concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the conclusion that respondent, Nelson Kandel (Kandel), violated DR 5-103(B) but not for the reason emphasized by the majority. It is unnecessary in this case to hold that “[t]he advancement of funds for medical treatment, or for transportation to a medical office for treatment, is a violation of DR 5-103(B).” 317 Md. at 279, 563 A.2d at 389. All of Kandel’s exceptions challenge fact-findings by Judge Gordy, but those fact-findings are not clearly erroneous. Nor is Judge Gordy’s conclusion that Kandel was advancing funds for Prescimone’s living expenses, predicated on a legal conclusion which gave an erroneously narrow meaning to “expenses of litigation,” within the meaning of DR 5-103(B). This is made abundantly clear by Judge Gordy’s finding concerning the cumulative effect of the evidence.
“The extant pattern was very simple factually: Client would approach Respondent and on each occasion proclaim poverty and request financial assistance. Respondent’s response on each and every occasion, regardless of the surrounding circumstances, was to arbitrarily and capriciously set an amount and give money (cash or personal business check) spontaneously to Client. The pattern exposes financial advances from Respondent to Client that are but ‘thinly veiled’ living expenses, as divulged from the total and complete facts, existing throughout the period complained of.
“I find from clear and convincing evidence that these eight (8) advances from Respondent to Client were in fact for living expenses.”
Because there is no need to decide the instant matter on that narrow construction of DR 5-103(B), I would leave the construction issue for some other case in which the issue must be faced squarely.
Further, I dissent from the sanction. Inasmuch as there is a pattern of eight loans made for living expenses over the course of two separate cases, I believe these violations warrant more than a reprimand. Recognizing that the *284instant matter does not involve additional violations of other types, cf Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, 310 Md. 197, 528 A.2d 895 (1987), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1020, 98 L.Ed.2d 985 (1988) (six month suspension imposed for violation of several disciplinary rules), and giving due regard to Kandel’s many years of practice untainted by any disciplinary violations, I would suspend Kandel for thirty days.
McAULIFFE and ADKINS, JJ., have authorized me to state that they join in this concurring and dissenting opinion.