concurring:
I concur with the majority’s decision. I write separately, however, in order to express my concern regarding the conclusion of the majority that the Commonwealth Court should not substitute its judgment for that of the PUC when substantial evidence supports the PUC’s decision on a matter within the commission’s expertise and in order to, once again, more particularly set forth the underlying requirements for scrutinizing matters such as these while utilizing a substantial evidence standard of review.
My Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Bowman v. Department of Environmental Resources, 549 Pa. 65, 700 A.2d 427 (1997), which was joined by Mr. Justice Castille, explained that the Commonwealth Court’s function, as a reviewing appellate court, does not end once the Commonwealth Court finds a single, substantive item of evidence that supports the commission’s decision. The Commonwealth Court’s review, pursuant to 2 Pa.C.S. § 704, is not limited to giving a “rubber stamp” affirmance of the tribunal below. Rather, the Commonwealth Court is required to review the entire record, including the evidence which was at the heart of the agency’s decision. When the record as a whole contains substantial evidence which supports the commission’s decision, the Commonwealth Court should affirm. See Peak v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 509 Pa. 267, *466274, 501 A.2d 1383, 1387 (1985). In conducting its review of the record as a whole, and assessing whether substantial evidence to support the commission’s decision exists, the Commonwealth Court is not compelled to affirm the agency decision simply because there is some evidence in the record which supports the commission’s decision, especially in an instance where the commission did not address important countervailing evidence which was before it. In such a situation, the Commonwealth Court’s remand of the matter to the commission to address the important countervailing evidence is necessary so that meaningful appellate review can occur. As I emphasized in Bowman,
An agency opinion needs to contain sufficiently detailed findings of fact, together with a coherent legal discussion, so that the Commonwealth Court can perform a meaningful review. Any less would frustrate the legislative intent, in addition to providing agency panels with a means of nullifying the effect of legislation, because it would enable an agency to shield its decisions from review by drafting opinions in generalized and conclusory terms.
Bowman, 700 A.2d at 431.
In Bowman, because it was not apparent from the Commission’s adjudication why particular evidence was significant, I stated my belief that a remand to the Civil Service Commission was appropriate.
In contrast, the PUC’s adjudication in the case presently before us set forth the evidence from the record and the rationale relied upon by the commission in rendering its adjudication. I agree with the majority that the Commonwealth Court, in vacating the price stability mechanism and remanding for recalculation including an input price differential, improperly substituted its judgment for that of the commission. Moreover, I agree with the majority that the Commonwealth Court erred in reversing or vacating the PUC’s classifications of services as competitive without a prior determination that competitive safeguards are in place. Finally, I agree that the Commonwealth Court’s holding, that the PUC failed to make the required statutory findings for each of the *467six services prior to their classification as competitive, was erroneous. As the majority states, the PUC made the necessary findings, by implicitly accepting Bell’s position with regard to each of the services, and by incorporating by reference the findings made by the administrative law judges below and adopting as its findings the detailed position of particular parties. The problem raised in Bowman, regarding gaps in an adjudication preventing effective review, is not present here, since, as the majority points out, the necessary findings were made by the PUC to allow effective review.
I therefore respectfully concur with the majority opinion.
CASTILLE, J., joins this Concurring Opinion.