concurring in result.
I write separately because the majority reaches the correct result, but for the wrong reasons. The trial court had the authority granted by Ind.Code 81-1-11.5-17 to entertain Maureen's Petition for Modification based on substantial changing conditions which rendered the original order unreasonable. Local Rule 19(A) is inconsistent with the statute. If it were otherwise, we must ask ourselves, "Why did Maureen ask in her petition for the rule to be waived?" The conflicts are apparent. The statute did not require a verified petition-the rule did. The statute did not provide a time limitation-the local rule prohibited a party, except in an extreme emergency, from exercising his or her rights to modify for at least a year after a prior order.1 The standard was changed from changed circumstances making the terms of the original order unreasonable to the rule's requirement of an "extreme emergency."
The majority makes the mistake of not following an established rule of appellate procedure; i.e., the rulings made by the trial court are considered presumptively valid on appeal and it is the burden of the party appealing to establish their legal invalidity. Moore v. State (1986), Ind., 493 N.E.2d 778.
"It has been held many times that all reasonable presumptions are indulged on *1295appeal in favor of the rulings and Judgments of the trial court ... a court of appeals will not presume anything in favor of appellant to sustain his alleged errors."
Reilly v. Robertson (1977), 266 Ind. 29, 360 N.E.2d 171, 176, citing First National Bank v. Penn-Harris-Madison School Corp. (1970), 255 Ind. 403, 265 N.E.2d 16, 18-19.
Here, the trial court exercised jurisdiction based on a right to modify granted by statute to either party under certain conditions. He did so despite the local rule by entering an order that the local rule was waived (without giving a reason). The exercise of his jurisdiction was presumptively correct. The majority ignores the burden placed upon Appellant William to show that it was incorrect. William cannot satisfy that burden by failing to address the issue in his brief or relying on Maureen's failure to raise it in her appellee's brief. Here, to overcome the presumption of validity, William had to show that: 1) the rule was valid and not inconsistent with a statute; and 2) the trial court abused its discretion in waiving the rule. William failed to meet his burden as to item (1), therefore, there was no need to reach the question of abuse of discretion. In the absence of cogent argument that overcomes the presumption favoring the ruling of the trial court, it is our duty to affirm that ruling.
This leaves the question of whether the evidence supported the judge's changes. By way of background, this is the story of the end of a nineteen year marriage, a marriage that produced three daughters. After a separation, Maureen and William determined that their marriage was over. They and their lawyers struggled to create a property settlement and support, custody, and visitation agreements that would be fair to them and would consider the best interests of their children. They almost succeeded. As noted by the trial court, the "agreement which has been read into the record today is fair, equitable, and in the best interests of the children." R. 84. This "would have been a very difficult case for the Court to decide." R. 85.
Maureen received more than half of the marital assets, including the family home in Carmel, and a maintenance payment of $660 per month for twenty-four months. R. 3. William agreed to pay $141 per child on a weekly basis ($428 per week) and assumed numerous other obligations for the benefit of their children. They agreed to joint custody with Maureen as the custodial parent. They also agreed that before any custodial or visitation dispute would be submitted to a court, they first would submit the dispute to mediation. Unfortunately, this provision did not extend to the support agreement.
The dispute before us involves a change in William's income, a change anticipated by the parties when they negotiated the settlement agreement. Maureen and William knew that William usually had an annual salary review in early April of each year. R. 67, 77. He previously received annual salary increases and bonuses. At the time of the dissolution decree, the amount of his salary increase (for 1990) and bonus (earned in 1989, but paid in 1990) was unknown. R. 79. William agreed to notify Maureen of his new salary and bonus award when he received them. R. 7. The trial court refused to either prospectively waive Local Rule 19(A) or to enter anything "in the Decree ... dealing with a future determination of support." R. 70. On April 16, fourteen (14) days after the dissolution decree was entered, in accordance with the decree William notified Maureen that his salary had been increased to $79,500 per year and he had received a $17,221.11 bonus. William earned a total gross income of $96,722.11 in 1990, compared to $85,000 for 1989.
About two months later, Maureen filed a petition for modification of the support agreement. Maureen asked the trial court to increase the support payments $17 ($51 per week)-from $141 per week per daughter to $158 per week per daughter ($574 per week), an increase of about 12%. Maureen based this level of support on William's new annual income and the support levels of the Indiana Child Support Guide*1296lines. Annually, the difference in total support is $2652.00
As stated by the majority, the trial court waived Local Rule 19 and heard argument on Maureen's petition. The trial court refused to increase the weekly support payment. - However, the trial court sua sponte ordered William to pay 95% of their oldest daughter's tuition and book expenses at IUPUI. The court then ordered William to pay to Maureen as "support," 40% of the net after tax amount of any futwre bonus he might receive. Finally, the court ordered William to pay $900 of Maureen's $2248 attorney fees.
Having shown above that the trial court correctly assumed jurisdiction, I address the remaining issues of whether the trial court erred by: 1) finding that Maureen demonstrated a change in circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms of the support order unreasonable; and 2) ordering William to pay part of Maureen's attorney fees.
The trial court found that "there have been substantial and continuing changes in circumstances making the former order of Court unreasonable as to child support." R. 30. The trial court then increased Maureen's future support payments by giving her forty (40%) of the net amount of William's future bonuses.2 In my opinion, this was error because Maureen failed to present any evidence of substantial and continuing changes in circumstances. The only evidence supporting Maureen's petition was that William's gross income had increased, by less than twenty percent, due to a bonus that both parties anticipated at 'the time of their agreement. This evidence only established that the current order was not in exact conformance with the guidelines.
Traditional examples of changed cireum-stances have included educational expenses, Martin v. Martin (1986), Ind., 495 N.E.2d 523; injury and bankruptcy, Kruse v. Kruse (1984), Ind.App., 464 N.E.2d 934, reh'g denied, trans. denied (1985), and a change of custody, Rice v. Rice (1984), Ind.App., 460 N.E.2d 1228. "In considering the role of the guidelines [Indiana Child Support Rules] ... we are of the opinion that the use of such guidelines, standing alone, does not comply with the statutory command which makes a showing of changed circumstances in modifying child support orders absolutely mandatory." - Stierwalt v. Dyer (1988); Ind.App., 531 N.E.2d 1213, 1214. "These guidelines ... may not be used absent a showing of a substantial change in circumstances." Vore v. Vore (1990), 563 N.E.2d 154, 157 n. 2, aff'd, Vore v. Vore (1991), Ind., 573 N.E.2d 397. Stier-walt and Vore make it clear that something more than a change in income, which would result in a different amount of child support payments based on the Indiana Child Support Rules, is required to change a support order.
I might also add that the judge's order only applied to future bonuses-not to weekly support payments. There clearly was no evidence of a change in circumstances (after only two months) on the bonus issue. The judge knew no more about future bonuses than he did at the time of the original decree. It appears to me that the judge was using a modification hearing to correct what he thought was an omission in the original decree.
I do agree with the majority's conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering William to pay college expenses sua sponte. The issue was not raised in Maureen's modification petition nor was it argued at the hearing. Therefore, this is *1297not a TR. 15 question of merely conforming the pleadings to the evidence. The only evidence before the court was that William was voluntarily paying these expenses and that he intended to continue to do so, consistent with their daughters' academic ability and his capacity to pay.
In addition to the authority of Lepper v. Lepper (1987), Ind., 509 N.E.2d 818, cited by the majority, this court has found that it is error for a trial court to sua sponte raise issues of child support. Gielsdorf-Aliah v. Aliah (1990), Ind.App., 560 N.E.2d 1275, 1277. "Where parents agree that the needs of their children are being met under an existing court order, and neither is petitioning the court for modification, the court is not required to initiate modifications ..." Id.
Here, Maureen asked only an increase in weekly child support payments. She did not ask that William be required to pay colleges expenses, probably because he had voluntarily paid them. Therefore, I agree that the court abused its discretion in ordering payment of college expenses.
I agree with the majority's decision with respect to payment of attorney fees. Since the court had jurisdiction to hear Maureen's petition, it did not abuse its discretion in finding that $900 of Maureen's legal fees was a reasonable amount that should be apportioned to William.
. Ind.Code 31-1-11.5-17. Modification and termination of maintenance, support and property dispositions.-(a) Provisions of an order with respect to child support or an order for maintenance ordered under section 9(c) ... of this chapter may be modified or revoked. Such modification shall be made only upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unreasonable. [P.L. 289-1987, section 1.]
This statute was modified by P.L. 155-1990 to read as follows:
Such modification shall be made only:
(1) Upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unreasonable; or
(2) Upon a showing that:
(A) A party has been ordered to pay an amount in child support that differs by more than twenty percent (20%) from the amount that would be ordered by applying the child support guidelines; and
(B) The order requested to be modified or revoked was issued at least twelve months before the petition requesting modification was filed.
. The trial court order clearly affects only future bonuses. The order states:
(5)(C) "Father shall pay 40% of the after tax benefit received from any bonus for performance within 10 days of its receipt to wife as support. This bonus is usually received in April.
(6) This order shall operate prospectively only." This is in accordance with well established Indiana case law. "A petition to modify a support order operates only prospectively ...." Pickett v. Pickett (1984), Ind.App., 470 N.E.2d 751, 755. A trial court may make a modification of support payments effective as of any date after the filing of the petition. In re Marriage of Wiley (1983), Ind.App., 444 N.E.2d 315, 319. See also Smith v. Mobley (1990), Ind.App., 561 N.E.2d 504; Andrews v. Andrews (1988), Ind.App., 531 N.E.2d 219; Kruse v. Kruse (1984), Ind.App., 464 N.E.2d 934, trans. denied.