concurring.
I agree that termination of Smith's parental rights was not erroneous. I write separately, however, in order to state that under some cireamstances it might constitute an abuse of discretion for a CHINS court to fail to appoint counsel for an indigent parent.
The majority here holds: "The absence of counsel at the CHINS proceeding had no bearing on the evidence that was presented at the termination hearing." Op. at 1144. This conclusion is somewhat misleading. It focuses upon failure of visitation, non-participation in counseling and parenting sessions, and instability of residence and employment. These factors then prompt the court to validate the trial court's determination that continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the child's well being. While these determinations are factually supported, they do not necessarily support the conclusion that Smith was not adversely affected by the absence of counsel at the CHINS stage.
It must be kept in mind that several of the allegations which led to the CHINS determination were extremely damaging to Smith's parental relationship, Le., that Smith participated in a child selling scheme, that she was an alcoholic, a heavy drug user and was a participant in nearly fifty robberies. The fact that Smith's agreed entry specifically admitted only that the child was in need of services and did not specifically admit or deny the damaging accusations does not dispel the strong probability that the allegations may have had some bearing upon the ultimate termination judgment. Had counsel been present at the CHINS stage those allegations or some of them might have been contested.
The termination stage in large measure depends upon preceding events. Most importantly, for cases of this nature, is the requirement that the court must conclude that the "reasons for the [CHINS] removal.... will not be remedied." Op. at 1147. Thus, we cannot say with any degree of assurance that the trial court in making its decision focused only upon the relatively innocuous factors emphasized by the majority opinion.
*1151This case could well have provided the basis for enunciation of a prospective rule establishing that in some cireumstances a parent might have a right to appointed counsel. If lack of counsel is likely to lead to particularly damaging uncontested allegations and if such allegations be deemed established and not subject to subsequent challenge, those allegations might virtually assure a subsequent termination decision. In such situations the trial court might well abuse its discretion by failing to appoint counsel for an indigent parent.1
Be that as it may, in the present case, affirmance is appropriate. Even though Smith may have been qualifiedly entitled to counsel had she so requested, her attorney at termination did not attack the agreed CHINS entry or request that the allegations of the CHINS petition ke reestablished by evidence. Neither does Smith, on appeal, challenge the validity of those assertions.
Subject to these observations, I concur.
. In this context, I find fault with that portion of the written advisement form which instructs parents of alleged CHINS children that: "You may obtain legal counsel for all proceedings although there is no right to a free court appointed attorney." Appellee's Appendix at 10. This advisement is misleadingly inflexible and permits of no exception notwithstanding the clear proviso of I.C. 31-6-7-2 which contemplates discretionary appointment of counsel. This advisement should be deleted from the written form and replaced by a more accurate statement of the rights of parents.