delivered the opinion of the court:
A decree of divorce was entered on June 22, 1965, in favor of the plaintiff-respondent-appellant herein, hereinafter referred to as respondent. The decree provided that die custody, education and control, of the four minor children be awarded to the mother, the plaintiff-respondent..
The maternal grandfather, John C. Setecka, since the entry of the decree, had for more than six years visited with said grandchildren with plaintiffs consent on an average of once a week as well as on birthdays and other special occasions. He had taken them to various sporting events and on vacations each year and overnight automobile trips out of the city. On January 25, 1972, plaintiff advised the grandfather that he could no longer see the grandchildren without expressing any reason therefor.
On May 24, 1972, said John Setecka presented a petition to intervene, seeking an order on the respondent to permit him to visit with and take out said minor grandchildren without any interference with respondent’s custodial right of said children. The respondent filed a motion seeking denial of leave to file said petition on the ground that petitioner had no legal standing to intervene and had not pleaded sufficient facts entitling him to the relief sought. The trial court, after a hearing, overruled the motion and allowed petitioner to intervene.
On June 27, 1972, respondent filed an answer alleging in substance that petitioner’s visitations have been injurious to her and the children and have interfered with her raising the children and disturbed the tranquility of her home and asked that the petition be dismissed and that an injunction be issued restraining petitioner from “harassing, annoying or bothering respondent or her children or otherwise interfering with the tranquility of her home.”
The father of the children advised the trial judge that he was desirous of having the children visit with their grandfather; that said visitations take place on a Sunday when the father had visitation rights; and that he would pick up the children at their mother’s home, take them to the grandfather and return them to their mother at the agreed time in the evening.
On September 27, 1972, the following agreed order was entered by the trial court:
“That parties shall continue to exercise the voluntary one Sunday per month visitation with petitioner as had been exercised since the last hearing, the same being exercised and allowed, without prejudice to parties’ respective positions.”
On December 6, 1972, the trial court entered the following order:
“It is hereby ordered that the grandfather of the minor children be permitted until further order of the court to visit with said minor children one Sunday each month in the same manner as such visitation has existed since June 27, 1972, by the parties and without prejudice.”
On July 30, 1973, respondent moved to vacate the court’s said order of December 6, 1972, alleging that petitioner had sole custody of the minor children. This motion came up for hearing on November 16, 1973. The trial court denied the respondent’s motion to vacate the order of December 6, 1972.
Plaintiff-appellant claims on appeal that the trial court erred in allowing petitioner to intervene and in granting him visitation rights in the absence of allegations in his petition and proof that respondent was an unfit parent and that other special circumstances exist warranting such relief.
We agree with the intervening petitioner that the law distinguishes between custody and visitation. The court has jurisdiction to determine visitation rights without a showing that a parent is unfit or that other special, extenuating circumstances exist. A parent has a paramount right to custody of minor children. The plaintiff-respondent-appellant in this appeal refers to section 132 of the Probate Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 3, par. 132). This section provides that “the court for good reason may award the custody and education of the minor to either parent, or to some other person.” (Emphasis added.) The Divorce Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 40, par. 19) provides:
“The court may, on application, from time to time, terminate or make such alterations in the allowance of alimony and maintenance, and the care, education, custody and support of the children, as shall appear reasonable and proper.” (Emphasis added.)
The relief sought here is visitation privilege. There are decisions in Illinois in which a grandparent has been awarded actual custody of a minor. The remedy in these cases is far more drastic than the remedy requested and granted by the trial court in the case at bar. The Illinois Supreme Comt in Giacopelli v. Florence Crittenton Home, 16 Ill.2d 556, 565, 158 N.E.2d 613, 618, where the child had been placed in the home of third parties, the Illinois Supreme Court denied custody to the parents of the child and stated:
“It is always recognized that a natural parent has a superior right to the custody of his child. That right, however, is not absolute and must yield to the best interest of the child. Such superior right only obtains when it is in accord with the best interest of the child. * * * The parent need not be shown to be totally unfit to rear the child in order to deny him the custody of the child. Fitness of the parent is only one of the factors to be considered in determining how the best interest of the child may be served. * * s”
In a very recent case of Boyles v. Boyles, 14 Ill.App.3d 602, the grandparents were granted visitation privileges. The court recognized here the distinction between custody and visitation and held that both rest in the court’s discretion. Said decision also recognized the inherent right of the court to modify visitation rights where it appears reasonable and proper and the child’s best interest makes it advisable. The court held:
“It is our opinion that the trial court erred in basing its decision on a rule which says grandparents are not entitled to visitation rights as a matter of law. While it is true that a natural parent is entitled to exclusive care and custody of his child [citations], we believe if circumstances warrant visitation, grandparents may be granted a right to visit their grandchild. (See Lucchesi v. Lucchesi, 330 Ill.App.506, 71 N.E.2d 920.) Recent decisions in the Illinois courts indicate that all matters concerning custody and also those concerning visitation rights must be governed by what is in the best interest of the child.” 14 Ill.App.3d 602, 604.
In the Lucchesi case mentioned above, the court recognized the grand-parental privilege of visitation by saying: “That the grandparents, under all of the circumstances shown in this record, should be denied any opportunity to visit the child at the home of respondent, the latter retaining the custody of the child, shocks our sense of justice.”
In our study of the cases where grandparents’ visitation rights were recognized we find that the grandparents were allowed more liberal visitation privileges than in the case at bar. Here the visitation was reduced from prior weekly visitation, which existed for some six years, to once a month and then during the time the children were with their father, so that not one single moment of their time with their mother was disturbed by the order.
The Illinois cases relied upon by the respondent pertained to custody of children. The instant case deals solely with the privilege of visitation. The efforts of the grandfather in the instant case reveal a love and affection for tire grandchildren without any interference with the custodial right of the mother. As a justification for cutting off the grandfather’s visitation privilege, the mother alleges conclusions that the grandfather’s visitations were injurious to her and the children and have interfered with her raising the children. Nowhere in the record is there any evidence of the grandfather’s interference with the mother of the children or any act of the grandfather which would be detrimental to the mother.
It is not necessary to show the mother in the instant case to be an unfit parent to allow the grandfather to visit the grandchildren. The mother also argues that “other special extenuating circumstances existed” which justified her denial of the visitation privileges. We believe that the grandfather’s efforts to visit the children actually is a special extenuating circumstance which can be beneficial to the children. The love and affection for the children by both the mother and grandfather is a fortunate circumstance benefiting the children.
The plaintiff-respondent finally argues that the trial court erred in allowing visitation rights to the grandfather without conducting an evidentiary hearing requiring the petitioner grandfather to sustain his burden of proving the allegations contained in his petition. An issue of fact was created by the intervening petition and the reply. No further hearing was requested by respondent to vacate the agreed order. The trial judge, who had been a capable lawyer in the field of family law, repeatedly stated that he would hear proof on the pending issue if respondent wished it. The trial judge stated: “But we all have to look towards what is best for the children. And it is in that connection that I’ll certainly allow you, if you want to, Mr. Haas [respondent’s attorney] to put on evidence that would indicate that for the best interest of the children, there should be an abridgement or suspension or termination or modification of the grandfather’s continuing visitation privileges with these youngsters. I’ll be glad to set that at a time that’s convenient.”
Counsel for the respondent admitted in open court that the trial judge gave the parties a full hearing as to the best interests of the children.
The judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
JOHNSON, J., concurs.