smock v. Commonwealth, 496 Pa. 204, 436 A.2d 615 (1981); Clark v. Pennsylvania State Police, 496 Pa. 310, 436 A.2d 1383 (1981); and I find no reason to except the situation posed by the majority in Section V.
Thus, I join in the opinion of the majority, except for the limitation intimated in Section V.
. Act of October 5, 1978, P.L. 1104 No. 260, § 2, as amended.
. Act of April 28, 1978, P.L. 202, No. 53 § 5.
. Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142 § 2.