— This action was brought in the court below by appellees (Plaintiffs below) to obtain an injunction enjoining the appellants (Defendants below) from blocking a driveway with a gate or throwing rubbish into said driveway, or in any way interfering with the appellees’ use of said driveway.
Appellees allege in their complaint that said driveway is a way of necessity from the public alley to the back of their property, and that there is no other feasible method of getting from the public highway to the back of said property.
The court below found for the appellees and issued an injunction. From this judgment the appellant appeals, assigning as error the court below erred in overruling his motion for a new trial. The grounds stated therein is that the verdict was not sustained by sufficient evidence and was contrary to law.
The evidence discloses that appellants and appellees owned adjoining plots of real estate with improvements thereon; that appellants’ Plot No. 1, is forty-six feet (46') in width, and has for its south boundary line an alley; that appellees’ Plot No. 2, lies adjoining appellants’ Plot No. 1, on the north and has a width of thirty-nine and seven tenths feet (39 7/10'). Both properties front on LaSalle Street. The southern plot is bounded on the south by a twelve (12) foot alley running east and west terminating on the east at La-Salle Street. Both properties had very small back yards, and in the appellees’ (Plaintiffs’) back yard there was located a *244small garage, with the doors opening to the south, thereby making it mandatory to cross over appellants’ (Defendants’) back yard in order to use the garage for parking an automobile.
The evidence also indicates that both plots in question, in addition to some surrounding areas, were all previously owned by one Harry Borst, who had constructed and used the garage on Plot No. 2, for parking some time before his death in 1941. After his death, the trustees under his will, sold and transferred by warranty deed the south Plot No. 1, to one Smith in 1947, but no access or right of easement for the use of the garage was provided; and then, in 1948, it passed by sale to R. W. Hunt, who died leaving it to the appellants. In 1951, the appellees purchased Plot No. 2 from the trustee.
Between the time of Harry Borst’s death in 1941, and the time this suit was instituted, the garage had been used for parking, only by the appellant, who had rented it from Mrs. Borst about three months after the appellants had moved there. When the appellees moved into the residence on Plot No. 2, appellants unsuccessfully negotiated for rental of the garage from them. Shortly thereafter, the appellees began parking their automobile in the garage, using appellants’ back yard as a driveway.
The question presented for determination is whether a way by necessity existed for appellees to use appellants’ back yard as a driveway for ingress and egress to and from the garage.
There seemed to be some confusion on the trial level among the parties involved as to the concept of an implied easement by way of necessity. An early expression of this concept is found in Anderson v. Buchanan (1856), 8 Ind. 132, p. 133, where the court quoted from 3 Kent, pp. 420, 424, which says:
“Thus, if a man sells land to another which is wholly surrounded by his own land, in this case the purchaser is en*245titled to a right of way over the other’s ground to arrive at his own land.”
The court in its own words then added, “But necessity, not convenience, is the foundation of the right.” (Our Emphasis.)
There seemed to be some disagreement in Indiana, for a time, as to whether it is a question of strict necessity or one of only reasonable necessity. See Dudgeon v. Bronson (1909), 159 Ind. 562, 564, 64 N. E. 910; and Shandy v. Bell (1934), 207 Ind. 215, 222, 189 N. E. 627. In Shandy v. Bell, supra, the court in discussing what a reasonable necessity would require at Page 223, said:
“It is, however, the universal rule, in our judgment, that a reasonable necessity must be something more than convenient or beneficial. A mere convenience is not sufficient to create or convey a right or easement, or impose burdens on lands other than those granted, as incident to the grant. And a way of reasonable necessity must be more than convenient and beneficial, for if the owner of the land can me another way, he can not claim, by implication the right to pass over that of another to get to his own.” (Emphasis supplied).
However, in the case at bar, we need not concern ourselves with the question of strict versus reasonable necessity. The question presented for our determination is whether a necessity, if any, exists. We contend that the answer can be determined by looking to the case of Ritchey et al. v. Welsh (1898), 149 Ind. 214, 217, 48 N. E. 1031, where the court in speaking of right of ways by necessity stated:
“It is settled law that if one conveys a part of his land in such form as to deprive himself of access to the remainder, unless he goes across the land sold, he has a way of necessity over the portion conveyed. This is because the law presumes an understanding of the parties that the one selling a portion of his land shall have a legal right of access over the part sold to the remainder, if he cannot reach it in any other way. If the [the sic] part conveyed is in such form that the grantee cannot reach the same except over the *246part not conveyed, such grantee has a way of necessity thereto over the land of the grantor, not conveyed, for the reason that the law presumes that one would not sell his land to another without an understanding that the grantee should have a legal right of access thereto over the part not conveyed.” (Emphasis supplied).
It is a well reasoned rule that for a necessity to exist, there must be no other means of ingress and egress to the property in question. A right of way by necessity cannot apply to property which is already accessible to the landowner. To hold otherwise would be to hold that a right of way by necessity is determined by convenience or benefit to the land owner, and this would be clearly erroneous. See Shandy v. Bell, supra. Thus, in the case at hand, the appellee already had a method of ingress and egress, for his property fronted on LaSalle Street. It may be true that he had no ingress or egress for the use of his garage in the manner for which it had been designed, but this is not our concern. We are concerned only with the land as a whole, and not as to the use of a particular building located on the land.
We are of the opinion that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and said injunction dissolved.
Judgment reversed and the trial court directed to dissolve said injunction and free appellants from liability on the bond.
Hunter, J., and Mote, J., concur. Smith, C. J., concurs in result.