(concurring). I concur in the result only. I write separately to urge our Supreme Court to resolve the issue whether the precedent negligence requirement of a gross negligence claim survived the adoption in Michigan of comparative negligence in Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638; 275 NW2d 511 (1979).
A panel of this Court recently determined that the precedent negligence requirement should continue to be applied. In Pavlov v Community Emergency Medical Service, Inc, 195 Mich App 711, 718; 491 NW2d 874 (1992), a case in which the trial court granted summary disposition to the defendants on the basis of immunity under the former emergency medical services act, MCL 333.20701 et seq.; MSA 14.15(20701) et seq., the majority opin*719ion noted that, in its historical context, the concept of "gross negligence” was intended as a plaintiffs doctrine to be used to avoid the harsh bar of contributory negligence. The Pavlov majority set forth the definition of gross negligence from Gibbard v Cursan, 225 Mich 311, 319; 196 NW 398 (1923):
"When will gross negligence of a defendant excuse contributory negligence of a plaintiff? In a case where the defendant, who knows, or ought, by the exercise of ordinary care, to know, of the precedent negligence of the plaintiff, by his subsequent negligence does plaintiff an injury. . . .
"The theory of gross negligence is that the antecedent negligence of plaintiff only put him in a position of danger and was therefore only the remote cause of the injury, while the subsequently intervening negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause.” [Pavlov, supra, pp 718-719; citations omitted, emphasis in original.]
The Pavlov majority also stated:
The Gibbard definition has remained unaltered, despite the adoption in Michigan of comparative negligence (Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638; 275 NW2d 511 [1979]) and the dissatisfaction with its misuse noted even in Gibbard, supra at 321. See, e.g., Papajesk [v Chesapeake & O R Co, 14 Mich App 550, 555; 166 NW2d 46 (1968)]. Our Supreme Court specifically declined an opportunity to redefine the phrase in Burnett [v City of Adrian, 414 Mich 448, 455-456; 326 NW2d 810 (1982)], stating that it preferred to wait for a case with a "fully developed factual record.” Id. at 456. [Pavlov, supra, p 719.]
The Pavlov majority concluded, in light of the substantive law regarding the issue of gross negligence, that the trial court did not err in applying *720the Gibbard/Burnett definition of gross negligence. Pavlov, supra, p 720. The Pavlov majority further stated:
[C]ase law plainly requires that the plaintiff must plead gross negligence correctly if the claim, is to be addressed. "In order to properly allege gross negligence, plaintiffs must plead defendants’ subsequent negligence.” Mallory v Detroit, 181 Mich App 121, 125; 449 NW2d 115 (1989), another case construing MCL 333.20737; MSÁ 14.15(20737). The panel in Malcolm v East Detroit, 180 Mich App 633, 643; 447 NW2d 860 (1989), applied the same rule: "[F]or a gross negligence claim to be actionable it must allege that the defendant’s negligent conduct occurred subsequent to some negligent conduct on the part of the plaintiff.” The Supreme Court reversed the Malcolm decision on other grounds, but did not address the definition of "gross negligence” because the plaintiff failed to raise it on cross-appeal. 437 Mich 132, 147-148; 468 NW2d 479 (1991). See also Abraham [v Jackson, 189 Mich App 367, 372; 473 NW2d 699 (1991)]. [Pavlov, supra, p 720.]
The Pavlov majority concluded that the trial court correctly dismissed the plaintiff’s gross negligence claim and declined the plaintiff’s request that it ignore the definition of gross negligence set out in Malcolm, Mallory, and Abraham and instead apply the standard found in MCL 691.1407(2) (c); MSA 3.996(107)(2)(c), which provides that "gross negligence” means "conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.” Pavlov, supra, pp 720-721.
In my view, the precedent negligence requirement of a gross negligence claim simply makes no sense in a comparative negligence context. I agree wholeheartedly with Judge Michael J. Kelly’s *721concurring opinion in Pavlov that, in the context of emergency medical service, the only definition of gross negligence that makes any sense is that provided by MCL 691.1407(2)(c); MSA 3.996(107X2) (c). Pavlov, supra, p 723. Judge Kelly stated:
I opt for that definition of gross negligence [provided for in MCL 691.1407(2)(c); MSA 3.996 (107X2) (c)] because that is the only definition that makes sense in the context of emergency medical service. To use a fashionable term, it is ludicrous to attempt to portray human suffering and trauma inflicted by the forces of nature or society as negligence in order to establish gross negligence as defined by case law. The Supreme Court has signaled its intention to set this scheme aright in Burnette [sic] v City of Adrian, 414 Mich 448; 326 NW2d 810 (1982), and Malcolm v East Detroit, 437 Mich 132; 468 NW2d 479 (1991), but I do not anticipate that this is the case that will supply the factual basis for a new "best effort” by the Supreme Court. . . .
I would be gratified to see the Legislature insert the government tort liability act definition of gross negligence in the present version of the emergency medical services act, MCL 333.20901 et seq.; MSA 14.15(20901) et seq. I agree with plaintiff that the pre-Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638; 275 NW2d 511 (1979), case law definitions of gross negligence are obsolete. [Pavlov, supra, pp 723-724.]
If I were not bound by stare decisis and Administrative Order No. 1990-6, 436 Mich lxxxiv, as extended by Administrative Order No. 1991-11, 439 Mich cxliv, as extended by Administrative Order No. 1992-8, 441 Mich lii, I would find that plaintiff properly pleaded the existence of gross negligence, that the trial court’s instructional error was not harmless, and that our failure to reverse the judgment in this case would be incon*722sistent with substantial justice. I would reverse the judgment entered on the jury verdict and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial. I believe that this case, with its fully developed factual record, is the proper vehicle for our Supreme Court to dispense with the obsolete and outdated definition of gross negligence set forth in Gibbard.
I also note that the notion of subsequent or gross negligence under the Gibbard definition has been referred to as the "last clear chance” doctrine. Burnett, supra, pp 461-462 (Blair Moody, Jr., J., concurring); Gibbard, supra, pp 319, 322. In Petrove v Grand Trunk W R Co, 437 Mich 31, 33; 464 NW2d 711 (1991), our Supreme Court determined that, in light of this state’s adoption of comparative negligence, an instruction on the "last clear chance” doctrine constituted error. In so holding, the Supreme Court adopted as its own the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in Callesen v Grand Trunk W R Co, 175 Mich App 252, 259-263; 437 NW2d 372 (1989). In Callesen, Judge Shepherd wrote: "We adopt the view that the last clear chance doctrine has been abolished with the adoption of a pure comparative negligence system in Michigan.” Id., p 261. The demise of the last clear chance doctrine per Caliesen and Petrove signals the necessary demise of the Gibbard definition of gross negligence. I believe that it is time that our Supreme Court formally dispenses with the Gibbard definition of gross negligence, which in essence is merely a different way of referring to the "last clear chance” doctrine. Only then will the last vestiges of contributory negligence be replaced by the pure form of comparative negligence adopted in Placek. As noted, this case provides an appropriate vehicle with which to do so.