dissenting:
In this court’s two opinions denying reinstatement to petitioner, we noted that our primary concern was petitioner’s refusal to assume the role of an advocate for a client who desires to plead guilty. In re Stanton, 589 A.2d 425, 426 (D.C.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1098, 112 S.Ct. 1178, 117 L.Ed.2d 422 (1992) (Stanton III); In re Stanton, 532 A.2d 95, 97 (D.C.1987) (Stanton II). Since then, petitioner has changed his position, and in this petition for reinstatement he agreed to “advocate for acceptance of his client’s guilty plea, if that is the course his client freely and intelligently chooses.” He reiterated this pledge before the hearing committee and during oral arguments before this court. In Stanton II, supra, I stated that
we must be extremely careful to distinguish between a lawyer’s right to disagree from a philosophical standpoint and his or her pledge to comply with an accepted code of conduct, regardless of the lawyer’s *659personal feelings about the wisdom of policies or principles underlying that code.
532 A.2d at 100 (Mack, J., concurring). The petitioner has now pledged to comply with the accepted code of conduct, in spite of his philosophical concerns regarding advocacy of guilty pleas.
It is important to note that petitioner is not alone in having concerns about the plea bargaining system. I discussed in Stanton III, supra, the fact that “in the not too distant past, agreements between prosecutors and defendants were cause for serious concern.” 589 A.2d at 429 (Mack, J., dissenting) (citing Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962)). While the Supreme Court has since the Ma-chibroda decision recognized that “[p]roperly administered” plea bargaining “is to be encouraged” (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260, 92 S.Ct. 495, 497-98, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971)), critics of the system remain. Legal scholars have suggested ways to reform the plea bargaining process or to abandon it altogether. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 Harv. L.Rev. 1037 (1984); Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U.Chi.L.Rev. 931 (1983). Some jurisdictions have even experimented with bans on plea bargaining. See, e.g., Teresa White Carns & John A. Kruse, Alaska’s Ban on Plea Bargaining Reevaluated, 75 JUDICATURE 310 (1992); Robert A. Weinberger, The Abolition of Plea Bargaining: A Case Study of El Paso County, Texas, 35 UCLA L.Rev. 265 (1987).
These law review articles and case studies, in pointing out the history of the guilty plea in Anglo-American law, the degree of dependency on “bargaining” in our present generation, the defects (if not evils) inherent in such process, and the chances of eradication or reform because of differences in attitudes both of the public and the courtroom work groups, make for interesting reading. More significant to the issue here, these discussions suggest the reality, the insight, and the flexibility necessarily attendant to a “properly administered” plea bargain which the United States Supreme Court has encouraged, Santobello, supra, 404 U.S. at 260, 92 S.Ct. at 497-98, as well as what may be an “unethical” failure to seek a client’s “lawful” objective in violation of Disciplinary Rules.
My colleagues point out that the Hearing Committee reached its conclusion on the basis of Mr. Stanton’s statement (presumably based upon his experiences) that he did not “believe” that any client in fact would choose to have him be an advocate for guilt [but adding that if a client ever did, “I would do it”].1 They also note that although the *660Board concluded that Mr. Stanton had presented unrebutted evidence of good character, his inability to draw workable distinctions between his “philosophical beliefs” and his ethical obligations “called into question” the Roundtree factor concerning character. In re Roundtree, 503 A.2d 1215 (D.C.1985).
It is this court that makes the ultimate decision as to whether an attorney may be reinstated although the findings and recommendations of the Board are entitled to great weight. Id, at 1217. I believe the majority here has unjustly concluded that Mr. Stanton has not satisfied the Roundtree factors for reinstatement. I believe that it ill behooves us to summarily conclude that a lawyer’s unequivocal pledge (before the Hearing Committee and in this court) to follow the Rules of Professional Responsibility cannot be believed because of his general observations about human conduct and his esoteric philosophical views. I respectfully 'dissent. I would vote to reinstate.
. An insight into the thinking of one of our most experienced and thoughtful trial judges (as to the "advocate for guilt" phrase) is recorded in our recent opinion in Wingate v. United States, 669 A.2d 1275 (D.C.1995), arising on appeal from the denial of a post-trial collateral motion attacking the adequacy of a [Monroe-Farrelll pretrial inquiry into defense counsel's allegedly deficient preparation for trial. At the beginning of the inquiry, defense counsel, asked by the trial court to explain the conflict between counsel and client, explained: "I guess it’s a strategic basic question whether or not it's in the client’s best interest to plead guilty." Id. at 1281. At the end of the inquiry, the trial court in finding defense counsel to be prepared for trial, told the defendant that "he had to understand that his counsel was both an advisor and an advocate, and that often a defense attorney’s best advice might be that his client should plead guilty, but that if his client decided not to plead guilty, the attorney's job would be to act as a zealous advocate”.... Id. at 1283 (emphasis supplied).
On appeal, in this court, from the denial of the collateral motion, Chief Judge Wagner, dissenting from her colleagues' ultimate holding affirming the conviction, paints a graphic picture of the "advocate for guilt." Id. at 1288 n. 1:
1. The following are examples of appellant’s efforts to inform the court about his own decision to defend the case and his counsel’s attempt to persuade him to enter a plea of guilty while failing to discuss with appellant defense strategy:
[Fjrom day 1 [my attorney] has represented me, for day 1 I was arrested, he has always wanted me to cop a plea.
* * * * *
When I lost my job, [my attorney] conveyed to me to again accept the plea offer.... He strongly urged me to accept it.... From day I I decided to fight.. •.. (Emphasis added).
* * J¡e * * #
[My attorney] — seems as though he’s been working with the Government to plea bargain. He's not talking about any defense, he’s always talked to me about settling, plea bargain. (Emphasis added).
*660Mr. Wingate (a corrections officer, college educated, Marine Corps veteran who as an irate husband assaulted his wife’s paramour) was hardly in an enviable position. He might have made the wrong choice, but he fought for a principle and lost.