delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a bench trial, the circuit court of Du Page County convicted defendant of driving under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11 — 501(a)(2) (West 1996)). The appellate court found that the roadblock where the police arrested defendant did not comply with the constitutional standards set forth in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 121 S. Ct. 447 (2000). Accordingly, the appellate court reversed defendant’s conviction. 319 Ill. App. 3d 825. We granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and allowed the Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the State. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
BACKGROUND
On August 30, 1997, the Lombard police department set up a roadblock on North Avenue in Lombard, Illinois. A police officer stopped defendant at the roadblock and directed him to a side street where another police officer had defendant perform several field-sobriety tests. Defendant failed a number of the tests and was taken into custody.
Defendant was subsequently charged with the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol. He filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. At the hearing on the motion, Detective Ray Vasil testified that Lieutenant Glennon, third in command at the Lombard police department, authorized the roadblock. The purpose of the roadblock was to obtain information from motorists regarding a hit-and-run accident that took place one week earlier, at the same location, and at the same time of day. In particular, the police wanted information regarding a Ford Bronco or fall-sized pickup truck implicated in the accident.
The Lombard police department has a general order regarding the use of roadblocks. The order, however, does not contain guidelines regarding the use of roadblocks to obtain information from crime witnesses. The roadblock at issue was not videotaped. Further, the police did not publicize the roadblock.
Between 6 and 12 police vehicles participated in the roadblock. Detective Vasil wore an orange reflective vest with the word “Police” on it, and stood between the eastbound lanes of North Avenue, 15 feet from the roadblock. A line of cars formed at the roadblock. As each vehicle pulled up to Detective Vasil, he handed a flyer to the driver of the vehicle requesting information regarding the accident. Because defendant’s Mazda minivan almost hit him, Detective Vasil requested defendant’s driver’s license and insurance card. Detective Vasil smelled alcohol on defendant’s breath and noticed that defendant’s speech was slurred. Detective Vasil directed defendant to a side street where Detective Roy Newton had defendant perform several sobriety tests.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion.
At defendant’s subsequent bench trial, Detective Newton testified that he was assigned to the corner of North Avenue and Craig. His duties were to ensure that drivers did not skirt the roadblock and to provide help to the officers in the event they experienced any problems with the vehicles or drivers stopped at the roadblock. The officers at the roadblock directed several cars, including defendant’s vehicle, to Detective Newton’s location. At Detective Newton’s request, defendant produced a driver’s license and insurance information. Detective Newton then had defendant perform several sobriety tests and placed defendant under arrest.
The court found defendant guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol. The court sentenced defendant to one year of conditional discharge and required that defendant participate in counseling, complete 14 days in the “Sheriff’s Work Alternative Program,” and pay a fine of $200.
ANALYSIS
As noted above, the appellate court relied on Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 121 S. Ct. 447, in finding the roadblock at issue invalid. In Edmond, the United States Supreme Court invalidated checkpoints set up by the police on Indianapolis roads in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. Initially, the Court observed:
“The Fourth Amendment requires that searches and seizures be reasonable. A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. [Citation.] While such suspicion is not an ‘irreducible’ component of reasonableness [citation], we have recognized only limited circumstances in which the usual rule does not apply. For example, we have upheld certain regimes of suspicionless searches where the program was designed to serve ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.’ [Citations.] ***
We have also upheld brief, suspicionless seizures of motorists at a fixed Border Patrol checkpoint designed to intercept illegal aliens, Martinez-Fuerte, [428 U.S. 543, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976)], and at a sobriety checkpoint aimed at removing drunk drivers from the road, Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444[, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412, 110 S. Ct. 2481] (1990).” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 340-41, 121 S. Ct. at 451-52.
The Edmond Court then reviewed its decisions in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, detailing the need for the checkpoints at issue and the important governmental interests they served. The Court observed:
“We have never approved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. Rather, our checkpoint cases have recognized only limited exceptions to the general rule that a seizure must be accompanied by some measure of individualized suspicion. We suggested in Prouse that we would not credit the ‘general interest in crime control’ as justification for a regime of suspicionless stops. [Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 671 n.18, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1399 n.18 (1979).] Consistent with this suggestion, each of the checkpoint programs that we have approved was designed primarily to serve purposes closely related to the problems of policing the border or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 343, 121 S. Ct. at 454.
The Edmond Court firmly rejected the suggestion that the Indianapolis checkpoints could be upheld pursuant to Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz:
“Petitioners propose several ways in which the narcotics-detection purpose of the instant checkpoint program may instead resemble the primary purposes of the checkpoints in Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte. Petitioners state that the checkpoints in those cases had the same ultimate purpose of arresting those suspected of committing crimes. *** Securing the border and apprehending drunk drivers are, of course, law enforcement activities, and law enforcement officers employ arrests and criminal prosecutions in pursuit of these goals. [Citations.] If we were to rest the case at this high level of generality, there would be little check on the ability of the authorities to construct roadblocks for almost any conceivable law enforcement purpose. Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime control, the Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of American life.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 343-44, 121 S. Ct. at 454.
The Edmond Court concluded that the Indianapolis checkpoints were invalid, stating:
“The primary purpose of the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoints is in the end to advance ‘the general interest in crime control,’ [citation]. We decline to suspend the usual requirement of individualized suspicion where the police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes. We cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 345, 121 S. Ct. at 455.
See also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81, 149 L. Ed. 2d 205, 218-19, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1290 (2001) (in invalidating a program at a state hospital whereby urine samples from pregnant women were tested for drugs and the results communicated to the police, the Court stated: “Respondents argue in essence that their ultimate purpose — namely, protecting the health of both mother and child — is a beneficent one. In Chandler [v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 137 L. Ed. 2d 513, 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997)], however, we did not simply accept the State’s invocation of a ‘special need.’ Instead, we carried out a ‘close review’ of the scheme at issue before concluding that the need in question was not ‘special,’ as that term has been defined in our cases. [Citation.] In this case, a review of the M-7 policy plainly reveals that the purpose actually served by the [hospital] searches ‘is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control.’ Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000)”).
In the present case, the appellate court held the roadblock at issue invalid under Edmond. The appellate court noted “that the roadblock’s ostensible purpose was to seek evidence of ‘ordinary criminal wrongdoing.’ ” 319 Ill. App. 3d at 828. The court concluded “[t]his is the type of routine investigative work that the police must do every day and does not justify the extraordinary means chosen to further the investigation.” 319 Ill. App. 3d at 828.
The State asserts that Edmond is distinguishable because the roadblock at issue had a specific purpose of assisting the authorities in solving a crime that had already been committed and was known to the police. Thus, police efforts were not directed at general crime control. Unlike in Edmond, the Lombard police department did not seek to interrogate and inspect motorists to ferret out evidence that the motorists themselves had committed crime that was as yet unknown to police. Defendant was only subjected to further investigation because he narrowly missed hitting an officer in the area where vehicles were stopped.
The State’s interpretation of Edmond is incorrect. First, as the Court reaffirmed in Edmond, the general rule is that “a search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 340, 121 S. Ct. at 451. The checkpoints upheld in Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976) (immigration checkpoints located near the Mexican border), and Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990) (sobriety checkpoint), are “limited exceptions to the general rule.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 343, 121 S. Ct. at 454. Certainly the Lombard roadblock does not fall within the scope of the limited exceptions heretofore approved by the Supreme Court.
Second, the Court in Edmond was keenly aware that an exception for roadblocks “designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime control” would abrogate the general rule requiring individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. See 4 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 9.6 (3d ed. Supp. 2002). Accordingly, the Court drew a bright line that when the primary purpose of a roadblock is general crime control, the roadblock is unconstitutional. The Court explained:
“Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime control, the Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of American life.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 344, 121 S. Ct. at 454.
The Court declined “to suspend the usual requirement of individualized suspicion where the police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 345, 121 S. Ct. at 455.
In the case at bar, the State ignores the concerns expressed by the Court in Edmond. In spite of the clear admonishment in Edmond against the use of roadblocks to advance “the general interest in crime control,” the State requests that we allow a roadblock for precisely that purpose.
Third, the State finds a distinction between gathering information leading to the arrest and prosecution of a motorist as the perpetrator of a crime, and gathering information from a motorist leading to the identification of another motorist as the perpetrator of a crime. According to the State, gathering information leading to the arrest and prosecution of a motorist as the perpetrator of a crime is a part of general crime control. However, the State maintains that gathering information from a motorist leading to the identification of another motorist as the perpetrator of a crime is not considered a part of general crime control. Taking the State’s reasoning a step further, a police investigation tool such as canvassing a neighborhood to find identification witnesses to a crime is not considered to be a part of general crime control. In the State’s view, crime control involves arresting the perpetrator directly; it does not involve gathering information leading to the arrest of the perpetrator. We must reject this contention. In investigating and solving any crime, police efforts are directed at general crime control. This holds true whether the police happen upon the perpetrator of the crime at the roadblock or obtain information from a roadblock detainee identifying the perpetrator of the crime.
Lastly, an exception for informational roadblocks has the potential to make roadblocks “a routine part of American life.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 344, 121 S. Ct. at 454. In 2000, 870 murders, 49,652 assaults, 25,168 robberies, 77,947 burglaries, 306,805 thefts, 55,222 motor vehicle thefts, and 2,899 arsons were known by police to have been committed in Illinois. J. Fitch, 2001 Illinois Statistical Abstract 764 (16th ed. 2001). Of those, 706 murders, 31,655 assaults, 21,691 robberies, 41,464 burglaries, 168,890 thefts, 45,083 motor vehicle thefts, and 1,525 arsons were known by police to have been committed in Cook County. J. Fitch, 2001 Illinois Statistical Abstract 764 (16th ed. 2001). In the City of Chicago, there were 627 murders, 26,660 assaults, 19,449 robberies, 28,401 burglaries, 105,728 thefts, 35,570 motor vehicle thefts and 1,106 arsons. J. Fitch, 2001 Illinois Statistical Abstract 766 (16th ed. 2001). Should the police have been allowed to set up roadblocks to obtain information from potential witnesses for each murder? What of a robbery, an aggravated criminal sexual assault, an arson or any other serious crime? According to the State, for a period of at least a week after each crime, police could set up roadblocks with the specific purpose of making inquiries of persons who were possibly witnesses to a crime. The troubling specter then arises that the streets of Cook County, or at least the streets of Chicago, would be adorned with roadblocks, an outcome clearly unacceptable under Edmond.
Amicus suggests that exigent circumstances justified the use of the roadblock. Amicus asserts that police needed to act quickly to contact possible witnesses or else risk losing vital information. The Court in Edmond left open the possibility that an emergency may justify a law enforcement roadblock. The Court explained:
“Of course, there are circumstances that may justify a law enforcement checkpoint where the primary purpose would otherwise, but for some emergency, relate to ordinary crime control. For example, as the Court of Appeals noted, the Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a particular route. [Citation.] The exigencies created by these scenarios are far removed from the circumstances under which authorities might simply stop cars as a matter of course to see if there just happens to be a felon leaving the jurisdiction. While we do not limit the purposes that may justify a checkpoint program to any rigid set of categories, we decline to approve a program whose primary purpose is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 345, 121 S. Ct. at 455.
In the present case, the hit-and-run accident happened a week before the roadblock. There was no indication that the motorist involved posed any further danger to local residents or, indeed, that the motorist remained in the vicinity. There was also no indication that the motorist was driving recklessly or was driving under the influence of alcohol. While this court understands the efforts of the Lombard police department to obtain information leading to the identification of the motorist, the limited, exigent circumstances of the nature identified by the Supreme Court in Edmond are not present in the matter at bar. Absent such exigent circumstances, the fourth amendment’s prohibition against suspicion-less seizures should not give way to the normal needs of law enforcement, be they identified as crime control, criminal investigation or canvassing efforts to obtain information leading to the identification and apprehension of the perpetrator of a crime.
The State and amicus fail in their attempts to distinguish Edmond. Edmond clarifies that “[w]hen law enforcement authorities pursue primarily general crime control purposes at checkpoints such as here, *** stops can only be justified by some quantum of individualized suspicion.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 347, 121 S. Ct. at 457.
CONCLUSION
The laws of this state require that a motorist remain at the scene of an accident. In the present case, the motorist left the scene of the accident. The police set up a roadblock to obtain information regarding the identity of the motorist. The goals of the police in doing so are laudable.
This court is sympathetic to the efforts of the police in identifying the motorist involved in the accident. Sympathy, however, does not justify the roadblock at issue. As the Supreme Court observed in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 37 L. Ed. 2d 596, 93 S. Ct. 2535 (1973):
“The needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with the Constitution’s protections of the individual against certain exercises of official power. It is precisely the predictability of these pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards. It is well to recall the words of Mr. Justice Jackson, soon after his return from the Nuremberg Trials:
‘These [fourth amendment rights], I protest, are not mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government.’ Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 69 S. Ct. 1302 (Jackson, J., dissenting).” Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273-74, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 603, 93 S. Ct. at 2540.
The right of an individual to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is an indispensable freedom, not a mere luxury. It cannot give way in the face of a temporary need for the police to obtain information regarding the identity of the motorist at issue. As the protector of the constitutional rights of all citizens of this state, this court is commanded to draw a “line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime control.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 344, 121 S. Ct. at 454. Without such a line, the fourth amendment will do little to prevent intrusive searches and seizures from becoming a routine part of American life. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 344, 121 S. Ct. at 454.
The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
Affirmed.