dissenting:
What distinguishes this case from the cases relied upon by the majority is that this is a bench trial as opposed to a jury trial. There is no jury at a bench trial — the trial judge is the finder of fact. In the instant case, the record clearly indicates that the defendant was admonished of the “nature of charges and possible penalties” by the trial court. Therefore he was well aware of the possibility of being sentenced to an extended term upon a finding of exceptionally brutal and heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. Furthermore, the defendant voluntarily waived his right to have the charges tried by a jury and elected to have a bench trial. At a bench trial, we presume that the trial judge applied the law correctly. People v. Pearson, 324 Ill. App. 3d 622 (2001).
For purposes of this case, we must therefore presume the trial court found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the crime was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. Indeed, the court said, “Pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5— 5 — 3.2(b)(2) [(West 1998)], the [c]ourt finds that the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.” Accordingly, as I do not believe that the Apprendi safeguards were violated in the instant case (Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,147 L. Ed. 2d 435,120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000)), I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the defendant’s extended-term sentence.