(concurring). I agree with the majority’s treatment of all issues save their analysis of People v Lovett, 396 Mich 101; 238 NW2d 44 (1976), and the question whether People v Ora Jones, 395 Mich 379; 236 NW2d 461 (1975), should be applied retroactively. In any event, a reversal is not required since the record suggests that defendant made no more than "a mere request for an instruction on lesser included offenses” without specifying the particular lesser-offense instruction he desired. People v Herbert Smith, 396 Mich 362, 364; 240 NW2d 245 (1976).
Assuming, however, that defendant would have requested instructions on specific, necessarily included, lesser offenses of armed robbery had not the lower court refused to instruct on any lesser *458offenses, I believe People v Lovett, supra, would mandate a reversal. In Lovett, without acknowledging that it was applying Ora Jones, supra, retroactively, the Supreme Court did just that, People v Harrison, 71 Mich App 226, 228; 247 NW2d 360 (1976), and reversed a conviction because the trial judge refused defense counsel’s request to charge the jury on attempted armed robbery.
In the present case, the majority is appalled, as am I, by the practical effect of Lovett, that is, the reversal of a conviction based on the trial court’s refusal to instruct on specifically requested lesser offenses, even though applicable precedent, People v Kolodzieski, 237 Mich 654; 212 NW 958 (1927), would permit the refusal. Despite my reluctance to apply Lovett to the instant case, I cannot accept the majority’s rationale for distinguishing it:
"[T]he Supreme Court in Lovett did not address the retroactivity question since it failed to mention that the trial occurred before the decision in Ora Jones or Chamblis. Indeed, Lovett * * * so clearly represented a retroactive situation, that the failure to mention retro-activity suggests to us the Court may have based its decision on the statute on attempts. ”
To cast aside MCLA 768.32; MSA 28.1055 by labeling it as the "statute on attempts” is to ignore all but its final clause and to disregard precedents which accord it a wider scope:
"[T]he statute allowing conviction for lesser included offenses (now MCLA 768.32; MSA 28.1055) 'must * * * be construed as extending to all cases in which the statute has substantially, or in effect, recognized and provided for the punishment of offenses of different grades or degrees of enormity, wherever the charge for the higher grade includes a charge for the less’.” People *459v Chamblis, 395 Mich 408, 415-416; 236 NW2d 473 (1975), quoting Hanna v People, 19 Mich 316, 322 (1869).
In Chamblis, a companion case to Ora Jones, supra, the Court, holding it reversibly erroneous to refuse a requested charge on lesser included offenses which are supported by the evidence, adopted the following test:
"In determining whether the instruction should be given, the trial court should consider whether, if the defendant had been originally charged only on the lesser offense, the evidence adduced at trial would have supported a guilty verdict on that charge. If it would have, the requested instruction must be given.” 395 Mich at 423. (Emphasis added.)
Despite the clear mandate of Chamblis and its ready application to the facts at bar, the majority declines to adopt it by suggesting that Ora Jones, Chamblis and Lovett, supra, "are not necessarily controlling, even if retroactive, in an alibi situation”. I submit, however, that the alibi makes not a whit of difference. Since the evidence adduced below would have supported the lesser charge of unarmed robbery, of larceny, or of any other necessarily included, lesser offense, the trial judge was obliged to so charge upon proper request.
The instant case, moreover, plainly differs from People v Netzel, 295 Mich 353; 294 NW 708 (1940), upon which the majority relies. In Netzel, the Court justified an all-or-nothing verdict (i.e., either guilty of assault with a deadly weapon or not guilty) because the defendant freely admitted possession of firearms:
"Under the * * * testimony given by defendant, if he committed any assault in violation of law, he commit*460ted it while armed with a dangerous weapon.” 295 Mich at 359.
This is to be distinguished from a situation where, as in the case at bar, the evidence conflicts, for then it is "clearly a question of fact for the jury * * * as to which of the * * * [possible] offenses, if any, was established beyond a reasonable doubt”. Id, at 358.
The Supreme Court expressed a similar sentiment in Chamblis, supra:
” ’The requirement of instructions on lesser included offenses is based on the elementary principle that the court should instruct the jury on every material question. * * * The state has no interest in a defendant obtaining an acquittal where he is innocent of the primary offense charged but guilty of a necessarily included offense. Nor has the state any legitimate interest in obtaining a conviction of the offense charged where the jury entertains a reasonable doubt of guilt of the charged offense but returns a verdict of guilty of that offense solely because the jury is unwilling to acquit where it is satisfied that the defendant has been guilty of wrongful conduct constituting a necessarily included offense. Likewise, a defendant has no legitimate interest in compelling the jury to adopt an all or nothing approach to the issue of guilt. Our courts are not gambling halls but forums for the discovery of truth. ’ ” 395 Mich at 417, quoting People v St Martin, 1 Cal 3d 524, 533; 83 Cal Rptr 166, 170; 463 P2d 390, 394 (1970). (Emphasis added.)
While I believe, that Lovett, supra, compels retroactive application of Ora Jones, supra, and logically, of Chamblis, supra, as well, I do not by my grudging application of those cases condone a practice whereby new rules are forged by indirection. Certainty and uniformity, two basic goals of our legal system, are not advanced by de facto retroactivity. Ours is a de jure system, and the Supreme *461Court has a duty of clear statement. Const 1963, art 6, § 6 ("Decisions of the supreme court * * * shall be in writing and shall contain a concise statement of the * * * reasons for each decision”.)
Obviously, when it so chooses, the Supreme Court can produce a well reasoned discourse on retroactivity. See, e.g., People v Rich, 397 Mich 399; 245 NW2d 24 (1976). If, under Rich, "the general reliance on the old rule * * * [and] the effect of retroactive application of the new rule on the administration of justice” are "key factors”, 397 Mich at 403, then it is incumbent upon the Court to acknowledge and address the myriad problems engendered by Ora Jones and its progeny1_
The Supreme Court’s most recent, yet meager, effort in People v Lank Thomas, 399 Mich 826; 249 NW2d 867 (1977), reversing in part People v Thomas, 68 Mich App 302; 242 NW2d 564 (1976), satisfies neither the spirit of Const 1963, art 6, § 6, nor the Court’s general obligation to explain and reconcile the law for bench, bar and populace.