dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority's treatment of Issue I. While I agree that Trial Rule 32(D)(8)(a) controls this issue, I believe that the majority's interpretation of *1347the rule is in error. Therefore, I would reverse and grant a new trial.
Initially, the majority fundamentally misconceives the nature of the objection posed to the deposition testimony. Although the majority correctly recognizes that the objection is to the qualifications of Filipowicz to render an opinion on insurability, it incorrectly characterizes the objection for Trial Rule 32(D)(8)(a) purposes as relating to the competency of testimony. Clearly, the objection is to the competency of the witness to render the opinion on insurability. To this end, a brief review of the law regarding expert witnesses is instructive.
In Indiana, expert testimony is permitted if the subject matter of the testimony is beyond the understanding of a layman so the trier of fact cannot assess the evidence presented and draw an informed conclusion. Martin v. Roberts (1984), Ind., 464 N.E.2d 896, 901. The competency of an expert witness to testify on a particular subject is to be determined by his knowledge of the subject matter generally, whereas his knowledge of the specific subject of the inquiry goes to the weight to be accorded to his opinion. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong (1982), Ind., 442 N.E.2d 349, 365. Thus, the trial court's determination of competency contemplates a finding by the court that the witness have sufficient skill and knowledge in the field to aid the trier of fact in its search for the truth. Martin, supra, at 901. McCormick notes that the rules of competency regarding expert witnesses are unlike other rules of competency which go to the capacity of the witness to speak at all; rather, they are directed to his capacity to speak to a particular matter. McCormick on Evidence § 69 at 167 (8rd ed. 1984). Thus, "[the expert must possess such intelligence and familiarity with the subject as will enable him to express a well informed opinion; the competency of the expert depending on the
subject of the inquiry." Rogers on Expert Testimony § 37 at 58 (8rd ed. 1941). It follows that an expert witness may be competent to testify as to some matters but not others. See id. at § 48.
This was precisely the issue in the case at bar. There was no dispute as to Dr. Filipowiez's competency to render opinions on the medical matters at issue; the question was whether he was competent to testify as to Ms. Osborne's insurability,. Wen-ger contended that he was not,1 and Osborne argued that such a contention was waived by his failure to raise it at the deposition.
It may appear that I am splitting hairs here. In terms of Rule 32(D)(8)(a) it does not matter if the objection is to the competency of the testimony or the competency of the witness-neither objection is waived unless the grounds of the objection is one which might have been obviated or removed if presented at that time. The classification of the objection is relevant, however, in terms of the availability of analogous caselaw to aid in the determination of this issue.
We were asked to construe Trial Rule 32(D) in Wynder v. Lonergan (1972), 158 Ind.App. 92, 286 N.E.2d 418, transfer denied. In Wynder, the plaintiff sought reversal on the grounds that portions of the deposition testimony of a physician were erroneously excluded at trial on the basis of the defendant's hearsay objection, which she contended the defendant waived pursuant to Trial Rule 82(D)(8). In addressing this contention, we set out the eight types of objections which can be waived under Trial Rule 82(D) and concluded that a hearsay objection did not fall into any of these categories. Id. 286 N.E.2d at 415. However, one of the categories delineated by us in Wynder and set out in Trial Rule 32(D)(8) which may be waived by failure to *1348object at a deposition is the competency of a witness.
In Wynder, we noted the similarity between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 82 and our Indiana Rule, and looked at a federal court decision construing F.R.C.P. 32 to aid in our determination. Id. 286 N.E.2d at 415. Federal precedent is also available to aid in the resolution of the present case. In Bahamas Agr. Industries Ltd. v. Riley Stoker Corp., the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit outlined the rationale behind the F.R.C.P. 82 waiver rule:
If the objection could have been obviated or removed if made at the time of the taking of the deposition, but was not made, then that objection is waived. The focus of the Rule is on the necessity of making the objection at a point in the proceedings where it will be of some value in curing the alleged error in the deposition. When a party waits until trial to object to testimony in the deposition, the only manner in which to cure the deposition is to bar the objectionable portions from the trial. It is important that objections be made during the process of taking the deposition, so that the deposition retains some use at the time of trial; otherwise counsel would be encouraged to wait until trial before making any objection, with the hope that the testimony, although relevant, would be excluded altogether because of the manner in which it was elicited.
Id. (6th Cir.1975), 526 F.2d 1174, 1181.2
The precise issue with which we are confronted was addressed by the Florida Court of Appeal in Evans v. Perry (1964), Fla.App., 161 So.2d 27, 30. In construing a rule identical to Trial Rule 32(D)(8)(a), under similar cireumstances, the Florida court held that the opponents waived their objection to the competency of the witness by failing to raise it at the deposition:
It is quite clear that the objections were not made and sustained by the court on the ground that the deposition positively showed that the doctor was incompetent to testify, but rather on the ground that it did not show definitely and clearly that he was competent to testify. If these objections had been made at the time of the taking of the deposition or even at some later date during the two and a half years they were on file in this cause prior to the trial, the defendants might have been able to obviate or remove the grounds for the objections by offering proof of facts which would have shown the competency of the witness in these particular matters, or a hypothetical question might have been framed.
We feel that under this Florida Rule as cited that plaintiffs waived their objections by failing to make them at the time of the taking of the deposition and could not wait until the time of trial to make these particular objections which might have been obviated by the defendants if made at the time they were taken.
Id. at 80.
The majority argues that counsel is charged with knowledge that a proper foundation is necessary to render the opinion of the expert admissible and that policy considerations support permitting depositions to proceed without numerous objections, which should be saved for trial. It concludes that it was incumbent upon Osborne to show that Dr. Filipowiez possessed the necessary credentials to render his opinion admissible.
Such a conclusion flies in the face of the rationale underlying Rule 82(D)(8). As pointed out in Bahamas and Evans, the rule proposed by the majority allows the litigant to defer his objection until trial, in the hopes that otherwise admissible evidence will be excluded due to the proponent's failure to make an offer to prove. This is particularly relevant where the deposition is to be used at trial in lieu of *1349testimony. Obviously, the proponent will never be able to make an offer to prove because the source of the information-the deponent-is not available.
Such is the situation here. Osborne was not able to make an offer to prove in the manner required by the majority because Dr. Filipowicz was not at trial in fact, Filipowiez's unavailability was the reason that the deposition was used in lieu of his testimony. See T.R. 82(A)(8). Thus, the trial judge excluded the evidence, having no means by which to judge whether Dr. Filipowiez was competent to give the proffered testimony. Osborne was precluded from using this evidence through no fault of her own. Had Wenger raised a timely objection at the deposition, the witness could have been qualified (or his qualifications challenged) and the trial court could have had a basis for ruling on the merits of the objection.
I would hold that where a deposition is to be used in lieu of live testimony at trial, the objection to the competency of the witness to testify to a particular subject is an objection "which might have been obviated or removed if presented at that time." Accordingly, it is waived pursuant to Trial Rule 82(D)(8)(a) if not raised at the deposition. I do not feel that requiring the opponent to raise a timely objection at the deposition would intolerably frustrate the discovery process. Too, the interests of justice seem better served by requiring counsel to raise the objection at the deposition, rather than completely excluding the testimony because the trial court has no basis upon which to rule on the surprise objection at trial.
Because I would hold that the competency objection was waived, I also will address the other ground raised by Wenger for exclusion of the testimony. The second ground for objection to the testimony is that it was "prejudicial." An objection of "prejudicial" is unavailing. - Ferrier v. State (1977), 266 Ind. 117, 861 N.E.2d 150, 152. The reason is clear-most evidence offered in an adversary proceeding is "prejudicial" to the opponent. Thus the crucial inquiry is whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by:
(1) the danger that the evidence offered will unduly arouse the emotions of the jury to prejudice or sympathy;
(2) the probability that the evidence and the answering evidence it provokes will create a side issue that is unduly time consuming or distracting to the jury;
(3) the likelihood that the evidence will confuse or mislead the jury; [or]
(4) the likelihood that the evidence will unfairly surprise the opponent.
Smith v. Crouse-Hinds Co. (1978), 175 Ind. App. 679, 373 N.E.2d 923, 926, transfer denied 271 Ind. 366, 392 N.E.2d 1168.
The evidence here was unlikely to produce any of the undesirable effects delineated above. Nor does Wenger state how the evidence was improper other than his bald statement that its admission was prejudicial. To the contrary, the evidence was highly relevant to the issue of compensatory damages. Impairment of earning capacity is a proper element of damages.3 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Gregg (1990), Ind.App., 554 N.E.2d 1145, 1164, trangfer denied. Moreover, Osborne offered no economist or other expert who specifically testified how the injury affected her ability to obtain and perform new and different employment.
I can discern no other grounds by which the trial court might properly have exelud-ed Dr. Filipowiez's testimony. Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court's exclu*1350sion of the testimony was error and grant a new trial on the issue of compensatory damages.
. - Wenger's argument that Dr. Filipowicz's statements were clearly outside the scope of his expertise and therefore inadmissible may be quickly disposed of. Dr. Filipowicz's training as a physician does not preclude the possibility that he may be an expert in other areas, Moreover, degrees are not necessarily the hallmark of the expert witness. A witness may be qualified to render an expert opinion by knowledge or experience, as well as by his academic endeavors. Martin, supra, at 901. There is simply nothing in the record to indicate either Filipow-icz's qualifications on the insurability issue or his lack thereof.
. Both the concerns and the language of the court in Bakamas were echoed in Kirschner v. Broadhead (7th Cir.1982), 671 F.2d 1034, reh. denied. In Kirschner, as here, the deponent was unavailable to testify at trial, but his deposition testimony was excluded by the district court pursuant to an objection not raised at the time of the deposition. The Seventh Circuit held that such exclusion was error, as the objection was waived.
. The majority states in a footnote that the evidence shows Osborne had both a job and insurance at the time of trial, and therefore any error in excluding the testimony was necessarily harmless. The majority fails to recognize that Osborne may be compensated for impaired ability to obtain or maintain future employment in her vocation. Gregg, supra, at 1164-1165. That she retained a job with the same entity which employed her before the accident (albeit with considerable restrictions on the type of work which she was to perform) and remained on that employer's group insurance plan has little bearing on her ability to find a new job in the event that there would no longer be a place for her with her present employer. Id. To the extent that these facts indicate she was employable or insurable, they go to the weight of Fili-powiez's testimony, not to its admissibility.