dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s finding that Hazel Lohmiller must be joined in the partition action.
A tenancy by the entireties is a form of co-ownership that exists only between husband and wife and is presumed to exist whenever property is held in their joint names. It is characterized by the four unities of interest, title, time, and possession. Each spouse is entitled to enjoyment of the whole and a right of survivorship. Neither has an individual portion that can be alienated, separated, or reached by creditors, Madden v. Gosztonyi Savings & Trust Co., 331 Pa. 476, 200 A. 624 (1938). Parties who are not husband and wife may have a joint tenancy if the four unities exist, Estate of Kotz, 486 Pa. 444, 406 A.2d 524 (1979). Joint tenants had a right of survivorship at common law, but such right has been abolished except where it is expressly provided for in the instrument creating the estate, Act of March 31, 1812, P.L. 259, 5 S.M.L. 395, § 1, 68 P.S. § 110, Zomisky v. Zamiska, 449 Pa. 239, 296 A.2d 722 (1972). The lack of individually alienable portions is another attribute of a tenancy by the entireties that distinguishes it from a joint tenancy, Madden, Supra. Co-owners of property may also hold it by tenancy in common, which requires only a unity of possession and under which there may be unequal interests, there is no right of survivorship, and the individual interests are alienable, Edel v. Edel, 283 Pa.Super. 551, 424 A.2d 946 (1981).
*335A husband and wife may own a part interest in an estate as tenants by the entireties and have a tenancy in common with the other co-owners. In Michael Estate, 421 Pa. 207, 218 A.2d 338 (1966), a deed to real estate named as grantees two married couples as tenants by the entireties. We held that each couple owned a half interet in the property and a tenancy in common existed between the two couples. In Edel, Supra, the first and second grantees each had a one-fifth interest in a parcel of real estate and a husband and wife held the remaining three-fifths interest as tenants by the entireties. A tenancy in common existed between the first and second grantees and the entireties estate. These cases govern the relationship among the co-owners of the property here in question. Prior to the divorce, a tenancy in common existed between Hazel Lohmiller and the entireties estate held by the present appellant and appellee. The divorce created a tenancy in common among the three co-owners.
Tenancy by the entireties is a unique form of co-ownership of property that is available only to a husband and wife. The Act of 1927, quoted in the majority opinion, under which the present action was brought, takes account of that uniqueness by providing a special procedure for the disposal of entireties property after a divorce. The property is disposed of by selling it and dividing the proceeds. In Recktenwald v. Recktenwald, 284 Pa.Super. 185, 425 A.2d 765 (1981), the court noted that this differs from the normal procedure for dissolution of a tenancy in common, under which the property may be partitioned if possible, Rules of Civil Procedure 1558, 1560, and 1561. The former spouses have only a monetary as distinct from a proprietary interest, Lazare v. Lazare, 365 Pa. 591, 76 A.2d 190 (1950).
In view of the fact that Act of 1927 provides for a distinct procedure for the disposition of property held under a form of tenancy unique to husband and wife, I would find that a proceeding under the act is not a proper vehicle for dealing with any matter other than the sale of the property and the distribution of the proceeds to the former spouses. The joinder of other matters has been disallowed in previous *336cases. In Lykiardopoulos v. Lykiardopoulos, 453 Pa. 290, 309 A.2d 548 (1973), we held that the claims of the wife for support and credit for money spent to maintain the entire-ties property could not be joined in a proceeding under the act. In Reeping v. Reeping, 277 Pa.Super. 269, 419 A.2d 766 (1980), the husband’s mother asserted a claim for money spent in payment of the spouses’ debts. The court held that no part of the proceeds of the sale could be awarded to anyone other than the former tenants by the entireties. A creditor of one of the spouses has no standing to institute proceedings for the sale of former entireties property, Eastern Acceptance Corporation v. Gold, 60 D. & C. 95 (C.P. Montgomery, 1947). A claim involving property other than the former entireties estate may not be raised in a proceeding under the act, Sandusky v. Sandusky, 30 Fayette L.S. 75 (1967). In the instant case, I would find that the joinder of Hazel Lohmiller is neither required nor permitted, as it would involve property that was not part of the entireties estate. I agree with the majority that there is a cognizable claim involving Hazel Lohmiller’s interest in the farm, but such claim must be brought in an action other than the instant one.
I would affirm the Superior Court.
ROBERTS, C.J., joins in this dissenting opinion.