dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion for three reasons: (1) The result reached by the Court of Industrial Relations, hereinafter designated CIR, is contrary to the substantial weight of the evidence; (2) the fragmentation of bargaining units among public employees of the State of Nebraska is contrary to the public policy of our state labor law as set forth in the provisions of section 48-802, R. R. S. 1943; and (3) department chairmen should be excluded from any bargaining unit organized to represent the academic employees of the Board of Regents.
Two predominant public policies lie at the heart of Nebraska’s public sector labor law. These are the protection of the public interest in assuring the continuous operation and efficiency of governmental services, and providing public employees with a meaningful avenue through which they may negotiate wages, hours, and conditions of employment.
The majority opinion ignores the first of these problems by permitting undue fragmentation of the bargaining unit. Not only may every professional college — Law, Dentistry, Medicine, Teachers, Engineering, Pharmacy, Agriculture, etc., have its own bargaining unit, but other groups within the state University system may do likewise. The record indicates the Law College faculty numbers 18 and the Dental College faculty 52, exclusive of the Deans.
As Doctor Weinberg, Board’s expert, testified, and as many of the commentators suggest, fragmentation leads directly to development of expensive and administratively unmanageable bargaining structures and to increased administrative costs once an agreement is reached. It fosters proliferation of personnel necessary to bargain and administer contracts on both sides of the bargaining table. It destroys the ability of public institutions such as the University to develop, administer, and maintain any semblance of uniformity or coordination in their employment poli*274cies and practices. In the long run, it results in an inefficient, ineffective, and unworkable relationship for all parties concerned. Its ultimate effect is to substitute litigation for negotiation as the principal dispute-resolving process in the public sector. In effect, it defeats the purpose of Nebraska’s public sector labor law.
Shaw & Clark, in their article on Determination of Appropriate Bargaining Units in the Public Sector, Legal and Practiced Problems, 51 Ore. L. Rev. 152, epitomize the problem as follows: “The more bargaining units public management deals with, the greater the chance that competing unions will be able to whipsaw the employer. Moreover, a multiplicity of bargaining units make it difficult, if not impossible to maintain some semblance of uniformity in benefits and working conditions. Unfortunately, in many states and localities bargaining units have been established without consideration of the effect such units will have on negotiations or on the subsequent administration of an agreement. The resulting crazy-quilt pattern of representation has unduly complicated the collective bargaining process in the public sector.”
We last considered the proper scope and composition of bargaining units in the public sector in City of Grand Island v. American Federation of S. C. & M. Employees, 186 Neb. 711, 185 N. W. 2d 860 (1971). In 1972, following that decision, the Legislature passed L.B. 1228. That bill, which became effective in July 1972, made two very important changes in Nebraska’s labor law. First, it articulated an express legislative policy against fragmentation of bargaining units in the public sector of this state; and, second, it codified the criteria which were to be taken into account in resolving unit determination questions.
Further, City of Grand Island v. American Federation of S. C. & M. Employees, supra, delienated what I insist is the proper method of review in this case. We *275there said: “The review in the Supreme Court of proceedings before the Court of Industrial Relations is in the manner provided by law for equity cases.” See § 48-812, R. R. S. 1943. “We are required to reach an independent conclusion as to disputed issues of fact. § 25-1925, R. R. S. 1943.”
It is significant that in adopting section 48-838, R. S. Supp., 1974, the Legislature did not allude to an appropriate bargaining unit as did this court in City of Grand Island v. American Federation of S. C. & M. Employees, supra. To the contrary, the statute reads: “The court shall certify the exclusive collective bargaining agent of employees affected by sections 48-801 to 48-823 * * *.” (Italics supplied.)
In adopting L.B. 1228, the Legislature specifically incorporated a policy against fragmentation by providing: “It shall be presumed in the case of governmental subdivisions such as municipalities, counties, power districts, or utility districts with no previous history of collective bargaining, that units of employees of less than departmental size shall not be appropriate.” § 48-838(2), R. S. Supp., 1974.
It is not necessary to guess at the intent of the Legislature on the issue of fragmentation. The comments before the committee and on the legislative floor adequately portray the desire to avoid it. An attorney representing public employees testified: “Of the attorneys involved in preparing this bill, they represented both sides of the cases that have been before the. court. They represented government bodies as well as unions and associations and they all agreed that broad industrial type bargaining units are advantageous for the public employer, and that there is no purpose served in fragmenting units.”
Finally, the international representative for the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers specifically stated: “LB 1228 provides that the Court of Industrial Relations shall determine what is a proper unit for the purposes of collective bargaining and for *276the purposes of voting in collective bargaining elections, and provide some ground rules for the Court to use in making such determinations. The proper determination of a bargaining unit is important to both parties in a collective bargaining arrangement, because it adds to stability to the relationship between the employees and their employers. It provides first, that the employer can deal with the employees with a common interest to one representative, and secondly, it frees the employer from having to deal with a number of collective bargaining agents each representing a small segment of its employees.”
Inexplicably, the CIR has failed to follow its own prior finding in a case involving University of Nebraska employees, specifically recognizing the statutory policy against fragmentation in the public sector. In his opinion in IBEW v. State, 3 CIR 133/134 (1975), Judge Dean Kratz specifically found as follows: “Respondent also argues that L.B. 1228 effectuated a clear policy against proliferation of bargaining units in public employment in the State of Nebraska and that the creation of units proposed by the Petitioner would be violative of the legislative pronounced policy against proliferation of bargaining units in the public sector and would irrevocably interfere with the public interest of assuring the economic continuity of governmental service.
“We agree that LB 1228 was precipitated by a desire to avoid fragmented bargaining units.”
The CIR made a number of factual findings which were crucial to its determination herein. These findings are in some cases not supported by any evidence in the record whatsoever and in a large part appear to be based on the hearing judge’s mistaken intuitive assessment rather than on the testimony and documentation adduced at the hearing.
Specifically, on page 4 of the order, the CIR found the University of Nebraska labor policy on unit determination to be based on outdated legal prece*277dents. There was substantial testimony that the University of Nebraska has a system-wide labor relations policy, administered by a single individual in the Central Administration. Yet, there is no direct evidence in the record whatsoever to support the CIR’s finding.
Similarly, there is no evidence supporting the CIR’s determination on page 5 of the order relative to the dues check-off question or its finding in paragraph 9 on page 6 of the order that the faculty of the University of Nebraska Lincoln still tends to regard the University of Nebraska at Omaha as a stepchild. Not only are these fact findings without basis in the record, they are of dubious relevance to the unit determination question herein, and indicative of a prior bias.
I take exception to the CIR’s factual determinations because they wholly overlook the uncontroverted testimony of the Board’s witnesses which established that the University of Nebraska is a highly integrated statewide University system which employs academic staff who, subject to the highly centralized direction and control of the Board and the Central Administration, enjoy substantial identity in wages, fringe benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment.
The CIR finds on page 5, paragraph 3 of its opinion, that hiring, firing, tenure, and employment condition decisions are made at the department or college level rather than at the system-wide level. This is wrong. In fact, the evidence below clearly establishes that these decisions are made by the Board of Regents on a system-wide basis pursuant to uniformly established and centrally administered board policies. Apparently, the CIR has taken the delegation of certain supervisory and administrative duties to the various campuses and their respective colleges, schools, and departments to be a carte blanche grant of autonomy or abdication of author*278ity by the Board of Regents and the Central Administration. Certainly, nothing could be further from reality.
In paragraph 7, on page 6 of its order, the CIR found that the University of Nebraska Lincoln campus is predominately the doctorate and postdoctorate locale, while the University of Nebraska at Omaha campus has little doctoral emphasis. The finding emphasizes doctoral studies but overlooks entirely the relationship between the two campuses and their emphasis on graduate studies as a whole. Doctor Steven B. Sample testified in terms of both credit hours and student enrollment: “There is a parity of graduate students between the Lincoln campus and the Omaha campus.” Further, the CIR wholly failed to consider the fact that the graduate college of the University of Nebraska, which supervises all graduate studies including the doctoral and postdoctoral studies, is a campus-wide college and not limited to any single campus.
Finally, I note that although the CIR specifically finds in its opinion that there is little interchange or integration among the campuses, the record itself shows that there is a high degree of administrative and functional integration and substantial interchange in the common missions, common administration structures, common academic calendar and composition and structure, common budgetary planning, University-wide accreditation, common labor relation policies, common affirmative action, and central accounting and payroll programs. Further, the campuses are integrated through a number of duplicated programs, intercampus programs, University-wide councils and committees, a University-wide graduate college, and a substantial identity of employment practices. It is apparent to me that the findings of the CIR are not supported by the record.
The CIR has completely ignored other facts which are highly relevant herein. It failed to recognize the *279common and centrally administrative and academic structure of the University. It has overlooked centralized control of curriculum and budgetary planning. It has largely ignored the University’s uniform employment classification system, employment contract procedures, evaluation procedures, and uniform standards for promotion, tenure, and merit pay.
As the Board suggests, even more significantly, the CIR has not even mentioned the fact that all the Board’s academic employees enjoy a common centrally controlled wage policy, and have identical fringe benefit programs. They enjoy the same terms and conditions of employment in the following areas: Vacation policies; salary determination; professional leave policies; outside employment policies; patent policies and political activity policies ; and conflict of interest policies.
I do not accept the conclusions and findings of the CIR. If this court puts its stamp of approval on the findings of the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, it is abdicating its authority as a court of last resort and is in effect giving that authority to the Court of Industrial Relations.
The Board has directed our attention to several state university cases which support its position. The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Minnesota State College Board v. Public Emp. Rel. Board, 303 Minn. 453, 228 N. W. 2d 551 (1975), affirmed a holding that the appropriate geographical scope of a bargaining unit for faculty employed at seven state colleges was a statewide bargaining unit. In that case, unlike the instant one, there were local adaptations, different programs, local constitutions, grievance procedures, and local administrative policies on each of the college campuses. Also, the president of each state college had the apparent authority to recruit, appoint, retain, remove, sanction, grant salary increases, tenure, and promotions to and define the *280duties of all persons employed by the college. The Minnesota court overlooked these factors and pointed to the existence of the state college board as a single employer with centralized budgetary and academic planning functions, and held that a statewide planning unit was appropriate.
In Board of Regents of Eastern Michigan University v. Eastern Michigan U., 46 Mich. App. 534, 208 N. W. 2d 641 (1973), the Michigan court noted that the objective to be obtained in unit determination was to constitute the largest possible unit consistent with the community of interest of the membership. Michigan has never split faculty units by campus or location, but has consistently held in favor of system-wide faculty units.
In Pennsylvania State University, P. L. R. B., case No. PERA-R-801-C (1973), the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board refused to find a unit of academic employees limited in scope to only 1 of the 18 branch campuses appropriate, on the basis that such a decision would result in overfragmentation and would make integrated operation of the university impossible.
Similarly, in State University of New Jersey, P. E. R. C., cases Nos. RO-210 and RO-221 (1973), the New Jersey Commission reversed an earlier stand assumed in 1969, and determined that a statewide unit encompassing all academic employees of New Jersey’s various state colleges was an appropriate bargaining unit.
In State University of New York, P. E. R. B., cases Nos. C-0253, C-0260, C-0262, C-0263, C-0264, and C-0351 (1969), the New York Public Relations Board refused to establish separate bargaining units for the State University of New York although it consisted of 4 university centers, 11 4-year colleges, 2 medical centers, a college of forestry at Syracuse, and Green College at Fort Schuyler, 4 contract colleges at Cornell, a college of ceramics at Alfred Uni*281versity, 6 2-year agricultural and technical colleges, and 31 community colleges.
Two of the cases relied on by the Court of Industrial Relations — Oregon State Employees Assn., cases Nos. C-277, C-319, C-326, C-375, and C-230 (1974), and In re Kansas State College of Pittsburgh, P. E. R. B., case No. UE2-1974 (1974), do not lend support to the decision. Both these cases are distinguishable by their facts, and the Oregon case is distinguishable on the basis of the law on which it is based.
The decision herein should be based on our own act. I have set out the Board’s authorities merely to show how other states have met the problem. In my judgment, the bargaining units established by CIR are not appropriate, either in scope or composition. I believe the intent of L. B. 1228 (section 48-838, R. S. Supp., 1974), mandates a multi-campus bargaining unit, encompassing all academic employees, regardless of their physical location. At the very least, there definitely should not be any fragmentation on any campus.
Individuals holding the position of department chairmen are appointed by the Board of Regents and not elected by the faculty. They receive additional compensation for their administrative duties. In actual performance of management functions, the evidence indicates they are responsible within their departments for class scheduling, class assignments, review and approval of individual class content, and faculty evaluations. They are the individuals who recommend appointments, promotions, grants of tenure, nonrenewal of contracts, terminations, and merit salary increases. As one of petitioner’s witnesses testified, chairmen are responsive to the needs and desires of the faculty within their departments, but when the decision has to be made, the department chairman has to make a decision. “That’s what leadership is all about.”
*282Historically, in the private sector, supervisors have been considered a part of management. The National Labor Relations Act specifically provides: “* * * no employer subject to the act shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees * * *.” N. L. R. A., § 14a, 29 U. S. C., § 164a (1970 Ed.). It seems to me this is even more important in the public sector. I agree with the position of the Board of Regents that department chairmen are not representatives of the faculty but are in effect administrative management personnel.
I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Industrial Relations for each of the three reasons delineated above.
White, C. J., and Newton, J., join in this dissent.