dissenting:
I respectfully dissent for three reasons: (1) the trial court erroneously denied McClellan, over objection, the opportunity to cross-examine Wayne Smith for bias after Smith had invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and thus erroneously denied the defense motion to strike Smith’s testimony; (2) as the majority agrees, the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor, over defense objection, to argue in closing that Ayanna Grant “had seen McClellan’s face and was afraid of retaliation since she could identify him as the shooter,” ante at 552; and (3) these errors were not harmless. I therefore would reverse and remand for a new trial.
I.
Before beginning cross-examination, defense counsel, out of the presence of the jury, asked Smith the following questions:
Q: Mr. Smith I’d like to ask you a bunch of questions about your whereabouts on September 5, 1991 when there was a ride-by shooting perpetrated outside of Dunbar High School. Will you answer those questions truthfully if I put them to you?
******
Q: Were you present with Leonard Cole on that day when Leonard Cole perpetrated a ride-by shooting at Dunbar High School?
Smith invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent and declined to answer both questions.
“The guaranteed opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses is an inherent component of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.” Scull v. United States, 564 A.2d 1161, 1164 (D.C.1989). This right to cross-examine, however, does not guarantee the defendant the right to any cross-examination the defendant requests. See id. In particular, when a witness asserts the privilege against self-incrimination, the trial court must weigh a defendant’s right to cross-examine the government witness against the witness’s Fifth Amendment privilege. See Johnson v. United States, 418 A.2d 136, 140 (D.C.1980). All parties agree that Smith properly asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege in this case. Appellant McClellan contends, however, that the trial court erred in allowing Smith to testify while denying the defense, over objection, the opportunity to cross-examine Smith on his potential bias against McClellan, and later in denying the defense motion to strike that testimony.
“Bias is always a proper subject of cross-examination, and the alleged bias or unreliability of a witness is never a collateral issue.” Scull, 564 A.2d at 1165 (citations omitted). Moreover, “[w]hen the alleged bias involves the chief government witness in a criminal case, as it does here, ‘[t]he opportunity to present evidence of bias becomes particularly important.’ ” Hollingsworth v. United States, 531 A.2d 973, 979 (D.C.1987) (quoting Benjamin v. United States, 453 A.2d 810, 811 (D.C.1982)). Furthermore, “a defendant is allowed greater scope in questioning a witness as to his bias and motive than with respect to his general credibility.” Johnson, 418 A.2d at 140.
McClellan sought to advance the theory that Smith, not Cole, had been responsible for the September 5, 1991, shooting at McClellan and his group. The defense, therefore, attempted to establish that McClellan did not have a motive to shoot at Cole. Additionally, and more importantly, McClellan wished to show that Smith had demonstrated his hatred of McClellan by *557shooting at him on September 5, 1991, and that this hatred had motivated Smith to accuse McClellan falsely of carrying out the September 12, 1991, shooting of Cole.1 McClellan therefore contended that the trial court’s ruling violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront Smith and elicit his bias.
The government disputes McClellan’s premise; it contends in its brief that the trial court’s ruling “did not preclude appellant from impeaching Smith’s credibility by specifically questioning him about his bias toward appellant or about any motive Smith may have had for wanting to kill Cole.” True: defense counsel could have asked Smith, “You hate McClellan, don’t you?” But without the possibility of the obvious followup question — “You shot at McClellan and tried to kill him on September 5, 1991, didn’t you?” — the initial question undoubtedly would be pointless given Smith’s likely denial. As the Supreme Court expressed in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1111, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (emphasis in original):
While counsel was permitted to ask Green whether he was biased, counsel was unable to make a record from which to argue why Green might have been biased or otherwise lacked that degree of impartiality expected of a witness at trial.... On these facts it seems clear to us that to make any such inquiry effective, defense counsel should have been permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.
Alternatively, the government argued at trial, and stresses again on appeal, that McClellan had other ways to demonstrate Smith’s bias. The government cites the trial court’s announcement to the jury that Smith was awaiting trial for the drive-by shooting on September 5, 1991, and had invoked his right to silence in connection with that shooting. This particular substitute for cross-examination does not serve the purpose. If McClellan could show that Smith very likely was guilty of the drive-by shooting, then McClellan would have a basis for arguing that the shooting reflected Smith’s hatred of McClellan, which had led Smith to testify falsely against McClellan in the death of Cole. But the fact of Smith’s indictment and upcoming trial could not be used to demonstrate his guilt. The court instructed the jury at the end of the case that an “indict-' ment is not evidence. It is merely a formal way of accusing a person of a crime in order to bring that person to trial. Do not consider the indictment as any evidence of the guilt of the defendant and do not draw any inference of guilt from it.” Although this instruction referred to the indictment of McClellan in this case, there is no reason to believe the jury would have — or properly could have— thought the indictment against Smith was to be treated any differently. Thus, the indictment could not be used to suggest that Smith’s hatred of McClellan was evidenced by a drive-by shooting.
At most, the fact of the indictment could be used to suggest that Smith was angry at McClellan because — presumably—McClellan or his confederates must have supplied information to the police that led to that indictment. This surely was a lesser basis than actual guilt of the drive-by shooting would be for imputing enough bias to Smith to suggest a willingness to perjure himself to “get” McClellan. Moreover, this lesser basis for bias is further weakened because the underlying assumption — McClellan’s involvement in the indictment process — is undermined to some extent by Smith’s voluntarily surrendering himself to the police, an action as consistent with claimed innocence as with admitted guilt. In sum, the indictment could not serve as a basis for demonstrating the kind of intense hatred of McClellan, reflecting bias, that the shooting itself would have reflected.
Nor can the fact that the government did not dispute McClellan’s theory that Smith had shot at McClellan on September 5 satisfy McClellan’s right to confront Smith. The prosecutor’s opening statement indicated that Smith and Cole were together during the September 5 shooting, but it did not *558indicate who the target was or whether Smith himself had shot at McClellan. Even if the opening statement had linked Smith to shooting McClellan, the prosecutor’s statements were not evidence and the jury was instructed to decide the case on the evidence presented, not on the statements of the lawyers. Just as a party cannot be forced to stipulate to a fact instead of presenting evidence to prove the fact, the -government’s position on the September 6 shooting cannot be used to prevent McClellan from electing to cross-examine Smith. See United States v. Washington, 227 U.S.App. D.C. 184, 193-94, 705 F.2d 489, 498-99 (1988) (“Stipulations as to testimony are frequently not as effective in communicating facts to the jury as in-eourt testimony, and the government has a large measure of, discretion in deciding to accept or reject an offer to stipulate”); JACK B. Weinstein et al„ Weinstein’s Evidenoe ¶403.04[3] (1997).
The government adds, however, that the defense had adequate opportunity to show Smith’s role in the September 5, 1991 drive-by shooting — and thus to expose his hatred of McClellan — through the testimony of Kar-lyles Spencer, who told the jury that Smith in fact had been the shooter. We previously rejected a similar argument. In Johnson, 418 A.2d at 139, the defendant sought to prove that the complaining witness, Martha Ellis, who testified that the defendant had robbed her, had fabricated her testimony in revenge for the defendant’s failure to pay for marijuana he had purchased from her. See id. At trial, “when defense counsel attempted to cross-examine [Ellis] along this line, the witness repeatedly invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination” and declined to answer. Id. at 141. After objecting to this limitation, Johnson tried to show such bias circumstantially by introducing photographs of marijuana growing in Ellis’s apartment and by questioning another witness, Milton Blue, who lived in the apartment with Ellis, about the alleged marijuana sales. See id. at 139. Blue “de-niéd ever engaging in a marijuana transaetion with appellant.” Id.2 This court held that Johnson did not have to settle for this second-best approach to proving bias, and we reversed Johnson’s conviction:
While appellant possessed, and fully exercised, a right to present extrinsic evidence in support of his theory, he also had an unquestioned right to develop his case through cross-examination of the government’s witnesses, for there could be nothing more basic to appellant’s attempt to demonstrate from her own testimony that Ms. Ellis did indeed have a very strong motive for being hostile towards and testifying against him. Without such evidence before' the jury, they would not be in possession of a sufficient amount of information concerning formative events to allow them to make a discriminating appraisal of the witness’ motive and bias.
Id. at 141 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized the power of confrontation, in contrast with indirect evidence; it has ruled that the Confrontation Clause protects the defendant’s opportunity to elicit the facts necessary to establish bias by actual cross-examination of adverse witnesses, not merely through evidence from third parties. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (“the focus of the Confrontation Clause is on individual witnesses”); Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 294, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (per curiam) (noting that Confrontation Clause right of effective cross-examination allows factfinder to assess reliability of testimony by observing “witness’s demeanor under cross-examination”); Davis, 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. at 1110 (“The opponent demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-examination, which cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers.”) (quoting 5 J. Wigmore, Evidenoe § 1395, at 123 (3d *559ed.1940)); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1076, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965) (“a primary interest secured by [the confrontation clause] is the right of cross-examination”).
The problem here is not that the defense was prevented from getting its bias theory before the jury, absent cross-examination of Smith about the September 5, 1991 drive-by shooting. Rather, the defect in this “alternative means of doing so” argument is, very simply, that the defense had no opportunity to confront the witness personally. When cross-examination is so limited, the jury has no opportunity to assess the reaction — the demeanor — of a key witness when that witness is confronted not only with an accusation of bias but also with the factual basis that supports the accusation. Although the trial court’s ruling did not prohibit the defense from asking Karlyles Spencer questions to establish the factual predicate for its bias theory (i.e., Smith shot at McClellan), Spencer would have had no basis for knowing Smith’s mental and emotional state and could not supply the reaction that Smith himself would convey if confronted directly with questions about the drive-by shooting. In sum, where the defense was precluded from exploring its bias theory through effective cross-examination of Smith himself, the trial court’s allowing McClellan to establish Smith’s bias through alternative means did not satisfy McClellan’s right to confront Smith. Cf. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 3163, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990) (Confrontation Clause purposes served by “physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and observation of demeanor by the trier of fact”); Jones v. United States, 441 A.2d 1004, 1006 (D.C.1982) (“The confrontation clause also gives defendants the right to have the jury observe the demeanor of witnesses against the accused.”).
The cases the government relies on for curtailing cross-examination are distinguishable from this case in significant respects. Some of them concerned limitations of the defendant’s cross-examination on purely collateral matters.3 In another, the cross-examination for bias was not substantially curtailed.4 In still another case, the defendant did not seek to cross-examine the witness for bias but, rather, sought only to introduce extrinsic evidence to impeach the witness’s *560testimony.5 The government, therefore, provides no sound basis for avoiding an inevitable result: the trial court erred in allowing Smith to testify while precluding McClellan from effectively, cross-examining Smith for bias. See Jenkins v. United States 617 A.2d 529, 532 (D.C.1992); Scull, 564 A.2d at 1166; Ford v. United States, 549 A.2d 1124, 1126 (D.C.1988); Johnson, 418 A.2d at 141,
The government potentially could have avoided the problem by bringing Smith to trial first so that he no longer retained a Fifth Amendment privilege at a later McClellan trial. I do not know what practical problems, if any, foreclosed this course of action.6 If they were insurmountable, the government retained the options to offer Smith a plea satisfactory to him or, failing that, to consider whether immunizing him was an acceptable price for obtaining his critical testimony in a murder case. But the government should not have the benefit of Smith’s key testimony, as the only eyewitness to the killing, without subjecting him to confrontation through cross-examination for bias; the government should not have been able to put Smith’s identification testimony before the jury unless the defense had an opportunity to question Smith about the apparent rivalry between Smith and McClellan — a rivalry that resulted in shootings by each group at the other a week apart, the latter causing death.
The trial court therefore erred, in my judgment, in limiting the defense to “alternative means” of eliciting the information McClellan could have sought through cross-examination of Wayne Smith.
II.
Because McClellan’s constitutional right to confrontation was abridged by cutting off an entire line of cross-examination for bias, Chapman’s harmless error test applies. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. at 1438; Jenkins, 617 A.2d at 532-34.7
Identification was the key issue in this case, and the government’s case was not exceptionally strong. Wayne Smith — whose testimony should have been disallowed or stricken — was the only witness who testified that he had been able to see McClellan’s face during the crime. Smith’s testimony, however, was substantially impeached by evidence of his indictment and upcoming trial for the September 5, 1991 drive-by shooting and by Karlyles Spencer’s testimony that Smith had been the one who shot at McClellan. As a consequence, the impeaching evidence mitigated, to some extent, the trial court’s constitutional error, since that evidence supplied at least some, of the information that cross-examination itself might have accomplished. Given, however, the. compelling legal precedent that “alternative means” of achieving the objects of cross-examination cannot be held sufficient because they are not likely to be as effective as personal confrontation, I cannot say these mitigating factors purged the court’s error of all significant harm. The erroneous, admission of Smith’s testimony without cross-examination for bias was still a serious minus for the defense and a corresponding plus for the government.
This negative impact on the defense cannot easily be dismissed as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because the government obtained the benefit of Smith’s unequivocal identification of McClellan as the shooter— when there was no. other identification evi*561dence of that quality — without the burden of defense counsel’s personal confrontation of Smith about his bias. The other government witnesses described what they could see of the person who shot Cole by referring only— and inconsistently with one another — to many different kinds of colored shirts, not to a face. There also was conflicting testimony about the color and caliber of the gun used in the shooting. And, a number of government witnesses were impeached with prior inconsistent statements, or by the admission of photographs of the crime scene tending to discredit their testimonies. In sum, Smith’s identification evidence was the government’s most direct, and thus most powerful, evidence of guilt that otherwise was far from clear. I must conclude, therefore, that the error in admitting Smith’s testimony without adequate cross-examination for bias was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
III.
Finally, I do not agree with my colleagues that the prosecutor’s “improper” argument— that “Grant had seen McClellan’s face and was afraid of retaliation since she could identify him as the shooter” — did “not ... inject[] reversible error into the proceeding.” Ante at 553.
As was true on very similar facts in Lewis v. United States, 541 A.2d 145, 147 (D.C.1988), “the prosecutor’s argument constituted a clear misstatement of the evidence and, as such, was [error].”
The defects in the government’s identification evidence against McClellan make the prosecutor’s improper reliance on the testimony about the Grant family’s fear of McClellan especially damaging. In its general instructions before the jury retired, the trial court did instruct the jury that the statements of counsel were not evidence, but “[e]urative judicial instructions ... do not always eradicate the harm.” Powell v. United States, 455 A.2d 405, 411 (D.C.1982). That general instruction was not a cure here. The trial court earlier had overruled defense counsel’s objection to the prosecutor’s erroneous argument that Ayanna Grant had seen the shooter’s — McClellan’s—face. The prosecutor then had elaborated upon the argument, impermissibly buttressing Grant s identification by contending that Grant’s fear and her move to North Carolina had prompted Grant to say, falsely, that she had not seen the shooter’s face, despite Grant’s undisputed testimony to the contrary. The prosecutor’s closing argument, therefore, was highly prejudicial in view of the government’s problematic case. The defense was hampered not only by the court’s restricting cross-examination for bias of the only eyewitness, Smith, but also by the court’s allowing the prosecutor to enhance Grant’s identification of McClellan by arguing that Grant had seen McClellan’s face.
Because I would reverse for the trial court’s constitutional error in refusing to strike Smith’s testimony, I need not evaluate whether the prosecutor’s misuse of the evidence in closing argument — standing alone— could have been nonconstitutional harmless error. For completeness of analysis, however, I do not hesitate to add my view that the error was not harmless; I cannot say the error did not “substantially sway” the verdict. Peoples v. United States, 640 A.2d 1047, 1056 (D.C.1994) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)).
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
. The prosecutor acknowledged before trial that “obviously the bias issue would be, 'Well, you shot at my client a week before, and now you are here testifying to get him in trouble again.' ”
. It is unclear whether Blue testified that he had never sold marijuana to Johnson (implying that the marijuana in the apartment belonged to Ellis and, thus, bolstering Johnson’s theory that Ellis’s testimony was biased), or that no one in the apartment had ever sold marijuana to Johnson (weakening Johnson's bias theory).
. See United States v. Lord, 711 F.2d 887, 892 (9th Cir.1983) (error to strike testimony where witness refused to provide names of cocaine suppliers she introduced to defendant); United States v. Humphrey, 696 F.2d 72, 75 (8th Cir.1982) cert. denied 459 U.S. 1222, 103 S.Ct. 1230, 75 L.Ed.2d 463 (1983) (no error in refusing to strike testimony when witness refused to answer questions related to other crimes that allegedly took place at time witness identified defendant); United States v. Nunez, 668 F.2d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir.1981) (single precluded question was "collateral to the matters raised on direct examination”); United States v. Gould, 536 F.2d 216, 222 (8th Cir.1976) ("If the witness’s refusal to testify merely precludes inquiry into an area relating to a collateral matter, such as the credibility of the witness, the defendant has suffered no prejudice and the witness’s other testimony may be admitted”); United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cir.) ("[w]here the privilege has been invoked as to purely collateral matters, there is little danger of prejudice to the defendant and, therefore, the witness's testimony may be used against him.”), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822, 84 S.Ct. 60, 11 L.Ed.2d 55 (1963).
. United States v. Viera, 819 F.2d 498 (5th Cir.1987), affirmed en banc, 839 F.2d 1113, 1114 (5th Cir.1988), is fundamentally distinguishable from the situation presented here. The trial court in Viera precluded defense counsel from exploring one particular line of bias cross-examination but allowed extensive cross-examination regarding a nearly identical bias theory, such that the bias at issue was effectively pursued. Viera was convicted of "conspiring to distribute cocaine and for aiding and abetting Ernest King, Jr. in completing the underlying substantive offense.” Id. at 499. At trial, defense counsel sought to establish that the government’s key witness, Ernest King, Jr., was biased because he had sought favorable treatment from prosecutors both in his upcoming sentencing for the drug offense underlying Viera’s case and in his prosecutions for two extraneous drug offenses. King invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege only with respect to the two drug offenses that were unrelated to Viera's case. Id. at 500. The trial court "permitted extensive cross-examination of King concerning both his plea bargain and his agreement that he would testify against appellant before being sentenced.” Id. at 502. Accordingly, because the trial court did not materially prevent effective cross-examination for the kind of bias the defendant sought to prove, the appellate court held that "the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting appellant’s cross-examination of King.” Id. at 502.
. See United States v. Brown, 634 F.2d 819, 824 (5th Cir.1981) (invocation of marital privilege precluded defendant from using wife's proffered testimony to impeach husband/witness).
. I cannot accept the majority’s implication that McClellan’s failure to seek a continuance until after Smith's trial, or to urge the government to grant Smith use immunity, somehow affected the strength of McClellan's argument. It is not the defendant’s responsibility to tell the government how to sequence its trials or whom to immunize; it is the government’s responsibility to make thpse decisions and to accept the consequences that flow therefrom.
. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). In contrast, ”[w]hen this court determines that the cross-examination allowed was consistent with the defendant's sixth amendment right to confront the witnesses against him [or her], we will focus on the scope of cross-examination allowed, and will not reverse the trial court’s determination absent an abuse of discretion.” Beard v. United States, 535 A.2d 1373, 1379 (D.C.1988).