(dissenting):
Because I conclude that the family court lacks jurisdiction to modify a child support order in a pre-1973 marriage dissolution action after the obligee child reaches the age of 18 years, I respectfully dissent.
The majority correctly chronicles the history of our laws governing the obligation of parents for support of minor children from a time immediately before the enactment of an Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 725, §§ 83 and 84, 1973 Minn. Laws 2082, 2131-32, (the statute lowering the age of majority from 21 to 18). While in Brugger v. Brugger, 303 Minn. 488, 229 N.W.2d 131 (1975) and Yaeger v. Yaeger, 303 Minn. 497, 229 N.W.2d 137 (1975), we did hold that enactment of the statute did not relieve a noncustodial obligor parent in pre-1973 stipulations and dissolution decrees from payment of the agreed to and court ordered support obligation as provided in the decree or order, we did not there address the issue posed by this case — to-wit, whether the courts have jurisdiction to increase child support orders in pre-1973 dissolution decrees after the dependent child has attained the age of 18. Both Brugger and Yaeger were premised upon the statutory rule of construction that, absent clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, statutes are not to be retroactively applied. In both cases we recognized the bargaining “give and take” that results in an equitable stipulation to be incorporated into a decree, and in those cases we held that in the absence of a statutory mandate to the contrary, equity and fairness dictated that we enforce pre-1973 decree obligations, whether arrived at by stipulation, order of the court, or both. The holdings in those cases were limited to enforcing payment of appropriate child support in orders entered before the child reached 18, the new statutory age of majority. Indeed, simultaneously with Brugger and Yaeger, in Hampton v. Hampton, 303 Minn. 500, 229 N.W.2d 139 (1975), we specifically held the contempt remedy to be unavailable to the custodial parent seeking to enforce post-age-18 child support obligations. In doing so, we were unable to discern any important state interest in ensuring that parents support children past the age of 18. We there noted “by legislative enactment, the state has declared that children after their 18th birthday are adults and are not entitled to support from their parents.” Hampton, 303 Minn. at 502, 229 N.W.2d at 141.
Notwithstanding that history, without citation of any statutory authority or any case authority from this court or any other court of final jurisdiction, the majority makes the bold assertion that the family court has continuing jurisdiction which “ex*841tends to the modification or enforcement of the decree.”1
The majority places reliance on Winter v. Winter, 375 N.W.2d 76 (Minn.App.1985). I suggest that reliance is inappropriate. In Winter the court of appeals premised its conclusion that it had jurisdiction to increase child support in orders made for children over the age of 18 upon the alleged “continuing jurisdiction” over cases involving domestic relationships. In doing so, the court of appeals failed to explain the source of that alleged “continuing jurisdiction.” While in dicta we did note in Angelos v. Angelos, 367 N.W.2d 518, 519 (Minn.1985), that for some purposes courts might have continuing jurisdiction, that case involved appealability from orders refusing to modify property settlements, not jurisdiction to increase or decrease the amount of support the noncustodial obli-gor parent must pay for support of a person no longer a dependent child of the parties under the laws of this state.
In my opinion, both in Winter and in this case, the court of appeals has misapprehended the significance of the “continuing jurisdiction” the statute gives to family courts. See Minn.Stat. § 518.64 (Supp. 1985). That the statute grants to the courts “continuing jurisdiction” is not determinative of the law to be applied and the resolution of these matters. The law to be applied in a modification proceeding is not the law in effect when the original decree was rendered or when it was previously modified; rather courts should apply the law in effect at the time of the current petition for modification. The “continuing jurisdiction” resting in the court is for enforcement of support orders entered before the child reached the age of majority by any method exclusive only of use of the contempt power.
From application of general rules of statutory construction, I can ascertain no legislative intent that courts retain jurisdiction to modify child support orders in pre-1973 dissolutions after the child attains majority. Minn.Stat. ch. 518 provides a comprehensive legislative scheme governing substance and procedure in marriage dissolu-tions. The word “child” as used in the child support section of that statute is defined as being an individual under the age of 18.2 That definition, in essence, has existed in the statute since 1974. Other statutory provisions using the word “child” relating to child support have been enacted or amended since 1974.3 Nowhere in Chapter 518 nor in any post-1974 statutory amendments to child support provisions of that statute has the legislature given any indication that the word “child” as used therein is to include persons over the age of 18. Nowhere in chapter 518 can be found any legislative intent that courts were to have jurisdiction to modify support orders in pre-1973 dissolutions after the *842child reached the age of 18. Nowhere has the legislature indicated that it is to be the policy of this state to provide a dual standard with respect to modification of support obligations in pre-1973 decrees as contrasted with post-1973 dissolutions. In dis-solutions granted after 1973, the noncustodial parent obligor’s support burden is terminated upon the child reaching the age of 18. That parent by law is relieved of the obligation to pay any support. In Brugger and Yaeger, we held in pre-1973 dissolution decrees, obligation to pay stipulated or court ordered support continues to age 21. By not legislatively overruling those cases, the legislature has apparently acquiesced in our holdings. However, absolutely no legislative evidence exists that the state’s public policy should impose additional burdens upon pre-1973 dissolution child support obligors to support children who have become adults when not imposing a similar obligation on noncustodial parents in post-1973 dissolutions. Therefore, I would interpret the statute (chapter 518) to comport with the literal meaning of the words “child” defined by the legislature in Minn. Stat. § 518.54, subd. 2 (1984), so that courts would have no jurisdiction to modify support orders after the child had passed the age of 18 years. That interpretation, in my opinion, would not only comport with manifested legislative intent, but also, in the absence of any legislative evidence of a contrary public policy, would avoid the necessity of addressing the constitutional equal protection issue.
Had the legislature specifically attempted to enact laws that would exacerbate the disparate treatment of pre-1973 and post-1973 child support obligors, I take it that such an attempt would have fatally violated the equal protection clauses of the Federal and Minnesota State Constitutions.4
By construing the statute in a manner that accomplishes the same result, in my opinion the majority perpetuates that disparate treatment of child support obligors placed into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to any perceived objectives of the statutes. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 1035, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972). That construction, in my view, converts otherwise constitutionally permissible statutes, into laws denying a certain class of persons (of which appellant is. a member) equal protection of the laws.
The equal protection clause of each constitution denies to the state the power to treat persons placed by statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of the statute. Persons may not be treated differently, unless the discrimination is based upon differences reasonably or rationally related to the purpose of the statute. See, e.g., Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F.Supp. 234, 239 (D.Minn.1970) (citing Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 77 S.Ct. 1344, 1 L.Ed.2d 1485 (1957)), aff'd, 401 U.S. 985, 91 S.Ct. 1231, 28 L.Ed.2d 527 (1971). Crucial to the determination of whether this rational relation test has been satisfied is the ascertainment of whether an appropriate governmental interest is suitably furthered by the differential treatment of the classes. See, e.g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); see also Dependents of Ondler v. Peace Officers Benefit Fund, 289 N.W.2d 486 (Minn.1980). Although a law’s classifica*843tion may treat one class of persons differently from another, it can neither be arbitrary nor unreasonable, and must be based upon a difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation’s objective. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971). To aid in the rational relation analysis, this court in Schwartz v. Talmo, 295 Minn. 356, 205 N.W.2d 318 (1973), advanced three criteria which must be met if a legislative classification is to withstand an equal protection challenge.5 I conclude that the interpretation of the statute arrived at by the majority fails to meet any of those criteria. Admittedly, it can be argued that under the court’s interpretation all support obligors in pre-1973 support orders are uniformly classified and treated alike. I contend the first requirement of the Schwartz criteria is not met because support obligors in decrees entered before and after 1973 are “similarly” situated in that they possess the identical obligation — to-wit, the obligation to support their children pursuant to court orders. However, those obligors in post-1973 stipulations and decrees receive disparate treatment because no court has jurisdiction to order any support, let alone increased support, for support obligees who have attained the age of 18, whereas, according to the majority’s interpretation of the statute, obligors in .pre-1973 stipulations and decrees are subjected to the jurisdiction of all courts for the purpose of increasing support amounts for obligees between the age of 18 and 21 years.
Likewise, it appears to me the second of the three Schwartz criteria is not met. By subjecting support obligors in pre-1973 support orders to continuing jurisdiction of courts to increase support obligations after the obligee reaches 18, when all other support obligors are statutorily' immune from the exercise of such jurisdiction, creates a distinction which to my view appears to be “manifestly arbitrary or fanciful” furnishing no “natural and reasonable basis in the necessity or circumstances” to justify such disparate treatment, Schwartz v. Talmo, 295 Minn. at 362, 205 N.W.2d at 322.6
Finally, I’m unconvinced that the disparate classification is germane to the purpose *844of the law. What distinctive needs exist that are peculiar to the class of support obligors in pre-1973 decrees that are dissimilar to those in post-1973 decrees and orders to justify the disparate treatment after the obligees reach the age of 18? I can find none. Instead, I concur in, and reiterate what we said in Hampton v. Hampton, 303 Minn. 500, 502, 229 N.W.2d 139, 141 (1975):
We perceive no interest of the state in this matter. The state by legislative enactment has evidenced an interest in support of minor children, incapacitated children irrespective of their age, and alimony payments for a spouse. However, by legislative enactment, the state has declared that children after their 18th birthday are adults and are not entitled to support from their parents.
While one may question the wisdom of the state’s policy, determination of that policy remains the proper function of the legislature, not the courts.
Accordingly, I would reverse the lower courts and hold that after an obligee in a support order reaches majority, the courts have no further jurisdiction to modify any support order entered prior to that date.
. It is not clear what the court means by "enforcement." I suggest that Hampton precludes the utilization of the contempt power, at least, in the enforcement of post-age-18 decree modifications, whereas, before the supported child reaches the age of 18, clearly the contempt power is available in "enforcement" of the decree.
. Minn.Stat. § 518.54, subd. 2 (1984) reads:
Child. "Child” means an individual under 18 years of age, an individual under age 20 who is still attending secondary school, or an individual who, by reason of his physical or mental condition, is unable to support himself.
Since enactment of an Act of April 5, 1978, ch. 772, § 48, 1978 Minn. Laws 1062, 1081, the word “child” has meant an individual under the age of 18, or one who is unable to support himself because of physical or mental condition. The inclusion of those under the age of 20 attending a secondary school was added by an Act of May 17, 1983, ch. 144, 1983 Minn. Laws 389, 390. The legislative definition of secondary school is found in Minn.Stat. § 120.05, subd. 2(a)(3). In the case at bar, Ron Katz is neither physically nor mentally disabled nor is he still attending a secondary school.
.See, e.g., Act of June 9, 1983, ch. 308, 1983 Minn. Laws 1748-67 (now codified in part as Minn.Stat. §§ 518.551, 518.641 (1984)); Act of May 29, 1979, ch. 259, § 31, 1979 Minn. Laws 557, 571-72 (now codified in part as Minn.Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2 (1984)); Act of April 5, 1978, ch. 772,1978 Minn. Laws 1062-88 (now codified in part as Minn.Stat. § 518.611 (1984)); Act of May 26, 1977, ch. 282, § 29, 1977 Minn. Laws 484, 494; Act of March 14, 1974, ch. 107, 1974 Minn. Laws 157-68.
. Amendment XIV to the United States Constitution insofar as applicable reads: "nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
Although no clause in the Minnesota Constitution resembles the federal equal protection clause, Minn. Const, art. 1, § 2 provides "No member of this state shall be disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.” Generally, during its history this court has treated this state clause as analagous to the federal equal protection clause in the fourteenth amendment. For a history of Minnesota's equal protection clause and its interpretation, see, generally McKnight, Minnesota Rational Relation Test: The Lochner Monster in the 10,000 Lakes, 10 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 709, 722-723 (1984).
. The rule is that legislative classification will be held to be constitutionally valid if—
(1) the classification uniformly, without discrimination, applies to and embraces all who are similarly situated with respect to conditions or wants justifying appropriate legislation;
(2) the distinctions which separate those who are included within the classifications from those who are excluded are not manifestly arbitrary or fanciful, but are genuine and substantial so as to provide a natural and reasonable basis in the necessity or circumstances of the members of the classification to justify different legislation adapted to their peculiar conditions and needs; and
(3) the classification is germane or relevant to the purpose of the law; that is, there must be an evident connection between the distinctive needs peculiar to the class and the remedy or regulations therefor which the law purports to provide.
Schwartz, 295 Minn. at 362, 205 N.W.2d at 322.
. In footnote 6 of the majority opinion, the court points out that in Brugger, we found a rational basis for the disparate treatment of pre- and post-1973 support obligors. I concur in the rational basis analysis employed by the court in Brugger, but submit that that analysis falls far short of what the court rules today. As the extracted quote from Brugger in footnote 6 demonstrates, facts supporting a rational basis for holding a pre-1973 support obligor to his agreed upon bargain or court imposed obligation was that to do otherwise would not only affect that support obligation under a pre-1973 decree, but other rights and obligations incorporated into the decree and order as well. See Brugger, 303 Minn. at 494-95, 229 N.W.2d at 135-36. Following enactment of 1973 Minn. Laws, ch. 725, §§ 83 and 84, those same equities would usually not exist in dissolution decrees. But that sound rational basis analysis is inapplicable to the issue before us today. The grounds for increasing or decreasing support awards are identical for modification of pre-1973 or post-1973 support decrees. Application of the 1973 statute to deprive courts of jurisdiction to modify pre-1973 support decrees would "not unbalance the equities in prior divorce decrees." Resolution of the issue of modification rests upon grounds independent of other "intertwined * * * rights and obligations in divorce decrees." Brugger, 303 Minn. at 494, 229 N.W.2d at 135. Clearly courts have no jurisdiction to modify support orders in post-1973 decrees or orders after the child has reached 18. To hold those courts have jurisdiction to compel support obligors in pre-1973 decrees to pay additional support after the supported child gains majority results in unfair disparity bottomed oh no rational basis.