dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In the circumstances here, the Minnesota trial court should defer to the continuing jurisdiction of the Wisconsin court.
It is undisputed that the 1985 Wisconsin decree cannot be modified in Minnesota unless it appears that the Wisconsin court “does not now have jurisdiction.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.14, subd. 1 (1986). In my opinion, Wisconsin has continued “home state” jurisdiction under Wisconsin Statutes § 822.03 (1983-84), which parallels the jurisdictional standards found in Minnesota Statutes § 518A.13 (1986).
Wisconsin retains continuing jurisdiction if it remains the home state of the child “at the time of the commencement of the proceedings.” Minn.Stat. § 518A.03, subd. 1(a); see Bergh v. Bergh, 387 N.W.2d 213, 215 (Minn.Ct.App.1986). Citing Bergh, my *181colleagues on this panel conclude that the “proceeding” to be examined here is the Minnesota modification motion commenced on June 26, 1986. I disagree. Based on the degree of continued court involvement contemplated in the original dissolution judgment, there is compelling reason to examine Wisconsin jurisdiction in terms of the home state of the child at the time the dissolution proceedings were commenced.
In Bergh, we held that North Dakota, although the site of a 1985 dissolution decree, was not the home state of a child when modifications were commenced in Minnesota six weeks later. See id. at 215-216. That decision governs dissolution decrees which contain unconditional placements of custody. The Minnesota Supreme Court endorsed this approach for “a typical divorce decree setting forth terms of child custody,” where the “nexus” of the parties with that court “attenuates” when the parties to the decree move out of state. In re Welfare of Mullins, 298 N.W.2d 56, 59 (Minn.1980).
The Wisconsin decree here was not a typical dissolution decree. First, the Wisconsin court made detailed provision for future steps needed to provide for visitation of the child with his father. In addition, the court specifically charged a Wisconsin agency, Dane County Family Court Counseling, with supervision of future visits. The court charged staff of that agency with the responsibility to approve or disapprove of a counselor for the child who was to be identified by the child’s mother. The court named a staff person of Dane County Family Court Counseling to act on its behalf in screening the mother’s suggestion for a counselor. In my opinion, these provisions are a straightforward form of exercise of continuing jurisdiction, so that Wisconsin’s role in the case is to be examined with reference to the time the dissolution proceedings were commenced.
The concept of continuing jurisdiction has already received attention in Minnesota. In Mullins, the supreme court recognized that a relationship of a court and a child “does not attenuate overtime but continues” where the court periodically remains involved in the proceedings. Id. at 59. In these circumstances:
The relationship [of the child and the court] continues despite geography. The UCCJA’s ‘home state’ theory of jurisdiction therefore bears little relevance in this context.
Id. at 60. Mullins dealt with a California dependency proceeding which it found in sharp contrast with “a typical divorce decree setting forth terms of child custody,” because the latter “does not contemplate active supervision by the issuing court.” Id. at 59.
We are not dealing with the same kind of “active supervision” as is typically involved in a juvenile court dependency or neglect proceeding. On the other hand, we are not dealing here with a typical divorce decree which includes an unconditional determination on custody and visitation. In my judgment, the degree of continued court involvement provided in Wisconsin’s 1985 dissolution judgment involves the kind of continuing jurisdiction which requires that we put aside the notion of a change of the child’s home state based solely on changes in residence.
In addition, recognition of Wisconsin’s superior jurisdiction in this case coincides with the purposes of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. Among the general purposes of the act is:
To avoid relitigation of custody decisions of other states in this state insofar as feasible, and to facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states.
Minn.Stat. § 518A.01, subd. 1(c). Here respondent proposes to involve the Minnesota court in precisely those judicial decisions which were made in Wisconsin in 1985 and reviewed in the Wisconsin court in 1986. Wisconsin had before it in 1986 a duly instituted enforcement proceeding regarding the terms of its earlier decree. In sum, involvement of a Minnesota court in the matter is unnecessary, meddlesome, and in conflict with the spirit of the language of UCCJA. I would reverse the Minnesota trial court's decision to accept jurisdiction.