This is an appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County (per President Judge Reilly) denying, in part, appellant’s, George A. Corbin’s, ineffectiveness of counsel claim. See note 2, infra. We reverse and remand.
We have reviewed all of appellant’s claims and find that the only one meriting discussion concerns trial counsel’s failure to file pre-trial motions. For the reasons that are *273discussed infra, we maintain that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the course of the police’s examination of the glove compartment and trunk of a vehicle linked to the appellant if no warrant existed to sanction the search and seizure.
Moreover, we find the cases of South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976) and Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967) to be distinguishable from the case at bar. There, the United States Supreme Court authorized the search of impounded vehicles by police, days after their seizure, for purposes of making an inventory of the contents so as to protect themselves and avoid the consequences of owner claims against the police over lost or stolen property. Instantly, unlike in Opperman and Cooper, the police were utilizing a national handbook to assist them in locating the vehicle’s registration number when the incriminating evidence was discovered. The purpose of the police’s conduct was not to inventory the vehicle as a precaution against possible claims by the true owner for loss of contents. Rather, the search conducted was for the specific purpose of locating potentially incriminating evidence against the driver-appellant, and, thus, “was a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive.” South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, 428 U.S. at 376, 96 S.Ct. at 3100. This is supported by the facts, i.e., after the appellant presented the police with a driver’s license inconsistent with the name of the vehicle’s owner, as told to them by the appellant, the police observed through the windshield that the vehicle’s identification number was “gone.” Thereafter, the vehicle was impounded and the following day the vehicle was searched and the evidence complained of (check-writing equipment, checks and a corporate seal) was seized from the glove compartment and trunk.
To adhere to any other position would be to sanction an illegal search for incriminating evidence under the guise of an inventory search, especially given the facts available to *274the police prior to the search which rendered the ownership of the vehicle suspect. In other words, the legal owner of the impounded vehicle was brought into question and the police’s “protective procedures [were but] a subterfuge for criminal investigations.” South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, 428 U.S. at 370 n. 5, 96 S.Ct. at 3097 n. 5. If we were to approve of such an activity by the authorities, henceforth the police could eschew the requirements of a warrant to search an impounded vehicle regardless of the object of their search. This goes far beyond what Opperman and Cooper envisioned.
In light of the fact that the search conducted by the police was not for inventory purposes, appellant’s trial counsel’s action in failing to file a motion to suppress the evidence seized raises a question as to his stewardship, which was dealt with by the court below and raised by appellant on appeal. In evaluating this claim, we' observe that we must make an independent review of the record and decide if the course of action counsel is charged with not pursuing had some reasonable basis. Commonwealth v. Byrd, 250 Pa.Super. 250, 378 A.2d 921 (1977). Only if the claim is ruled to be of arguable merit must we inquire into counsel’s reasons for not pursuing it. Commonwealth v. Strader, 262 Pa.Super. 166, 396 A.2d 697 (1978).
We find that the subject of the existence or non-existence of a warrant, which is pivotal to a determination of counsel’s stewardship, is not ascertainable from the documents provided to this Court, and, thus, another remand is necessary.
For example, at the evidentiary hearing conducted at this Court’s direction, see Commonwealth v. Corbin, 268 Pa.Super. 526, 408 A.2d 1128 (1979), to evaluate appellant’s various allegations of ineffectiveness attendant to his trials, one of which occurred on November 14-15, 1977 and is of concern to us here, counsel for appellant testified that he filed no pre-trial suppression motion or post-trial motions *275regarding the evidence seized by the Warren police. On this subject, the following exchange took place:
[By Mr. Kresner — appellant’s new counsel:]
Q Now, Mr. Corbin alleges, Mr. Blakley, that you were ineffective in failing to file Pre-Trial Motions prior to the November Trial. Did you consider filing any PreTrial Motions prior to the Trial?
[Benjamin S. Blakley, III — appellant’s trial counsel:]
A No, I didn’t.
Hs * * * * • Hi
Q He also alleges that you were ineffective in failing to object to certain evidence seized in the November Trial.
A I did object to it ... [when appellant] leaned over to me and asked me to object to it [at defense table] because he felt that there was not sufficient identification. And at that time, on the record, I did object to it.
Q And I don’t believe you filed Post-Verdict Motions on that basis. What was the reason there?
He Hi Hi * * *
A Based on the testimony raised at Trial, it was my opinion that the automobile had been sufficiently identified and that my Post-Trial Motions would have been frivolous. So I did not file them.
Q Now, Mr. Corbin has alleged in testimony that you gave him a copy of your Motion for New Trial and/or Verdict in Arrest of Judgment and told him that it had been filed when ultimately no such Motion was filed. You would agree that no such Motion was filed?
A III agree to that.
Q Would you agree that you gave such to Mr. Corbin and indicated to him that such was filed?
A I will assume that I gave a copy to Mr. Corbin—
* He He He He
THE WITNESS: Mr. Corbin has a copy of the Motion that I had prepared. I do not recall telling him that I had definitely, filed it. I — I believe that I discussed the *276situation with Mr. Corbin. I cannot be sure, two years later, exactly what words were stated to Mr. Corbin.
Q ... Appellant, Mr. Corbin, ... indicates] basically that there “were Pre-Trial Motions which you could have filed which you did not file because of a lack of experience?
A I — it [ — a letter written by Attorney Blakley to the appellant dated March 28, 1978 — ] doesn’t specify PreTrial Motions, Post-Trial Motions, it just says certain things. There are certain tactical moves which I, had I been aware of them, and which I may become aware of ten years from now, I probably could have filed. I’m not aware of any. I suppose if I would have chosen to employ some delaying tactics or so forth, I might have been able to do it. I know of none now. Undoubtedly a more experienced attorney could — could have done it. I was explaining to Mr. Corbin, at the time of this Trial, I had been sworn in at the Supreme Court about a week and a half, a week before.
Q Before what, Mr. Blakley?
A Before this Trial.
Q Before the November Trial?
A Before the November Trial. I was sworn in the first week of November of ’77. This was my first Trial. I was explaining to Mr. Corbin why certain — why I was not acting as an F. Lee Bailey.
sj; sK
Q ... Would you read the exact sentence which is underlined [in the letter sent by you to the appellant and dated March 28, 1978.]
A I realized at the November Trial there were certain things that I could have filed that I did not file and I told you this in January, the reason being that I was fresh out of law school and was not aware of the proper procedures at that time.
*277Q The proper procedures at that time. In retrospect, Mr. Blakley, were there any Motions which you at this point feel that you should have filed but for your inexperience?
A There are Motions that I believe could, have been filed but probably would have been frivolous. I don’t believe that I would have conducted myself any differently than I did at the time. There are many things that could have been filed.
(Emphasis added) (N.T. 10/17-18/79 at 159, 160-161, 162-163, 165-167)
Appellant’s trial counsel’s belief that the filing of a motion to suppress would have been a useless gesture was reaffirmed during his cross-examination by the Commonwealth’s attorney; viz.:
Q Now, you said that you could have filed a number of Pre-Trial Motions, but you felt that they were fruitless. I believe those were your words, is that correct?
A Yes.
Q That included your feeling that an attempt to Suppress this evidence taken and used against the Defendant would have been fruitless to file a Motion to Suppress that?
A Given what I knew, yes.
(Emphasis added) (N.T. 10/17-18/79 at 174)
Keeping the aforesaid in mind, we turn to the record which reveals that on November 14, 1977, the date appellant’s second trial commenced, appellant also was scheduled for criminal court for a third trial charging similar offenses arising out of a separate incident (but using the same evidence seized in the November trial) which resulted in his conviction on January 23, 1978. Of interest here is the fact that on January 17, 1978 Attorney Blakley did file an “Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion For Suppression of Evidence” in which the following averments were made:
1. That your Petitioner is charged with the crimes of forgery, receiving stolen property and criminal conspiracy.
*2782. That your Petitioner is scheduled for trial on January 23, 1977 [ — sic 1978].
3. That the Commonwealth intends to introduce certain physical evidence obtained by the Warren PA Police Department from a Cadillac Eldorado allegedly belonging to the petitioner. Such evidence consisting of a checkwriting machine, a box of unused checks and a corporate seal.
4. That your Petitioner’s rights will be violated by the introduction of the said physical evidence for the following reasons:
A) That the Warren Pa Police Department lacked probable cause to impound said Cadillac Eldorado prior to the search of said vehicle leading to the discovery of the aforesaid physical evidence.
B) That the Warren PA Police Department failed to obtain proper search warrant before conducting a search of said Cadillac Eldorado.
C) That if a search warrant was issued prior to the search of said vehicle, such search warrant was issued without probable cause.
D) That for the reasons set forth above, petitioners [sic] rights under the United States Constitution and Pennsylvania Constitution would be violated if the physical evidence obtained during the search of said Cadillac Eldorado is introduced.
WHEREFORE, your Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court direct the Commonwealth to show cause why the physical evidence obtained by the Warren PA Police Department should not be suppressed.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Benjamin Spencer Blakley III
Benjamin Spencer Blakley III
Assistant Public Defender
(Emphasis added) (Record at page 23)
On January 20, 1978, the date set for hearing appellant’s Motion to Suppress, the court entered an Order granting the suppression of the evidence listed in the Motion because *279“the District Attorney ... indicated no opposition thereto[.]” (Record at page 25) It seems difficult for this Court to perceive that by appellant’s third trial1 counsel would be totally ignorant of the existence of a warrant, although such a conclusion can be drawn from a reading of Attorney Blakley’s Motion to Suppress at Point 4, paragraphs (B) & (C).
Thus, in light of the aforecited, it cannot be seriously argued that the record contains evidence to establish the absence of a warrant. Were we to hold trial counsel ineffective without assuring ourselves that a search warrant was not secured by the Warren police prior to the seizure of the incriminating evidence from the Cadillac Eldorado, such a procedure would assault the tenet that “counsel should be afforded the opportunity to explain his choice of strategy at an evidentiary hearing.” Commonwealth v. Lambeth, 273 Pa.Super. 460, 462, 417 A.2d 739, 740 (1979). This requirement has not been satisfied by the hearing held on October 17-18, 1979, and, thus, the record is silent on the subject of ineffectiveness. In Commonwealth v. Robinson, 298 Pa.Super. 447, 444 A.2d 1260 (1982) a panel of this Court was confronted with an identical problem and handled it in the following manner:
[We] will not automatically deem counsel ineffective for failing to present the suppression motion timely. Counsel ■ will not be deemed ineffective when he fails to pursue a meritless claim. Commonwealth v. Weathers El, 485 Pa. 28, 400 A.2d 1295 (1979). In this case, however, because of the inadequacy of the record, it is not possible to conclude that the motion to suppress had arguable merit.
*280The affidavit supporting the search warrant is not in the record and the lower court did not address the issue. We therefore remand to the trial court with direction to order the party in possession to produce the search warrant and affidavit and to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the question of whether the suppression motion had arguable merit. If the lower court determines that counsel was ineffective, appellant should be allowed to file a suppression motion nunc pro tunc.
The judgment of sentence is reversed and case remanded.
Id. 298 Pa.Super. at 453-54, 444 A.2d at 1263-64.
In accordance with Robinson, this case will be remanded with directions to require the person in possession of the search warrant, if one does exist, to produce it and then have the trial court assess the probable cause section in accordance with accepted standards.
On the other hand, if a warrant was not secured by the authorities, failure to raise in a pre-trial motion such an arguably meritorious claim cannot be said to have been a course of action designed to effectuate a client’s interest. See Commonwealth v. Segers, 479 Pa. 108, 387 A.2d 858 (1978); cf. Commonwealth v. Byrd, 250 Pa.Super. 250, 256, 378 A.2d 921, 924 (1977) (“We can perceive no reasonable legal basis for an attorney to fail to object to a violation of his client’s right to speedy trial under Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100.” (Citation omitted)). This is especially so given the interpretation of the officers’ actions (motive) in searching the vehicle. (N.T. 11/14-15/77 at 83-94)
Consequently, if a remand establishes that the search was a warrantless one, it seems clear to us that counsel was ineffective. Appellant should be then afforded the opportunity to file a suppression motion nunc pro tunc, see Commonwealth v. Robinson, supra, and have the case proceed through the judicial process as any other matter, for it'may be that the Commonwealth can secure a conviction in the absence of the seized evidence as occurred in appellant’s January 23, 1978 trial.
*281Order reversed and case remanded.2 Jurisdiction is relinquished.
JOHNSON, J., concurs in the result. HESTER, J., files a concurring and dissenting opinion.. We note that the charges lodged against the appellant were all the outgrowth of a check cashing scheme that occurred, as is evident from the criminal complaints filed by Trooper Ronald Amon, on June 13th, May 5th and April 19th of 1977. Each of the fraudulent checks linked to the appellant resulted in separate trials of September 21, 1977, November 14-15, 1977 and January 23, 1978.
As far as we can decipher from the record, since the transcript of the September trial is not included herein, at the November trial the evidence seized from the Cadillac Eldorado was introduced to buttress the Commonwealth’s case against the appellant. Thus, it was a factor in his conviction.
. Pursuant to this Court’s directive, see Commonwealth v. Corbin, 268 Pa.Super. 526, 408 A.2d 1128 (1979), a hearing was conducted to evaluate appellant’s various allegations of ineffectiveness attendant to his trials, one of which occurred on September 21, 1977 and the other on November 14-15, 1977. The hearing judge, after the proceedings were completed, held that "a new trial must be granted to the [appellant] for the September 21st trial.” (Lower Court Opinion at 3) We see no reason, based on the claims made and the facts presented in regard thereto, to disturb this ruling.
As an aside, we note that the Commonwealth filed a “Petition For Nolle Prosequi” on May 15, 1981; therein it stated:
8. That on January 22, 1981, by Order of your Honorable Court, the defendant was granted a new trial with regards [sic] to the first trial by jury which was held on September 21, 1977.
9. After remand by your Honorable Court, it was discovered that through no fault of the Clearfield County District Attorney’s Office, evidence necessary to commence trial in this particular case had been destroyed and lost, despite diligent efforts by the District Attorney’s Office to locate same. Therefore, we will be unable to proceed in this matter.
(Record at page 76)
The court entered an Order dated May 14, 1981 holding that a nolle prosequi be granted with regard to one count of forgery and receiving stolen property, of which the defendant was convicted on September 21, 1977. All other matters in connection with the case (77-610-CRA) were to remain the same.