concurring.
I join in majority’s disposition of both Babich’s claim for a new trial on damages and the contentions of cross-appellant, Indiana Refrigerator Lines.
I also agree that the trial court properly disallowed Babich's Petition for delay damages. Although Indiana had tendered no written offer of settlement, the trial court found that Babich had caused the delay of the trial by erroneously and belatedly seeking relief from the stay imposed after Indiana had declared bankruptcy. The trial court also concluded that Babich had further impeded the progress of the litigation towards trial when he delayed placing the case at issue. The trial court makes this analysis based upon its interpretation of Craig v. Magee Memorial Rehabilitation Center, 512 Pa. 60, 515 A.2d 1350 (1986).
I note that the same result would obtain under new Pa.R.C.P. 238, promulgated on November 7, 1988. The new Rule provides that calculation of delay damages shall be for the period of time after which a defendant has made a written offer of settlement that exceeds the ultimate verdict by more than one hundred twenty-five percent or during which plaintiff caused the delay of the trial. Pa.R.C.P. 238(b)(1), (2). Here, Indiana failed to make a written offer of settlement, but the trial court found, quite properly, that the responsibility for delay damages had been mitigated by *490Babich’s conduct in impeding the progress of the case towards trial.
Moreover, the majority correctly concludes that an evidentiary hearing on Babich’s Petition for delay damages is not mandatory either under Craig or under new Pa.R.C.P. 238(c)(1). The new Rule leaves to the court’s discretion the holding of a hearing on the Petition.