concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with the holding that the defendant’s convictions of burglary and retail theft should be affirmed. Also, I agree with the reasoning for reducing the defendant’s concurrent sentence for retail theft to a term of five years. As a result, I concur with those portions of the opinion.
However, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the defendant’s sentence for burglary must be reduced to a term of seven years. Nor do I find that it was error to impose a Class X sentence for burglary under section 5 — 5—3(c)(8) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5 — 5—3(c)(8) (West 1992)).
My analysis does not lead me to the conclusion that the State was required by section 111 — 3(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/111 — 3(c) (West 1992)) to state its intent to seek an enhanced sentence in the charging instrument.
The First District Appellate Court has decided this very issue in six recent opinions. In People v. Newell (1994), 259 Ill. App. 3d 819, 632 N.E.2d 244, People v. Murphy (1994), 258 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 630 N.E.2d 1257, People v. Harris (1994), 259 Ill. App. 3d 106, 630 N.E.2d 1047, People v. Cole (1993), 256 Ill. App. 3d 1, 628 N.E.2d 713, People v. Jameson (1993), 252 Ill. App. 3d 604, 626 N.E.2d 230, appeal allowed (1994), 154 Ill. 2d 565, 629 N.E.2d 56, and People v. Contreras (1993), 241 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 609 N.E.2d 949, the first district held that section 111 — 3(c) is not applicable when a defendant is given an enhanced sentence pursuant to section 5 — 5—3(c)(8). The court in Cole explained:
"[Section 111 — 3(c)] applies to those situations where the enhanced Class X sentence is triggered by defendant’s prior conviction, and the class of the offense is increased to a higher classification. Where the sentence, but not the classification of the offense, is enhanced by defendant’s prior convictions, there is no statutory requirement that the State notify defendant of its intention to seek an enhanced penalty.” (Emphasis added.) Cole, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 5-6, 628 N.E.2d at 716-17.
Section 5 — 5—3(c)(8) provides that a "defendant shall be sentenced as a Class X offender” because of the previous convictions. (Emphasis added.) (730 ILCS 5/5 — 5—3(c)(8) (West 1992).) Based upon this language, I agree with the first district’s analysis that the classification of the offense does not change because of the previous convictions. It is only the sentence which is enhanced by the previous convictions. As noted by the first district, the language of section 111 — 3(c) explicitly excludes situations where the sentence is increased because of a prior conviction, but the classification of the offense remains the same. Newell, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 824, 632 N.E.2d at 248; Harris, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 111-12, 630 N.E.2d at 1050-51; Contreras, 241 Ill. App. 3d at 1023, 609 N.E.2d at 950.
For the reasons indicated, I agree with the recent decisions of the first district and would affirm the Class X sentence. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which reduces the defendant’s sentence for burglary to a term of seven years’ imprisonment.